PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XI. No. 42. APRIL 1936

THE PLACE OF MYTH IN PHILOSOPHY

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MY subject is the place of myth in philosophy, not in religion. If I were dealing with the philosophy of religion, I should, of course, have much to say on the place of myth in theology; and what I have to say may have some bearing on this subject; but I am not dealing with particular dogmas of Christianity or of any other religion. My thesis is that when the mind communes with the world of values its natural and inevitable language is the language of poetry, symbol, and myth. And, further, that philosophy has to deal with a number of irreducible surds which cannot be rationalized. They must be accepted as given material for reason to work upon. For example, we do not know why there is a world; we cannot unify the world of what we call facts and the world of values; there are antinomies in space and time which do not seem to disappear when we put a hyphen between them. Our reason—some would say reason itself—has reached its limits. We are driven to mythologize, confessing that we have left the realm of scientific fact. We give rein to the imagination, not exactly claiming with Wordsworth that it is reason in her most exalted mood, but hoping that the creative imagination may reveal to us some of the real meaning of questions which we cannot answer.

This might serve as a statement of the kind of way in which Plato uses the myth. But under the influence of modern irrationalism, and of the biological approach to philosophy, Goethe's words, "all that is transitory is only a symbol," have received an extension which he never intended. Just as Freud regards dreaming as the fiction which helps us to sleep, so thinking, we are now told, is the fiction which helps us to live. Vaihinger's strange book *Als Ob* seems to have influenced many modern writers. He has many points

of affinity with pragmatism, but while the pragmatists make usefulness the only test of truth, Vaihinger holds that we use hypotheses and symbols which we know to be false, and yet arrive by means of them at the truth. How we know them to be false is not clear, unless, as Hegel's epigram against Kant declares, we know that our thoughts are false because it is we who think them. If the ultimate appeal is to biology, is not biology itself a fiction of the will to live? To those who, interpreting everything biologically, say that reason is merely an instrument of adaptation, the difference between truth and falsehood, fact and fancy, is obscured. So psycho-analysts of the school of Jung will tell a patient that he is suffering from a decay of faith in God and the future life, in which many of them do not believe themselves. I do not think that myth, in the proper sense, has any place in this type of thought. The use of concepts which we know to be false, if, as Vaihinger thinks, we really use them, is quite different from the myth, which is as near the truth as we can get, and which, we believe, may bring us nearer to the truth by means of symbols which are a projection of the reality, dimly seen by the soul, upon the world of sense.

The myth has points of contact with symbol, allegory, and legend, but is to be distinguished from all these. Like the symbol, myth represents a thought. But the symbol and the truth which it figures are contemplated apart. In the myth the truth is seen in the story, which is a sensible representation of a universal truth, the poetry of faith. Plato, in point of fact, is not very fond of the word mythus; he more than once claims that his stories are narratives (λόγοι) not merely μῦθοι; that is to say, he claims for them a factual basis with a sacramental meaning. This is, in fact, the attitude, often unconscious, of the religious mind to myths which have become dogmas.

An allegory, like a myth, half conceals and half reveals the truth which it clothes. But in an allegory the thought is first grasped by itself, and then consciously dressed up in a sensible image. Plato often uses allegories: for instance, the choice of Heracles. But the myth is not illustrative; it does not, like the allegory, represent pictorially results already obtained in argument. The allegory has been popular in theology, because from a very early date it was used to reinterpret and save the credit of stories which had become offensive or incredible. The Greeks applied the allegorical method to the interpretation of Homer; the Christians to parts of the Old Testament.

In the legend the factual element so far predominates that the sacramental meaning is often forgotten, and has to be reintroduced with the help of allegory. A good example in Plato is the story told by Diotima in the *Symposium*. When Socrates speaks of love as a glorious god, Diotima answers: "He is no god, Socrates, but a great spirit, one of those beings who hold a middle place between

gods and men; for God himself can hold no intercourse with man, and all the fellowship between them is realized through this intermediate order, which bridges the gulf which separates them. Love is one of a large company of spirits. You ask about his lineage? It is a rather long story. When Aphrodite was born, the gods made a great feast, and among the company was Resource, the son of Cunning. To them came Poverty, begging at the door. Resource, grown tipsy with nectar, went into the garden and slept. Then Poverty made the scheme of having a child by Resource, and she conceived Love. As the son of Resource and Poverty, Love is a peculiar case. . . ." Then she proceeds to show how love is a blend of resource and poverty, conceived on the birthday of Aphrodite. This long speech shows how impossible it is to separate myth from allegory and legend. The legend, if it is not Plato's invention, soon passes into allegory, and the allegory into myth; for the latter part of Diotima's speech is more like prophetic inspiration. This allegory, however, proved so attractive that Plotinus elaborates it still further. In his *Third Ennead* Zeus is *Νοῦς*, Aphrodite is *ψυχή*, Resource is *λόγος*, Poverty is *ὕλη*, and more to the same effect.

The genuine myth, as used by Plato, is what von Hügel, speaking of Christian dogma, calls a "fact-like story" with a spiritual meaning. Is the connection with historical fact essential? This is an awkward question, which neither Plato nor his disciples are very ready to answer. Plato, in fact, was rather unscrupulous. He is willing to resort to pious fraud, "a noble lie," to make the citizens of his *Republic* believe that all is ordered for the best. "All ye who are in the State, we will say, following out our fiction, are brethren; but God at the time of your birth mixed gold in the substance of those who are fit to rule, silver in the military caste, iron and bronze in the husbandmen and craftsmen." If any are found to be wrongly classified, the error can be corrected. "We shall not persuade the first generation that this is so, but in time their descendants may believe the tale, and this belief would have very beneficial results." This is, in fact, the way in which myths degenerate. They congeal and petrify; they are accepted as flat historical recitals, and so become either meaningless or fraudulent; and then, since they no longer bridge the gulf between the natural and the spiritual, they are discarded as useless. Our Reformers objected to the Catholic materialization of the eucharistic myth as "destroying the nature of a sacrament." Their opponents answer that to convert a symbolical sacrifice into a mere commemorative service also destroys the nature of a sacrament. We seem to be on a knife-edge.

I propose to consider and criticize two books by living writers which have dealt with this subject. They illustrate two different modes of approach. Nicolas Berdyaeff is a Russian, who has had the

unusual experience of being banished by the Tsar as a communist and by Lenin as a Christian. He found peace at Paris. His book, *The Freedom of the Spirit,* is a very able and original contribution to the philosophy of religion. He might perhaps be classed, with certain reservations, among Platonic mystics, and he criticizes from the outside, from the standpoint of Eastern Christianity, both Latin Catholicism and Protestantism. Here I am concerned only with his view of the function of myth in the philosophy of the spirit.

He begins by calling attention to the almost universal tendency to hypostatize abstractions. Being has been conceived as an objective substance, whether spiritual or material. God is conceived of as a substance, a thing; and ideas are also substances. Reality has been understood on the analogy of the material world. We have had a metaphysics of naturalism, and of phenomenalism which denied the possibility of knowing life and its source. Theological systems also make God an object like other objects, and His reality is made to resemble that of material substances. Thus in Latin Christian philosophy the supernatural is simply the natural on a higher plane, a kind of second physical world. But philosophy is a function of life, and of the deeper currents of life. Spirit is life, and the knowledge which spirit has of itself is the knowledge which life has of itself. This does not justify relativism. In spirit and life are revealed qualities which are not relative. We must insist on the old distinction between soul and spirit. All psychologism in philosophy is only a form of naturalism, psychology without a psyche.

Naïve realism consists in transferring to the spiritual world that quality of reality which belongs to the natural world. The two worlds are quite unlike. Spiritual realities are revealed only in spiritual life. Spirit is real existence, an "extra-objective reality." Space and time are created by spirit and merely denote a particular condition of the spiritual world. The reality of the spiritual world is guaranteed by the mystical experience, which requires and proves a real affinity between the knowing subject and the known object.

(In denying "substantiality" to God Berdyaeff, I think, mistakes the meaning of "substance" in Western thought. He assumes wrongly that a substance must be static, not dynamic, and he prefers Heraclitus to Parmenides. But this, I think, is only an error in terminology.)

We must not set the two worlds against each other. Flesh is the symbol of spirit; history is the image of spiritual life under the conditions of time and divisibility. I affirm, he says, a spirituality which is concrete.

There are real occurrences and even conflicts in the spiritual world; these are symbolically reflected in nature and history, Naturalist theology both confuses and separates the two spheres

of being, regarding the events of the spiritual world as actually taking place on earth. The dogmas of religion are really mystical facts and discoveries of the spiritual world, which have been translated by theologians into the language of reason and of the natural world. The language of spiritual experience is inevitably symbolic and mythological. The ideas of the soul and the spirit have themselves a mythological origin. The relation between God and man is an inward one, not an exterior relation between the natural and the supernatural in this world. So the mystics have always understood.

But is this the Christianity of the Churches? Berdyaeff answers this question in a remarkable passage: "Christianity, which is a religion not of this world, suffers humiliation in the world for the sake of the general mass of humanity, and so spiritual life becomes merely symbolic, and is no longer realized in practice. Christianity, by entering the world in order to save it, is always running the risk of becoming weakened and losing its true spirit. Herein lies its dramatic quality, the origin of its success and also of its failure. It must descend into the natural world, while remaining the truth which is not of this world, that is, the truth of the spirit and of spiritual life. The whole tragedy of spiritual humanity lies in this fact." Nevertheless, the truly spiritual man never rejects the symbols, in which he sees more, not less, than the average man. The tragedy is when God is forgotten in the approach designed to lead men to Him; when "men set themselves to hate in the cause of love, to use compulsion in the name of freedom, and to become practising materialists for the vindication of spiritual principles."

This preliminary survey prepares the way for the chapter on Symbol, Myth, and Dogma. A symbol, which bridges the gulf between two worlds, presupposes the existence of both. Idealism is a metaphysical theory; symbolism is religious by the fact of its existence. Subjective idealist symbolism, such as that of Schleiermacher and the French "symbolo-fideism," contradicts the nature of a symbol; there is no necessity in these symbols; they are no bond of union with the outside world; they leave a man shut up in himself. For realist symbolism, on the other hand, the outward form is a symbolic incarnation of spiritual realities. It is fundamentally opposed both to naïve realism and to subjective idealism. The conception of which we are speaking demands the sanctification of natural and historical life, but it must be symbolic in character.

"The whole life of the Church is a myth created within history, a realist symbolism expressing and incarnating the dynamic energy of the spirit." Only the facts of mysticism are absolute, and our thought about them is always relative.

"Mystical and symbolic knowledge finds expression not in formal philosophical statement but in mythological representation. Religious

philosophy is itself a creation of myth, an imagination. The philosophy of Plato is steeped in Orphic mythology. At the heart of Christian philosophy we find the most important of all the myths of mankind, that of redemption and the Redeemer. The most arid rational theology and metaphysics derive their sustenance from the myths of religion. Living knowledge is mythological in character."

Myth, says Berdyaeff, is a reality far greater than concept. It presents to us the supernatural in the natural, the suprasensible in the sensible, the spiritual life in the life of the flesh; it brings two worlds together symbolically. "Christianity is entirely mythological, as indeed all religion is, and Christian myths represent the deepest and most central realities of the spiritual world. It is high time to cease being ashamed of Christian mythology." But we must grasp the inner meaning in a spiritual manner, in order to free ourselves from that naïvely realist influence which has developed as the result of superstition.

We have here an outline of a philosophy of mysticism, of the Platonic or Neoplatonic type, in which a firm knowledge of ultimate truth is obtained by spiritual vision or insight, which is its own evidence. It is not based on rationalist argument, nor on scientific knowledge of the laws of nature. Spiritual things are spiritually discerned, and no appeal lies from the affirmations of the spirit to any facts of nature. Naturalism and positivism are denied a hearing. The witnesses to the truths of the spiritual life are the specialists in divine knowledge, the mystics.

What then are the relations between the world of spiritual values and the world of phenomena? We are forbidden to speak of the latter as mere appearance. The world of sense is real, but its reality is symbolic. Its meaning and value are not in itself, but in the world of spirit. In a word, all nature is sacramental; in being what it is, it half conceals and half reveals truths which belong to another order. This is a conception which has a high philosophical and religious value. It avoids the dualism of natural and supernatural; it asserts the holiness of the natural world, in which the footprints of the Deity are everywhere discernible. It is a form of realism, which nevertheless maintains that reality is throughout spiritual. Further, its symbolism is objective and deeply serious. It will have none of the "loose types of things through all degrees" which are woven by the poetic fancy. It relies not on fancy but on imagination, as Wordsworth, in his nature-poetry, always strives to do. So far, it seems to have much in common with what Tennyson called the higher pantheism, and with what Krause, wishing to avoid the word pantheism, called panentheism.

But is this sacramental view of nature quite consistent with the disparagement of naturalism, a philosophy based on the observation

of nature's methods, in abstraction no doubt from the higher values which the spirit finds in them? Is it consistent with what the author calls an irrationalist attitude towards experience generally? Platonism, it seems to me, builds its mysticism on a foundation of reason, and advances with the help of dialectic from the particular to the universal, from plurality and diversity to harmony and unity. Myth is only called in to give substance to the aspirations or intuitions of faith.

The question must also be asked: Does the mystic create myths? Would it not be true to say that he commonly accepts the myths of his religion and turns them into allegories, dramatizations of the normal experience of the soul in its ascent to God? In this process they almost cease to be myths; their factual historicity has no longer much importance. And his tendency is to discard all images, one after another. Like the Indian sages he says: "Neti, neti"; things are not so. Finally, he enters the Presence, as Plotinus says, naked, alone with the Alone. The poet of nature—Wordsworth is the supreme type—continues to immerse himself in the beauties of the visible world, and to admire with pantheistic enthusiasm all manifestations of the universal life. But the religious mystic withdraws himself from the external; he draws the world into himself; *introrsum ascendere* is his motto.

Berdyaeff has a chapter on mysticism—a very good one. Mysticism is not a refined psychologism, nor an irrational passion of the soul, nor simply the music of the soul. It is not a romantic subjectivism, nor a dreamy condition. It is essentially realistic and sober. It presupposes a symbolical conception of the world, but it seeks to transcend symbolism. There are differences between the Eastern and the Western forms of Christian mysticism. In Orthodox mysticism human nature is transfigured and deified from within by the Holy Spirit. The idea of the divinization of man is its fundamental concept, the object of which is the transfiguration of everything created. Catholic mysticism is more Christocentric and more anthropological. It surrounds suffering with a kind of ecstasy, and insists that the saint must pass through "the dark night of the soul," of which Orthodox mysticism knows nothing as a normal experience. The gulf between natural and supernatural is exclusively Western. Thomism shows a fear of the intuition which bridges this gulf, and consequently condemns Plato's ontology. The danger in all mysticism is that it tends to foster an impersonal and impassible love, which is very unlike the spirit of Christianity. But "there is a mysticism of love, the apostles of which are St. John and St. Paul."

All this is excellent, but it does not help us much in solving the question of the relation of mysticism to mythology. Is the mythological apprehension of reality an inevitable result of human

weakness, which we hope to transcend as we rise *per tenebras in lucem*, or is it the final recognition by the reason of its own limitations, when it approaches the deepest mysteries of life? The two views seem to be different. And while pantheistic nature-mysticism revels in symbols, and sometimes resembles a poetical and imaginative naturalism, exclusive mysticism aims at being able to do without them, and hopes to see God "face to face."

The symbols which the higher religion creates for itself are not generally miracle-stories. This is notoriously one of the difficulties of liberalized theology. The Christian philosopher finds in the Incarnation a revelation of the divine character and purposes towards men. The myths, if we may use the word honorifically, as Berdyaeff does, are significant not as irruptions of the supernatural into the order of nature, but as symbols of eternal truths. But this is not the way in which simple faith regards them. The plain man does not really believe that miraculous events are on the same level as ordinary events, but he thinks he does. The dove-tailing of the supernatural into the natural is, to his consciousness, the foundation of his faith. And it seems to be in these intellectual strata, and not in the mind of the contemplative saint, that myths arise. The mystic allegorizes them; he does not invent them; perhaps he does not really need them.

The best example is St. Paul, whose faith was based on a very clear conviction that the glorified Spirit-Christ "lived in him." His religion was a pure Christ-mysticism. But he identified this indwelling spirit with the historical Jesus mainly because he saw the profound spiritual significance of the voluntary humiliation, the sufferings and death, the resurrection and ascension of Christ, as a revelation of the path which we all have to tread. And although he was content not to have known Jesus personally, he insists that these cardinal events in His career were historical facts. This attitude became the framework of Christianity as a great religion. St. Paul made the Gospel intelligible and acceptable to the European mind.

Now we have seen that Plato distinguishes between μῦθος and λόγος and claims that his more serious myths, as we call them, are substantially true in fact. "Either this happened, or something like it." I cannot be quite certain whether Berdyaeff takes the same view about the Christian creeds. I think he does, but at the same time he disparages "dogmatic and systematic theology of the academic type, which is naïvely realist and non-symbolist." This want of definiteness is, I think, very characteristic. The religious mind shrinks from cutting itself loose from particular events, and I think rightly. I know few things more impressive than the confession of F. H. Bradley in his *Essays on Truth and Reality* (p. 431): "I find myself now taking more and more as literal fact what I used in my

youth to admire and love as poetry." Such is the candour of a very great thinker. I gladly leave, with this concluding caution, a very thorny problem.

The philosopher does create myths, but he does not call them so. The whole psychology of Platonism, with its tripartite division of human nature into body, soul, and spirit, is mythical in form. Plotinus knows this, and cautions us against taking his classifications as anything more than contour-lines. The same applies to the Ideas, as soon as we begin to hypostatize them, as we cannot help doing if we make them more than subjective, and to the great division of "Here" and "Yonder." "All things that are Yonder are also Here," says Plotinus, well aware how necessary such warnings are. But I must consider this more fully at the end of this paper.

The other writer whose views on myth I propose to consider—much more shortly—is George Santayana, an American of Spanish extraction, who thinks and writes with the lucidity, ruthless logic, and long civilized experience of the Latin races. He is not, I take it, a religious man, and it is possible to find in his writings a fundamental want of seriousness in his treatment of the deepest problems. As a pendant to Berdyaeff this may make his approach to the subject more instructive.

Primitive thought, he says, has the form of poetry and the function of prose. Myth, which arose in this stratum, is an observation of things encumbered with all that they may suggest to a dramatic fancy. It is the common root and raw material of both poetry and science, and also of art. The Hebrews, who denied themselves a rich mythology, had no science or plastic art; the Greeks, who indulged in irresponsible myths, were the founders of science and philosophy. Myth is the natural prologue to philosophy.

Myths are not exactly believed; they are accepted as expressing reality in metaphor. When they descend to the plane of particular fact they tell us nothing more about the meaning of life, and what they tell us about fact is false. Their function is to interpret events in terms relative to spirit. In practice, they are often defecated into theosophy or corrupted into a justification of magic.

The mark of a myth is that it does not interpret a phenomenon in terms capable of being subsumed under the same category with that phenomenon itself, but fills it out with images which could never appear side by side with it. It is a fruit of experience, but no vehicle of experience; it cannot serve the purposes of action.

Of Plato he says that it was a poignant sense for the excellence of real things that made him wish to transcend them; his metaphysics was nothing but a visionary intuition of values, an idealism in the proper sense of the word. But when the momentum of such enthusiasm remained without its motive power, idealism ceased to be

an idealization, an interpretation of reality reaching prophetically to its goals. It became a supernumerary second physics, a world to which an existence was attributed which was supported by no evidence. An idealism which had consisted in understanding and discriminating values became a superstition incapable of discerning existences. In the Stoa, on the other hand, the surviving mythological element turned nature into an idol, so that the worship of her blasted all humane and plastic ideals and set men upon a vain and fanatical self-denial. Both philosophies, he says, were post-rational, as befitted a decadent age, and as their rival and heir, Christianity, was also. The eclectic Christian philosophy which entered into the inheritance was, he says, an impressive product of the human mind; the ruins of more than one civilization and of more than one philosophy were ransacked to furnish materials for this heavenly Byzantium. It was a myth circumstantial enough to pass for an account of facts, and yet loaded with enough moral philosophy to present an adequate ideal to the heart.

This is an unsympathetic and really superficial account of European civilization on the spiritual side. It will be observed that he uses myth in a very different sense from Berdyaeff, a sense which is common enough now, but is not the sense in which I am using it to-day. For him the Life of Reason consists in the service of an ideal which does not exist but which is set before us. Whether he believes in the perfectibility of the human race he does not tell us; probably not; he is too sensible. But he never realizes that for the religious mind, as opposed to mere moralism, the ideal is not only that which ought to be, but that which is. It is this mystery or paradox of the spiritual life which makes the construction of a bridge necessary. These mysteries make myth necessary and respectable. Santayana is so unconscious of them that his criticisms of religious philosophy seem almost flippant. I have mentioned him because he is a very typical product of our time.

A discussion of the place of myth in philosophy must necessarily give great attention to Plato, both because he is the acknowledged master of the myth, and because of the immense influence which he has had and still has on European thought.

The essential charm of Plato's myths, says Professor J. A. Stewart, is that of poetry generally. Poetry exists by its power of inducing, satisfying, and regulating transcendental feeling, especially a solemn sense of timeless being. It transports us into a dream-world from which we return with a sense that we have seen the mysteries—that we have been initiated into a higher and deeper state of being than is accessible to us at ordinary times. This initiation is, strictly speaking, imparted in silence, but it is interpreted to the understanding in symbolical language. Something of the universal plan

of creation is opened before us, nourishing, in Plato's words, "a sweet hope"—what Christianity calls faith, hope, and love. For the revelation is of the Good as the highest reality. "The religious man," says Wordsworth, "values what he sees mainly as an imperfect shadowing faith of what he is incapable of seeing. The concerns of religion refer to indefinite objects, and are too weighty for the mind to support them without resting a great part of the burden on words and symbols, by a process where much is represented in little, and the infinite Being accommodates Himself to a finite capacity. In all this may be perceived the affinity between poetry and religion."

The three realities which we desire to know are God, the human soul, and the world. The religious consciousness thinks of God as a Person. But logical thinking, whether in natural science or metaphysics, makes God impersonal. Aristotle's God is not personal, nor is Spinoza's "Deus sive Natura," nor is the Absolute of modern philosophy, nor the Nature of modern science. Plato attempts more than once a logical demonstration of God's existence and of its correlate, the immortality of the human soul. By common consent, his arguments are not such as to carry conviction to so keen a thinker as Plato himself. And yet he is unquestionably a theist, and a believer in human immortality. His arguments have not had much effect; his personal conviction has carried immense weight. It is in myth that he presents both ideas—a personal God and personal immortality.

He wishes this mythical teaching to be given to children, though they will of course take it literally. They are to be taught spiritual truth through literal falsehood. We do not like this notion, but in elementary education it can scarcely be avoided. And even the great Christian theologian, Origen, says quite frankly that in the Gospels, especially in St. John, spiritual truth is conveyed through "what we may call literal falsehood" (ψεύδει). Most people, in fact, remain children all their lives. In a sense, the dream-world of childhood may be dramatized for them under the form of myth.

A modern philosopher might call this dishonest. But "philosophy" is not wisdom, but love of wisdom; and wisdom, Plato is convinced, is a matter for the whole man, who is much more than a logic-chopping animal. He despises doctrinaire scholasticism, and knowledge for a man's self. In the allegory of the Cave the wise man who has escaped into the daylight must not stay there, but must go back to teach the others, who must be taught what they can understand. "We shall compel him to go back, though we do him an injustice."

But in truth the ideas of God and of immortality *can* be held only in mythical or symbolical form. We must behave as if they were literally true. Here, we may think, is a concession to *Als Ob*,

and Vaihinger of course seizes upon it. But Plato's is no philosophy of pan-illusionism. It is precisely the things which are most real which can only be seen, as St. Paul says, as in a mirror, by means of symbols (*αἰνίγματα*). God is not an object among other objects; there is and can be no demonstration of His existence; but we *know* that He is; *τὸ παντελῶς ὂν παντελῶς γνωστόν.*

The belief in human immortality depends on belief in God. The latter is central, the former is peripheral. If this were remembered, we should be spared a vast amount of dismal "proofs" of human survival, all entirely worthless. The myth is that there is a soul-substance, which never began to exist and will never pass out of existence; which will be rewarded or punished in a future state, reincarnated perhaps many times, and ultimately continuing for ever in a disembodied state. There has been endless discussion as to how much of this Plato really believed. Hegel thought it impossible that a thinker of such eminence as Plato could have believed in individual survival. He not only dismisses the speculations as purely mythical, but advances the quite untenable view that all Plato's myths are negligible for a student of his philosophy. Zeller, Adam, and most other Platonic scholars are convinced that Plato did believe in personal immortality, though the word personal should be used with caution, since the Greeks had no word for personality and did not need one. The soul, according to Plato, is that which makes us what we are, and the soul, he says quite definitely in the *Phaedrus*, is immortal. I do not see how anyone who reads the *Dialogues* can doubt that Plato really believed this. We have only to think of our beliefs about immortality to understand what was probably his position. We all know that Christian eschatology is a mass of contradictions; no one really believes that heaven and hell are at all like the popular descriptions of them. And yet we accept these pictures, or some of them, as symbols of a state of being which eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. Coleridge, in commenting on Wordsworth's famous Ode, says that it was "intended for such readers as had been accustomed to venture at times into the twilight realms of consciousness, and to feel a deep interest in modes of inmost being to which they knew that the attributes of time and space are inapplicable. For such readers the sense is sufficiently plain, and they will be as little disposed to charge Mr. Wordsworth with believing the Platonic pre-existence in the ordinary interpretation of the words, as I am to believe that Plato himself ever meant or taught it." This is instructive, but it goes too far. Plato, and possibly Wordsworth, too, when he wrote this poem, believed in pre-existence in exactly the same way as he believed in post-existence. The two doctrines, in his opinion, stand or fall together. The symbolic form

is necessitated by the impossibility of transcending the form of time, which in spite of this we know to be inapplicable to eternal life.

It is necessary to insist on this, because the illusionism of Plato's eschatology is really based on a metaphysical theory of reality. In his doctrine of the Ideas or Forms Plato is the protagonist, if we may not say the discoverer, of a conception of eternity as something more than endless survival. Eternity is timeless being. It must not be confounded with endless immobility any more than with endless motion; this error he combats in the *Parmenides*. Reason discloses to us a world lifted out of space and time altogether. But we can only think of eternity, mythically, as the future life. This, and the conception of God as an object among other objects, are the best examples of the necessity of mythical representation. But many philosophers cannot rid themselves of the temptation to take the myths quite literally, and they often find themselves in difficulties in consequence.

Plato did not invent his eschatology. He went for it to the Orphic religion, by which he was plainly much attracted. We seldom reflect how much of this mythology has passed into Christianity by way of Plato, though pre-existence and reincarnation have dropped out of orthodox theology. The Orphics taught that a blessed life hereafter is a fuller communion with the god which the votary has already enjoyed in this life. The soul is essentially divine, but has fallen into sin, which explains its present state. In consequence of sin we are banished from the society of the gods. The object of the mysteries or sacraments, and of the rule of life there prescribed, was to show the soul how to expiate her guilt. The beautiful myths inscribed on the Orphic tablets make us wish we had more of the same kind. The soul, released from the body, says, "I have faced the penalty for deeds unjust, and now I am come as a suppliant to noble Persephone, beseeching her to be gracious and to send me to the abodes of the good." And is there not something touching in these instructions: "On your left you will find a stream, and near it a white poplar. Go not near this stream (the river of Forgetfulness), but you will find another, cool waters flowing from the lake of Memory, and by it are guards. Say to them, I am a child of earth and of starry heaven, but my race is of heaven alone. This you know well yourselves. And they will give you to drink of the holy spring." Or the soul thus addresses Persephone: "Out of the pure I come, pure Queen of them below. For I declare that I am of your blessed race. I have flown out of the sorrowful weary wheel." The answer is: "Happy and blessed one, thou shalt be god instead of mortal." (A god, as is well known, was for the Greek essentially an immortal being.)

The myths in the *Phaedo* and in the *Republic* (the myth of Er) expand the Orphic eschatology. Socrates will not affirm that the

Phaedo is literally true; that "would become no reasonable man. But I think it becomes him to believe that what I have said about the souls and their habitation is either literally true or like the truth, if at least the soul is shown to be immortal; and that it is worthy of him to face peril bravely in such a belief, for the peril is glorious; and such thoughts he ought to use as a charm to allay his own misgivings; in which spirit I have thus dwelt long upon this story." These words are perhaps the best indication of the way in which Plato meant his myths to be used.

It would be interesting to compare the Orphic eschatology with the beautifully simple myth of the sheep and the goats in the Gospels, and with the surely very horrible myth which Dante has enshrined in imperishable language. Myths undoubtedly promote very crude beliefs in the uneducated, and the "noble lie" in them may at last come home to roost. The cruelty which they introduced into Christianity has been a serious offset to its otherwise beneficent teaching.

But I wish to emphasize the importance of Plato's decision to admit Orphism, which was a religion, into his philosophy. Of the place which this religious teaching holds in history, Dr. Farnell says: "It familiarized the world with the conception of the divine element in the human soul, with the kinship between man and God. It quickened this sense by means of a mystic sacrament whereby man's life was transcendentally fused with God's. It strongly marked the antagonism between flesh and spirit and preached with insistence the doctrine of purity, a doctrine mainly ritualistic but containing also the spiritual idea of the purity of the soul from the taint of sin. It divorced religion from the State, making it the pre-eminent concern of the individual soul and the brotherhood. Finally, its chief aim and scope was other-worldliness, its mission was the preaching of salvation, of an eschatology based on dogmas of posthumous retribution, purgatory, and a succession of lives through which the soul is tried; and it promised immortal bliss through purity and the mysterious magic of a sacrament." It almost looks as if Orpheus was the real father of Catholicism! And how much of what has been permanent and still living in Plato's philosophy is contained in his Orphic myths!

The question which we really have to consider is whether philosophy ought to include within its scope the higher religion and mysticism, although these can only express their aspirations and intuitions in imaginative and symbolical language. I maintain that if philosophy treats this part of human nature as beyond its scope, it will necessarily be enslaved to natural science, or to psychology, which is a natural science if it is a science at all. Now that natural science, abating its former pretensions, claims only to be a hypothetical study, a matter of pointer readings and mathematical

symbols, we have to choose between returning to Plato and admitting that philosophy itself is out of contact with reality. We are left in a quagmire of relativism and subjectivism. But this is the suicide of philosophy, the aim of which is perfect knowledge of the perfect.

I was pleased to find an eloquent appeal for a "return to philosophy" in the old sense in a little book by Mr. Joad. The writing of philosophy, he says, is eloquent, inspiring, or lucid, as its themes are noble, profound, or ingenious. At any moment, one feels, the writer may break through into a different world. "Hence the mystical passages in the works of the great philosophers; the myths in which they seek to embody meanings incapable of rational statement; the inspired dogmatisms which, striking us with a feeling of utter rightness and conveying an air of complete certitude, seem to be less the products of the intellect than of a faculty akin to the vision of the mystic and the seer." Such philosophy may be accounted not only an escape from the uncertainties and transciences of the world of becoming, but a window through which the consciousness of man attains a vision of the world of being.

The concepts of philosophy are hypostatized ideals recognized as supreme realities. The philosopher cannot help mythologizing, if he tries to live by his philosophy. The Ideas are clothed with forms; the determinations of the Absolute become quickening spirits. If he avoids this, he must keep his philosophy and his conduct in watertight compartments; the former becomes arid, and the latter irrational. Of course we can do without a bridge, if we do not want to cross. But half of ourselves is on the other side. It is the task of philosophy to deliver us from the facile monisms of materialism and Nirvana. Crude realism and crude mentalism can dispense with myth, but only by shirking the great problems. In practice, their adherents usually set up queer fetishes of their own.

A bridge is of no use unless it takes us across, and some myths, honoured by time, no longer fulfil their function. Americans are fond of saying that the picture of God as a king no longer appeals to them. Since George III they have no use for kings. One of them wrote on the democratic conception of God. The Deity seems, according to him, to be rather like the President of the United States. But it would be rather rash just now to make a myth out of democracy. Parts of the Christian mythology, if we may use the word without offence, have been antiquated by natural science, not so much by Darwin or Jeans as by Copernicus and Galileo. But I maintain that the philosopher ought to be a prophet. It is a hard thing to be; and the training is not merely intellectual. A new Plato, when he arrives, may create his own myths; but he will probably prefer to work on those of Christianity, which may be as satisfying to the modern man as they were to St. Paul and St. Augustine.

THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

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THIS paper is concerned with the study of economic activity from two points of view; the first is that of the man of business, and his problem is "Of what use or value is the study of the activity to those who are actually engaged in the activity?" He has continually to grapple with individual and concrete situations and thus feels the clash between them and the abstract general pronouncements of certain economic studies: consequently he is bound to ask whether the latter have in fact any relevance for him at all.

The second point of view is that of the philosopher, and his problem is not the utility of the study, but its truth; and this problem presses, for the growth in the popularity of "Economics" has been accompanied by wide divergences of opinion about its methods, aims, and status. Behind the glaring searchlight of "Economics" the philosophical study of economic activity is becoming lost in the shadow. "Political economy" no longer forms part of the title of Scottish philosophical Chairs, and, where it still lingers on in, for instance, the syllabus for *Literae Humaniores* at Oxford it has the air of a mere survival of a past now distant, obsolescent if not obsolete. But if we accustom ourselves to the glare and refuse to be dazzled, we find that the light is after all not single, and that we are confronted with the problem of assessing the relative brilliance of Economic History, Economic Science, and what is sometimes noncommittally called the "Social Study" of Economics, all of which profess to illumine the darkness of the economic world.

That world rests upon and is the creation of human actions and motives and a theory about it must therefore at least do justice to the actual buying and selling transactions in which men engage. It is to lay emphasis on this fact that this paper is called "the study of Economic *Activity*," and that it focuses attention on industry and commerce, on buying and selling, rather than on, e.g. international debts which have a political as well as an economic reference.—This is not to say that economic study should be limited to mere commercial problems; it cannot be, for men are citizens as well as wage earners, and commercial life necessarily has a political environment which is more and more clearly discerned as industries grow in size and become first of national, and then of international significance. But just as we are more likely to understand the nature of political activity if we begin by studying a national constitution

rather than a disarmament conference or a League of Nations, so the essence of economic activity as such will be most clearly evident in transactions from which political considerations are as far as possible excluded. Human activity cannot be separated into water-tight compartments. Its different kinds shade off into each other, but that does not mean that there are no kinds. We must therefore remember that, since the economic sphere shades off into the political we shall not advance very far to the understanding of either economics or politics without a study of places where they overlap. But to admit that they overlap is not to assert their coincidence, and consequently, although the understanding of buying and selling is not the understanding of the whole economic sphere, it is at least the key to its essence, and to realize this is to be enabled at the outset to descend from the clouds of abstract speculation, where so many economists apparently feel at home, to the firm ground of concrete actuality.

In dealing with economic activity, therefore, we are concerned with "buying and selling," though that is not advanced as a *definition* of economic activity; it is a mere preliminary description, and it calls in fact for immediate revision, for all buying and selling is not of the same character.

Human activity, if it is to be understood, must be considered both subjectively and objectively, as both intention and behaviour. For the spectators, the activity of all the members of the team may be adequately described as "football playing," but some of the members of the team may thereby be "earning a livelihood," and their activity is wage earning for which play is only a disguise. The child turned loose in a toy shop to spend sixpence may take time to spend the money, in sheer joy at indulging in the activity of buying something: but its buying is not the same thing as the buying of the man on the Baltic Exchange who is negotiating for a cargo of palm kernels and eager to buy at 2s. 6d. per ton less than the price quoted to him. The child after all is amusing himself, buying for the sake of buying, and his activity is play. The man is engaged in the serious business of buying raw materials at lower prices than his competitor with a view to subsequently undercutting him in the price of his manufactures: he is buying, that is, with a view to profit, and his activity is economic. Thus, although the study or, at any rate, the *philosophic* study, of economic activity must deal with the development of the activity out of play on the one side, and into politics on the other, and although there is something of play in the zest of an enthusiastic salesman, and something political in a company merger that tends to be monopolist, an account of economic activity must at least be an account of buying and selling for profit, interpreted of course in the widest sense as including,

e.g. not only advertising but problems arising from the fact that one man's profit may be the community's loss.

Now study advances as our curiosity about its object is satisfied and the advance is dependent on the method of inquiry that we adopt, the type of question that we ask, and the type of answer which we find satisfactory. These in turn will vary with our conception of the object that we are studying. Thus, in studying the human body we may ask what are the laws of its working, or the laws which its working exemplifies? and the answers to these questions will give us the science of physiology. Alternatively we may ask how the human body has come to be what it is, not what are the *laws* of its growth but what are the past stages through which it has grown, and our method is then historical and history is its result. Or we can ask what in fact the human body is and how it is related to its environment and so treat it not as an external phenomenon, existing as a clear-cut, self-existent object of study, but as part and parcel of a living experience. In other words, we may study it philosophically.

There is no prima facie reason for rejecting any one of these three methods of studying economic activity (in fact they lead on to each other and are all required), for (*a*) however misleading consideration of the activity may be in abstraction from the rest of life, the abstraction may none the less be made and so be an object to which scientific methods of study are applicable; (*b*) since it is the study of men's actions, it has a past and is amenable to historical treatment; and (*c*) it is a study with which philosophy may concern itself, for just as artistic experience is not confined to the comparatively small community of artists, so economic experience is not the private preserve of company directors and bank officials, but is a necessary part of the life of everyone. And moral philosophers unduly limit the scope of their study when they confine it to such things as promises to post letters and ignore, e.g., a business man's decisions. Consideration must thus be given to each of these three different ways of studying economic activity, and it will be convenient to take Economic History first.

That the historical study of economic life has its legitimate and important place in the context of historical study as a whole has been ably illustrated in Oxford by the Chichele Professor of Economic History in his brilliant book on the seventeenth century, and is appropriately recognized in Cambridge by the project for the addition of an Economic History to the series of historical compendia already issued in that University: but to tear economic history out of its context and to study it by itself as if the economic activities of an epoch were something separate or separable from its other activities, or as if economic institutions had a history of their own,

is to make it unintelligible or else to reduce it to propaganda in favour of the dubious dogma of the materialist interpretation of history. The emphasis laid in modern historical work on economic and industrial activities and motives is welcome as indicative of their extraction from the political sphere in which they have hitherto been embedded and obscured, and the process of extraction has no doubt been helped by the devotion of monographs instead of mere excursus or footnotes or appendices to economic and industrial topics. There is a danger, however, that what begins as a change in emphasis may end as a destruction of historical perspective. For it is one thing to point out that *pari passu* with other developments in national life there has been a development in, e.g., the credit system, and that all these developments have interacted with each other, but quite a different thing to treat the credit system as if it had developed of itself and so had an isolated history of its own, or, worse still, as if its development were somehow the *fons et origo* of every other contemporary development or change. For, to suppose that the credit system has a history of its own is to commit the error of reducing history to catalogue making. One phase in the development of the credit system does not lead on to the next: the impulse to movement comes from those who use the system, not from the system itself. And in the lives of those who use it that system plays only one among the many parts in the cast.

Failure to recognize this results in the treatment of the history of an industry, or of buying and selling methods, as a self-enclosed and self-explanatory study. And when that happens, it is but a step from economic history to materialism, because abstractly treated, the steps in a process of economic development become not aspects of the development of civilization as a whole, but the actual phases of that development. It is one thing to point out the importance in Greek History of the Pontic corn supply, another so to exaggerate that importance that everything else in Greek History is treated in subordination and by reference to it. In other words, it is one thing to study what deserves the name of Economic History and another to produce a conglomeration of facts and to interpret them, not historically, but materialistically, for that is to produce not history but a mere abstract discipline scarcely worth calling history at all.

From the point of view of the business man the position is not quite so clear. Economic and industrial history, by which is usually meant the abstract study just referred to as undeserving of the name of history, frequently appears on the curricula of business training institutes and continuation schools, and the rationale of its inclusion seems to be that, while history as a whole is a merely academic study, this abstract type of history is useful, useful, that is, as part of the technical equipment of artisans or clerks. This, however, is

not the view of the business man *qua* business man, for his attitude to history was comprehensively summed up by Mr. Henry Ford in his well-known phrase "History is bunk," and nothing is more striking about the world of economic activity than its indifference to history and its inability to learn its lessons. Business men tell us, and tell us rightly, that cheerfulness, optimism, and far-seeing creative activity are the life-blood of business, and that sentimentalizing over the snows of yesteryear would soon play havoc with the Balance Sheet. Yesterday's newspaper, last year's statistics, are useless, and to call them "ancient history" is to pronounce their condemnation. For they tell a tale of a day that is past, and the new idea that made a fortune then has now become a commonplace and therefore valueless. The business man cannot but be constantly reminded of the fact that he can never make the same sale twice: to-day's set of circumstances is new, and it is out of that that profits must be made. He sees that history never repeats itself, and then makes the hasty assumption that therefore there is nothing in it for him *qua* business man. He identifies false or abstract history with that real concrete history whose true significance he fails *qua* business man to understand, and consequently he sees nothing in history but a catalogue of facts about what no longer exists. Hence his sweeping condemnation of all history, even that of his own business. The selling methods employed by his firm ten years ago in India have just as little significance for him now as Hannibal's Campaigns.

This attitude is intelligible enough; but it is easy to detect in it a certain blindness. Success in moulding the present afresh in order to produce greater profits is partly dependent on an understanding of what the present is, and how it has come to be what it is, is part of the truth about it. Some knowledge of the history of trade treated concretely as an aspect of the history of civilization, might be useful as well as merely interesting to a man whose duty it is to trade with savages amongst whom barter is common, cash payments usual, notes comparatively rare, and cheques unknown. To trade successfully with West African natives to-day, a man must reckon with and understand their mistrust of Europeans, but that means, amongst other things, studying the history of the slave trade. And attempts to corner the supply of various products still continue despite the sad experience of those who have made such attempts in the past.

To understand history, however, the economic world would have to understand itself, and it actually goes on its way without seeking for such an understanding, however much individual business men may seek it. It sees that its transactions are unique, like historical events, but it reckons them atomistically: the profit or loss on each

transaction is summed up and entered into the profit and loss account. And this atomistic quality is just what is not discoverable in the stages of an historical development. To see business transactions not atomistically but historically is to look at them with the eyes of those who are outside the economic sphere altogether, and who refuse to accept buying and selling for profit as a self-explanatory activity, but who ask what in fact and at bottom it really is, with the eyes, that is, of philosophers. It is when business men think of the atomistic character of their own transactions, that they suppose that the past is just made up of collections of the same, and that they misunderstand history, whether economic or industrial or any other, by confusing it with masses of dead statistics from the office cellar. On the other hand, their dissatisfaction with history is not less when they fail to find in it certain abstractions in terms of which they frequently give an account of what they are doing. "I bought at 12s. 6d., after which the market fell," is a typical phrase indicative of the uniqueness of my transaction, its severance from others, the "atomizing" of it, and then the denial of a similar unique or atomic status to other transactions which are all simply conflated into a *caput mortuum* called a "market" about which general statements may be made and in the working of which rules or laws may be found.

In other words, business men are accustomed in giving an account of economic activity to cleave it into two abstractions, atomic transactions on the one hand, and on the other a *caput mortuum* governed by mechanical laws. And since about such a field the language of history can say nothing relevant, its study is dismissed as futile.

Thus, to sum up, though to the business man economic history properly understood has something useful to say, he would have to be more than a business man to understand and use it: the student, on the other hand, while welcoming it as having an important place in the context of historical study, will criticize adversely any attempt to reduce it to unintelligibility by wresting it out of that context.

We now turn to the scientific study of economic activity, and here we are fortunate in having to guide us the important and brilliant book in which Professor Lionel Robbins expounds the *Nature and Significance of Economic Science.*

Like Kant, Professor Robbins is impressed by the achievements of science and attributes that success, at any rate in part, to clear methodology. And just as Kant tried to save philosophy from chaos by putting it on the "sure path of science," so Professor Robbins tries to make economics scientific instead of philosophical as it was in the hands of Adam Smith.

Now it is the characteristic of any scientific inquiry to demarcate a definite subject-matter to be considered in abstraction from everything else. The aim of science may be the discovery of truth about reality as a whole, but advance towards that goal seems to be *via* a continual pluralization of sciences, i.e. by an endless subdivision of subject-matter between sciences, and by gradually increasing abstraction in the search for accuracy. (Abstractness is the price of precision both in Professor Robbins's economics and in modern mathematical physics.) Hence, if economics is to be a science it must have a definite subject-matter of its own, and Professor Robbins lays down what that is. As geometry is the analysis of space, so economics is an analysis of the fact of scarcity: "Economics is concerned with the disposal of scarce goods with alternative uses. . . . That goods are scarce and have alternative uses is a fact. Economics consists in elucidating the manifold implications thereof."[1] (In reading this programme philosophers will be reminded of the method of Cambridge logic.)

Geometry can abstract from men and their actions, but economics cannot. Scarcity is meaningless in abstraction from the people for whom the goods are scarce. If scientific methods are to be used, however, *some* abstraction from men's conduct must be made; and hence just as the economics of another day postulated "*homo economicus*," an abstract type of man, Professor Robbins, rejecting such an abstraction as absurd, abstracts from human conduct as a whole and deals with one aspect of behaviour: "Economics does not pick out *kinds* of behaviour. It focuses attention on a particular *aspect* of behaviour, the form imposed by the influence of scarcity,"[2] and analyses that. Professor Robbins does not attempt to justify the abstraction involved in focusing attention on one aspect of behaviour and ignoring the rest. Moreover, "economic theory deduces from the assumption of scales of relative valuation their formal implication in different situations,"[3] the analytic and abstract character of the inquiry being again reminiscent of Cambridge logic and *a priori* science. The geometer for instance, without trying to justify his hypothesis of triangles, merely asks us to make the assumption and then points out analytically its consequences or implications. There is a difference, however, in Professor Robbins's view between economics and *a priori* science, because while the latter can advance in indifference to the facts of experience, the former must take account of those facts, though the facts cannot

[1] *Op. cit.*, Edn. 1, pp. 75–6. Not altered in substance on p. 83, Edn. 2, though the actual wording is changed.

[2] *Op. cit.*, Edn. 2, p. 16.

[3] P. 94, Edn. 1 (cf. pp. 75–83 and 95, Edn. 2, where the doctrine is not altered).

of themselves solve the theoretical problem of economics; they can only suggest "auxiliary postulates" or present problems to theory[1]; but the economist is not a statistician, and the collection of facts is in itself meaningless; it must be supplemented by their interpretation, and consequently the *applicability* of economic laws, alleged to be true *a priori*, to the world of fact, involves the correct interpretation of that world. For instance, it is an economic truth that "if the quantity of money in circulation is increased and other things remain the same, its value must fall," but the application of this universally true principle to the world of fact is dependent upon "a correct understanding of what things are to be regarded as money."[2]

Economics, in short, remains an *a priori* science; it is in fact the study of compossibilities.[3] Choice in a world of scarcity has implications x, y, and z. These are linked together by mutual logical implication, so that we can say with complete certainty that if x is, then y and z are also. Hence we can lay down universal laws such as: "Under competitive conditions in equilibrium the price of commodities is equal to their cost of production per unit"; we know that this law must be true because it is a logical deduction from a given fact or facts, and if the facts appear to conflict with it and invalidate it, that is only an appearance, due to the misinterpretation of the facts.

With such a view of the aims and methods of economic study, we know where we are, and students of economic activity will be grateful to Professor Robbins[4] for the clarity with which he expounds what economic science is, and for his grasp of the fact that like any other science it proceeds by abstraction, hypothesis, and analysis.

But the use of scientific methods in the field of economics involves the assumption that those methods are applicable in that field, or in other words that that field approximates to that of geometry. The question then arises as to whether and to what extent that assumption is justifiable.

In geometry the compossibilities which are discovered as the inquiry proceeds are simply those which were implied in the hypothesis from which the inquiry started and which are discoverable therein by logical analysis. It is because our original hypothesis required us to define it in that way that the concept of triangularity excludes that of foursidedness, and the geometer's assertion that "if a figure has four sides it cannot be a triangle',

[1] P. 118, Edn. 2. [2] P. 117, Edn. 2. [3] Pp. 121–5, Edn. 2.

[4] This view of the nature of economic science is of course not peculiar to him. Professor Pigou's *Economics of Stationary States* is confessedly the analysis of the implications of an hypothesis—an hypothesis of a state admitted never to exist (p. 264).

depends for its truth on constancy in the relationship between triangle and square—a constancy secured by the original definition laid down; and it remains true whether in fact any such figures *exist* or not, i.e. the assertion of the compossibility of x and y is quite compatible with the actual non-existence of both of them. If, on the other hand, an experimental scientist asserts, "If I drop this stone from my hand it will fall to the ground," he bases his assertion on a belief in the constant operation of universal laws which individual occurrences exemplify and which men may understand and use, but cannot alter

Now the assertions of economic scientists are reducible to the same hypothetical form: "If wages are kept above the marginal productivity of labour, unemployment will continue," and their validity must depend on constancies similar to those upon which science relies, namely those resulting either from a logical analysis of accepted definition or else from the assumption that the field under investigation is one where universal laws operate. But if Professor Robbins relies on the former, as his treatment of his subject suggests, then the economist's assertions are about compossibilities, not in the world of fact but in the world of hypothesis, and they will be true of the world of fact only if the hypothesis from which they issue can be justified. Or in other words, his conclusions will be logically valid whether the economic world exists or not, and can be maintained in indifference to any actual concrete economic situation. Economic science, that is, is true, but true only about the hypothetical abstractions from which it starts. And this fact inevitably limits its practical utility; but it only limits and does not destroy it, for abstractions after all are not imaginations, they are true as far as they go. What truth exactly is to be found in the conclusions of economic science will be clear from what follows.

If this result is unpalatable, it is perhaps no improvement for economic science to base a claim to truth on the assumption that economic activity is a field wherein universal laws operate. This assumption is common at the present time when there is widespread a belief in all-powerful economic forces and consequent despair of the efficacy of human endeavour. But the belief and the despair are alike based on failure to understand the real nature of what are called economic laws. For these on inspection turn out to be no more than hypothetical. Professor Robbins points out that if an economist asserts that the imposition of a protective tariff will result in a rise in the price of motor cars, his assertion is not invalidated if in fact, owing to such new factors in the situation as mass production and wage reduction, the price actually goes down; the decline in price, he says, exemplifies economic law, and does not

invalidate it. For the law is "if x, then y." But in the case in question x was not actually present by itself, it was accompanied by a and b, and consequently its concomitant was rightly z and not y. Thus the economic law is hypothetical in character, and its truth or falsehood is quite independent of the actual exemplification, at any time or place, of the conditions whose interconnection it asserts; for if we consider the formula "under competitive conditions in equilibrium the price of articles is equal to the cost of production per unit," we see at once that we can no more find in experience "competitive conditions in equilibrium" than we can find an equilateral triangle.

These consequences of marking out for economic science a territory amenable to scientific study like that of geometry or physics, need not be misleading so long as they are understood; but there is a further consequence, whose tendency to mislead is much more difficult to control. To make economics a science is to suppose that its conclusions, even if hypothetical, have the same certainty as, for instance, those of physics; to assume in other words that the same constancy which is discoverable in the dropping of the stone and its fall to the ground, is also discoverable in the relations between the imposition of tariffs and the movement of prices. But this latter relationship is one not between abstract concepts, but between men's *acts*, and human ingenuity is continually altering relations between *them*. In short, when the economist professes to give us universality, he forgets that an economic law is not merely like a physical law, one which man can understand and use, it is also one that he can alter. For the law is intended to cover man's acts and of those he, unlike the stone that is dropped, is conscious, and this very consciousness involves freedom to act differently. A law of human action can therefore be at best no more than a statistical generalization about the past, and if that is all that it is, there is no *a priori* probability that it will have any applicability in the future; for men may change their minds about what they want, or they may be led, by the discovery of a new invention or the examination of statistics of the past, to act in ways that hitherto had not occurred to them or that had been regarded as impossible.

It follows that the application of the concept of law to the field of economic activity involves abstracting from human conduct as a whole, treating it as behaviour only and not as intention as well. This abstraction in fact reduces action from something that men do, to something that happens to them. This reduction economic scientists attempt to avoid by the use of a concept of "rational choice." But if this concept is taken seriously it bursts the barriers of economic science. "Rational choice" carries with it the whole of a man's personality, and this at once makes futile an abstraction of an "aspect of behaviour"; for to suppose that a man's personality

is made up of isolable aspects is to make a presupposition about its character that many of us would be reluctant to defend.

If economic science, however, is not wholly satisfactory to students, it is still less so to business men, for they feel a very natural perplexity about the importance to them of the abstract results in which that study issues. Professor Robbins deals with this question of the *use* of Economic Science, and his answer is that it helps men of affairs to choose with knowledge of what they are choosing.[1] It gives them no help in solving the problem of what they *ought* to choose, but it does say to them: Remember that if you choose x, you choose y also, for the presence of the one involves also the presence of the other. "If you choose to keep wages above the marginal productivity of labour, recognize that that means choosing unemployment too."

Now Professor Robbins is no doubt right in pointing out that what a business man expects from an economist, or any practical man from any theorist, is not the answer to his problem but the understanding of it, but it is questionable whether the general statements of economic science provide the enlightenment which business men require, however useful they may be to politicians in the framing of an economic *policy*.

For either they are tautologies asserting that if a is, b is, in a case where a and b have been defined as implying each other, and so not informative, or else their validity depends on the belief, which we have rejected, of the applicability of a concept of law in human affairs, or else they are too vague. They are vague, first, because they are addressed to no one business man in particular, like the example about wages and unemployment, or like "the need of the time is to raise prices," or like the statement of an ecclesiastic that the world needs a change of heart, which may be true but is not helpful, and secondly, because their actual content is too little specific; e.g. "It is the most elementary implication of the idea of scarcity that if a price is lowered the demand tends to increase." This is true enough in this vague form, but it tells the business man nothing helpful about his particular difficulty in fixing the price of one of his wares. It does not follow from this generality that to reduce the price of *this* article will involve an increase in the demand for it, for (i) the article may be sea water at the seaside; and (ii) after an accident on a mountain railway no reduction in fares will increase the number of passengers while the accident is remembered; and (iii) there are luxury articles, the demand for which falls on any reduction of price. Attempts may be made, in the light of a criticism like this, to reword the general rule so as to make these cases instances of it instead of exceptions to it, but by the time it is hedged round by provisos enough for this, it becomes a recital of instances

[1] P. 152, Edn. 2.

instead of a general rule, or, in other words, it is reduced to a tautology once more. The most that can be granted to Professor Robbins in this direction is that when the economist says to the business man, "if you choose *a* you must also choose *b*," he means that "if you choose *a* you also choose *b* unless you change your methods or invent some new set of circumstances." In other words, the economist helps the business man by putting him on his mettle, by stimulating his genius for originality, by stating a problem to him.[1]

But even if the practical applicability of economic science is not quite what Professor Robbins thinks it to be, that does not mean that it has none, and in fact the notion of economic law has some truth, as is to be expected since acceptance of it is so widespread.

When Adam Smith says that "rent as the price paid for land is *naturally* the highest the tenant can afford to pay," what is really meant by "*naturally*" is "reasonably," for in so far as a man engages in economic transactions, he reasonably aims at securing as much profit as possible. The decision to do something, is a decision to do it well, and to engage in any given activity is to aim at the good which such an activity provides. Consequently to engage in business is to aim at profit, and the choice of profit is an instance, not of the working of an economic law or a natural propensity, but of reasoned action, as of course Adam Smith was well aware. Thus the regularity which economic transactions present is the regularity of reasoned action, as opposed to caprice, and law is the disguise which that regularity takes on, when by abstraction the field in which it occurs is reduced from life to rigidity. Economic law is an abstraction, not an imagination, and its truth is precisely the uniformity which rational choices present when they are abstractly or atomically considered. And as we have already seen, in dealing with economic history, this is an abstraction of which business men themselves make use.

For philosophers may point out and point out truly that while we must just accept laws of gravity, we may, if we will, change the laws of economics, but many business men will remain unconvinced; they are too certain that it is economic law and not their own lack of insight which stultifies their efforts and makes profit-making impossible; there are numerous employees who feel themselves mere cogs in a wheel, caught into a system which they can neither change nor escape. Moreover, a business is shackled by tradition, many of its employees have gathered moss and become

[1] The case is not altered if it is maintained that economic "laws" are really expressions of *tendencies*: "bad money tends to drive out good." For the assertion of the tendency can be justified only by appeal to *either* a statistical generalization of past experiences, *or* a necessary law which produces it because it underlies it.

immovable with the consequence that to carry into effect those new ideas upon which the advancement of any business depends, is a task which well nigh demands the patience of Job, the strength of Hercules, and the courage of Hector. Consequently, where the dead weight of stereotyped tradition presents such an intractable obstacle to endeavour, when so many men, blind to their own creative potentiality, fail to see reason and action behind law and happening, it is no wonder that a science which seeks to expound universal principles, as rigid as those of the static field of plane geometry, should possess both plausibility and attraction. The danger, however, remains that plausibility and attraction may be mistaken for validity without more ado, for principles applicable only to abstractions need interpretation before they can be legitimately applied to reality as a whole. This of course would not be denied by economists; they readily admit the difficulty, owing to the complexity of the field, of actually applying the conclusions of economic analysis.[1]

But it is not the *complexity* of the field of human conduct which makes difficult the actual application to a given situation of an economic generalization; it is, as we have seen, the essential *unpredictability* of human conduct, the unforeseeable novelty which human ingenuity ceaselessly imports into the world of its creation. Economic analysis may prove that national prosperity is at a maximum when there is international free-trade, but how can knowledge of that generalization help even a politician to decide whether or no to place a tariff on indigo?

Professor Robbins has been criticized for taking too austere a view of his subject and a plea is advanced for supplementing the rigorous scientific analysis of economic facts like "scarcity" or conditions like "welfare" with consideration of problems like the effect on the welfare of the community as a whole of economically profitable advertising. To do this, it is suggested, will give us a "social study" of economics, of which economic science will form a part, indispensable indeed, but still only a part. It may be doubted, however, whether the nature of economic science is such as to permit of an appendage of that kind. For if we want to know about the nature of space we go to a geometer; if we want to know about the nature of money we go to an economic scientist. But in each case we are being told the truth about an abstraction, which has the reality only of an abstraction. Concepts like "money" are human actions or experiences frozen into immobility for the purposes of scientific analysis. How then can any *supplementation* of the analysis of *capita mortua* of that kind give us truth about the concrete world of reality? Reality is not an aggregate

[1] See, e.g., Robbins, *op. cit.*, Edn. 2, p. 125.

or sum of abstractions. Hence when Professor Robbins points out that he is not pleading for "over-austerity in speculative range" but for "more accuracy in mode of statement" (*op. cit.*, Edn. 2, p. viii), it is difficult to see how he can achieve a wider "speculative range" without stepping outside the confining abstractions of his scientific study into what can only be the philosophic consideration of man's economic life in the context of man's conduct as a whole.

We are left, therefore, with the result that the historical and scientific methods of the study of economic activity leave incompletely satisfied the curiosity of *students*, and reach results which need special interpretation before they can be useful to politicians, let alone to *business men*.

From the point of view of the latter, economic science sacrifices individual occasions on the altar of universal principles: it treats "inflation" or the "gold standard" as something external, like the tides, and ignores the fact that these abstract nouns cover human actions and human motives, and so are less calculable than tidal invariability. But if economic science ignores the uniqueness of each business transaction, and reduces all of them to mere instances of a universal or general principle, economic history in the true sense is concerned with a stream of events, overlapping or running into each other, not reducible to the status of mere instances of a general principle, but carrying their whole importance within themselves and their development. And the business world cannot afford in this way to dispense altogether with law. Its individual transactions are indeed all of unique importance, but they are all also just means to an end and are subordinate to that end. We have seen that, in spite of this, economic science and economic history *have* relevance for the economic life, if they are rightly interpreted, and thus, to understand and profit from that relevance, those engaged in the economic activity itself must have done with abstractions and study it philosophically.

Students of economic activity, on the other hand, are no less driven on to philosophical study if they press their curiosity to its limits. For, from this point of view, economic history stops short of saying what economic activity is: it tells us only about its development. Economic science, moreover, is abstract and tells us not about men's reasoned actions, but about laws or tendencies, the disguise under which that action appears when it is considered in abstraction as mere behaviour. History and Science accept their object and take it for granted. They inquire neither into its categories nor into those which they themselves employ; but if the value and meaning of their results are to be rightly assessed, a criticism of

those categories is required, and this is the task or part of the task of the philosophic study of the economic sphere.

That study will be a part of ethics, the study of human conduct as a whole. It will consider the various forms in which economic activity appears, and will define it by giving an account of each of them, and of its development through each of them.[1] Moreover, it will consider not only its relations to other types of human activity (e.g. political or moral), but also its own internal structure. It will criticize, for instance, the category of exchange, and study its growth from barter to the modern credit system, or the category of organization and trace it from the work of artisans and shopkeepers, through limited liability companies and public utility companies, to national enterprises like the Post Office. It will employ a wealth of empirical detail, but its task will be precisely the interpretation of that detail: it will avoid being mere phenomenology, and while it will use the results of history and science it will stand outside them both instead of helplessly oscillating between them, as perhaps the less able of Oxford undergraduate students of economics tend to do as a result of working for an examination in which there is a tripartite division of economics into theory, phenomenology, and history. To describe further the philosophical study of economic activity, however, would be to go beyond the scope of this paper. For it is concerned with the character and methods of economic study, and it is no part of its programme to outline results in which the varying methods issue. And indeed philosophic consideration of a philosophical method of study can only be philosophy itself, but it may be worth while to show by way of a tentative illustration the kind of problem with which the philosophic study of the economic sphere may be confronted, and the kind of answer it can suggest.

Biographies of successful business men sometimes suggest the problem: "Is there anything in the nature of economic activity to make illogical action compatible with, if not actually responsible for, business success?" Business men seem frequently to choose course B when it seems possible to prove that course A is the more advantageous, that there is no reason against it and every reason in its favour. A may be reasonable, they will say, but B is business-like. Method, reason, logic are all in favour of A, but it is extraordinary how often, when the business man has chosen it, B turns out in the long run to be really the better course to have pursued, at least from the business, i.e. the profit-making, point of view. It is because of this that leaders in business so often give the impression of being opportunists, devoid of any consistent policy.

This characteristic of business success, at first sight so perplexing, yields up its secret to philosophic consideration, or, in other words,

[1] For an instance of this, see p. 147 above.

when the categorial structure of the business life is examined. For in practical affairs logic lags behind life: action is not completely self-conscious. Action, properly understood, is the concious self-assertion of the agent in face of the real; it is a process of self-creativity in which means, doing good, and end, being good, coincide. But in the economic sphere, that process is disguised under the category of means and end, held apart from each other, and regarded as abstract particular and abstract universal, the former subordinate to the latter. The end is profit, advantage, interest; everything else is reduced to the status of means. Employees, for instance, become hands: mass production of articles indistinguishable from each other takes the place of the individual products of artistry and handicraft. Now this divorce of ends from means involves the divorce of reason or order from contingency, and this may be illustrated by another quotation from Professor Robbins: "Individual valuation and technical facts are outside the sphere of economic uniformity. To use Strigl's expressive phrase, 'these things constitute the *irrational* element in the universe of economic discourse'."[1] Knowledge—and study—are confined to the sphere of uniformity, to rational ends, and apply themselves in vain to the irrational contingencies of means. Of the universal end we may have knowledge: of the particular means only εὐστοχία τις, a happy hitting of the mark, the business man's flair for what action to take, as opposed to the scientist's or the logician's knowledge, as opposed even to the Record Office official's flair for the date of an old writ. This is why there is so much controversy about and so little advance in the training of business men, for no training machine can be devised for the production of the necessary "flair," and it is this also which explains why sometimes lack of business exprience is not necessarily a disqualification for posts of responsibility in business. Such is the kind of light which philosophic contemplation may throw on obscurities in the economic sphere.

The argument, therefore, concludes with a plea for the revival of a genuine philosophic study of economic activity. Such a study is needed, *first*, by those who are interested in studying that field in *any* way. For as we have seen already, economic science and economic history are incomplete by themselves, and the remedy for that incompleteness is not any additional or supplementary study, but simply a philosophical study of what is—a study, namely, whose method involves both the understanding and the interpretation of general principles, a study which synthesizes the universality of science with the individuality of history, a study which grasps what ought to be in what is.

But *secondly*, the philosophic study of economic life is needed by

[1] P. 106, Edn. 2.

those who are actually living that life themselves. For there seems to be widespread amongst them the impression that prosperity is a matter not of human effort but of economic laws, the outcome of a system of organization or of parliamentary regulation, not something that men create, but something that happens to them, like falling to a stone. To such a view scientific abstraction may lend support, but it will not withstand philosophic criticism, for the category of action bursts through the framework of mechanism.

And *thirdly*, the philosophic study of economics is no less needed by philosophy itself. For, as was said at the outset, economic activity is an universal experience: artists seek to sell their pictures; religion never gets very far from tithes. If we do not all work in factories, we all buy their products, and without a study, therefore, of men's economic as well as of their other social activities, the strands of ethics and politics lie loose and confused, and a philosophy of life has not yet developed into system.

THE INTEREST THEORY OF VALUE

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THE connection of value-experience with activity has led to the widespread modern tendency to interpret value in terms of interest. To value a thing is certainly to take an interest in it, and there can be no doubt that the value any object has for us tends to vary with the interest we take in it. The suggestion readily arises, therefore, that the value of any object simply *is* the interest we take in it. The difficulty with views of this type is that interest is a distinctly subjective category while value is persistently spoken of as if it were somehow objective. Indeed, the term "value" would lose the most essential element of its meaning if it could not be applied to objects of common knowledge in such a way that two people could significantly discuss the question as to whether the object A is not more valuable than the object B and each, on the basis of his own interest and experience, defend a different view. I do not think the subjectivity of value can be as easily disposed of as does Laird[1] in discussing the argument, "Beauty is not in the aurora. Therefore it is in the beholder's mind." This, he says, leads to the absurdity, "Therefore the beholder's mind is beautiful." The apparent absurdity is due to the ambiguity of the term "beautiful." It is applied either to an experience or to the object of that experience. It might not be true, but it certainly would not be absurd, to say, "The beauty is not in the aurora, but in the beholder's experience." For we all agree that to behold an aurora is a beautiful experience. But when one says "The beholder's mind is beautiful," the form of the statement suggests that the beholder's mind is being characterized as the object of a beautiful experience; and that, of course, is absurd. It is not by such verbal tricks as this, then, that the objectivity of value can be maintained. But there is an element of *content* in the notion of value which is stubbornly objective in character. We all feel, when we value a thing, that we value it because it has value and not merely that it has value because we value it. And when we appreciate the value of a thing we always feel that others ought to appreciate the value of it too. On matters of taste it is the mark of the wise man to say "non disputandum"; but to say the same on matters of value is the mark of the fool. The interest theory of value, therefore, if it is to make good its claims, must be able to account for a genuine element of objectivity in value experience.

[1] John Laird: *The Idea of Value.*

This is attempted, for example, in Professor Perry's *General Theory of Value*. There we are given four notions which may legitimately be employed for the critical comparison of values. These are correctness, intensity, preference, and inclusiveness. Of these, the first named, correctness, is an objective standard. But, as Perry points out, it does not yield a measure of better or worse, of greater or lesser, value. "To judge an interest to be correct or incorrect does not in any sense predicate more or less of the interest, and thus does not in any sense predicate better or worse of its object."[1] The other three notions, however, intensity, preference, and inclusiveness, do yield measures of greater or lesser value, for they define quantities of interest, and the object of the greater interest *ipso facto* possesses the greater value. But of these standards the first and second are merely subjective. They do enable an individual to set his values over against each other and weigh them. But they provide no ground for an assertion that all men ought to value A above B because the nature of B is such that it is more valuable. If X *prefers* B to A or is more *intensely* interested in B than A, then these standards, in themselves, offer no ground for decision of the question whether this manifests an axiological obtuseness or a superior axiological perspicacity in X. X's interests confer more value on B than on A and, so far as the principles of intensity and preference are concerned, that is the end of it.

In the notion of inclusiveness, however, Perry finds a standard which can be used to decide questions left undecided by intensity and preference and which he even thinks gives us an objective criterion whereby we can often say that A, independently of my preference or intensity of interest, or yours (though not independently of everybody's) is better or worse than B. So far as inclusiveness is used as a purely subjective standard, there is no doubt of its applicability to problems of comparative value. There is more value in an object that satisfies both my interests A and B than in one that satisfies one only. So, too, if two or more interests which, taken severally, are mutually conflicting can be synthesized or integrated in one composite resultant interest, then there is more value in the more inclusive satisfaction which may be thus obtained than in the satisfaction of either interest, as existing separately, at the expense of the other. Perry points out that such a fine integration of interests is obtained in the "all-benevolent will" and shows, on this basis, that the greatest value is possible only to the harmoniously developed personality. But he also applies the standard objectively to argue that a harmonious society is superior to a state of conflict between persons and to support the humanitarian plea for "the greatest good of the greatest number." The

[1] R. B. Perry: *General Theory of Value*, p. 612.

principle of inclusiveness, he says, does not require that the two interests should be interests of the same subject, but that which James and John both like, *ipso facto*, is better than that which James likes and John dislikes.[1]

But this transition from the subjective standard is only achieved through the ambiguity of words. If X is positively interested in A, i.e. if X values A, then we may say that A has value in the eyes of X. And if A is similarly valued by a million people, then it has value for the million. Further, since, on this form of the interest theory of value, the value of an object is its character of being the object of interest, A then has much of this character, much value. In this sense a broadcast concert should be said to have much value because it can be so widely enjoyed. But here "has much value" merely means "is much valued." Yet the phrase may easily be interpreted to mean "is greatly to be valued," or "is very valuable"; and the same reason for this further meaning might be given, i.e. "because it can be so widely enjoyed." But in this second meaning we have passed from the mere factual notion that the concert is widely valued (is the object of favourable interest by many) to the axiological or ethical notion that that which is widely enjoyed ought to be valued, i.e. sustained and promoted. The term "valuable" (and its comparative "more valuable" and the synonym "better") never mean merely that, as a matter of fact, a thing is valued. They mean rather that it is worthy to be valued whether it is valued or not. This significance is revealed if, for example, I say "Millions of people like to smoke opium in China, so in China opium-smoking is very valuable." No! In China opium-smoking is *widely valued*; but that does not make it very valuable. Because Foo and Lee both like opium-smoking, that does not make it any "better" than if Foo alone liked it, while Lee and all the rest of the Chinese people disliked it. And it is just as misleading to say that "The object which James and John both like is better than the object which either or both dislike."[2] Again, it is similarly misusing terms to argue "If to James's interest in pushpin there is added John's interest in poetry, there is more value in the world than there was before; pushpin *and* poetry are more valuable than pushpin *or* poetry."[3] Only if the two interests are interests of the same subject can we say that it is more *valuable* to have both. If not, then we can only say that there is more valu*ing* in the world than there was before, and that pushpin *and* poetry together are more valu*ed* than either pushpin *or* poetry severally. Most of us would agree that probably a world in which there is more valuing, and thus more value experience, is a world more to be valued, a better or more valuable world, a world rather to be maintained and developed, than a world

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 646. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 648.

in which there is less. But it would be a mistake to assert that it necessarily must be so. On the other hand, most people would affirm that the little world of classical Attica was more valuable than the vast barbarian world of Scythia and Ethiopia. In doing so, we are allowing the subjective standard of "preference" to override the objective aspect of the standard of "inclusiveness." And we feel justified in doing so because we refuse to believe that the mere fact that a thing is "valued" necessarily renders it "valuable." In short, the character of "being valued" or "being an object of interest" does *not, ipso facto,* constitute the "value" of an object or make it "valuable" for any individual other than the one who actually feels the interest in that object. The attempt to treat value as an objective character of things which is *simply* given to them by the interest attitude adopted toward them by individuals thus breaks down as soon as we analyse the ambiguities on which its plausibility depends. Professor Perry's elaborate and brilliant thesis does not, after all, yield an objective standard of value.

But it does not follow that the interpretation of value in terms of interest must be given up. The failure of Professor Perry and other supporters of the interest theory of value to give a satisfactory account of the element of objectivity in our value experience is due, I would suggest, (*a*) to a too simple correlation of value and interest, and (*b*) to a certain limitation inherent in the concept of interest, and of the affective-volitional life, as taken over from current psychology. Let us take (*b*) first. Psychology, being a young science, has not ventured as yet to assert its right to, and need of, certain categories of its own, such as those which many biologists have recently insisted must be recognized in their own field,[1] and such as all biologists have used, whether explicitly recognizing the fact or not. Psychology has simply taken over its categories from biology and has endeavoured to interpret behaviour in physico-chemical terms *plus* such non-chemical concepts as those of the "organism" and the "struggle for existence" which were already in use in the biological sciences. In particular the affective-volitional life has always been interpreted as tending merely toward the maintenance of the individual and the species. The organism is conceived as initially uninterested so long as nothing occurs to disturb its organic equilibrium, and its interests are all conceived as originally directed solely towards those adjustments which tend to ensure the survival of individual and species.

In another work[2] I have urged that this account of motivation (of interest, or the affective volitional life) is inadequate, and that, in addition to its responses to stimuli—ultimately directed as these

[1] E.g. J. S. Haldane: *The Sciences and Philosophy.*

[2] A. Campbell Garnett: *The Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Values.*

are toward biological ends—"every living organism, so long as it is conscious, constantly seeks to express itself in ever-changing activity," that, indeed, "the essential nature of the process of living (from the standpoint of finite consciousness) is to be a finite centre of experience ever enlarging its grasp or penetration of the infinite reality in the midst of which it dwells." This concept of the essentially active nature of mental life presents us with a category or principle of explanation as distinct from the biological concepts of the struggle for existence and of the tendency of the organism to maintain its internal equilibrium as are these latter from the physico-chemical categories which they supplement, or which underlie them. Like these biological categories it is incapable of complete proof or demonstration, but is to be justified by its utility as an explanatory principle and by the stubborn resistance of the facts to any explanation which ignores it. In the light of this principle the objects of interest are seen not to be limited to the conditions which satisfy particular wants rooted in biological needs and feeling tone and in acquired tendencies based on these. Instead, we recognize that activity itself is an object of interest. Indeed, the progressive activity of the self in expanding its cognitive grasp of its world and extending its conative impact upon it is seen to be the most fundamental of all human interests. It is the indirect source of the lower human values which are concerned with our problems of self-maintenance and biological satisfactions; and it is the direct source of those higher human values—Intellectual, Aesthetic, Moral, and Religious—for which, on other forms of the interest theory of values, it is so difficult to account. It will be our aim, in the remainder of what we have here to say, to show how this wider and universal feature of human interest accounts both for the nature of our higher values and for the element of absoluteness or objectivity in all our value judgments.

But we must first seek to give a more definite answer to the question as to what is the precise feature of an experience which we call its value. We shall see that, while value does depend upon interest, the relation is not one of identity (De Witt Parker: "any interest in any object") nor of simple correlation (Perry: "any object of any interest"). This brings us back to point (*a*) in our suggested modification of the interest theory, i.e. that the relation between interest and value has been taken as too simple. Let us ask ourselves, then, what is the element of value which may be cognized in some such common experience as eating? The upholders of the interest theory usually say either that it is a feature of the self-activity of which we are aware (i.e. interest), or that it is a character belonging to the food or the act of eating by reason of that interest. But a man may eat, may enjoy eating, and may be

aware of his interest in the food and in the eating of it, and yet, if he knows he is eating something that is not good for him, may see the process as a whole as characterized by disvalue rather than value. The reason for the disvalue is that the act of eating, though successfully pursuing the ends of the interests of taste and appetite, is seen to be out of harmony with the further end of health. This further end may be only vaguely present to mind, may be largely repressed at the moment, but not unless it is entirely forgotten or unless the act of eating is seen as in harmony with it, can the experience as a whole be characterized by a sense of value.

In such cases, if the value were merely a matter of interest, then, since there is a strong interest in eating the food (strong enough to make the man eat what he knows is not good for him), there should be a vivid sense of value. The fact that there is also an interest in health and that this interest is being injured should also, it must be recognized, introduce a sense of disvalue, which would tend to diminish the total sense of value. But the stronger interest must, if interest as such is the source of value, produce the stronger sense of value. In the type of case we are considering, therefore, the predominant value quality should be positive. But we find instead that it is negative. The hedonic tone is predominantly positive, but not the sense of value. Pleasure is always present so long as the act appears to be harmoniously progressing toward the *immediate* ends of appetite and taste. Were that active interest hindered, the experience would be unpleasant. But the sense of value is only present when the act bears the appearance of harmony not only with its immediate end but also with some more ultimate end with which it is, perhaps more vaguely, felt to be concerned. *The value experience is* in this case *a sense of harmony of the nearer and remoter ends with which the act is concerned.* And as we proceed with our discussion we shall find that this same formula covers all cases.

Value, if this interpretation be correct, is thus something intellectually grasped. It is due to the relation between our ends—between the nearer and remoter ends with which present activity is concerned. But activity is always directed upon an object, whether it be a physical thing, an abstract thought, a sensory image, or some other mental process. The sense of value, therefore, is always a feature of our experience of objects. In our unanalysed experience it attaches itself naturally to the object which is the centre of attention, the object upon which the act is directed, and it is not easily distinguished, even by deliberate introspection, from the other features which enter in to our experience of the object. It is not a quality possessed by objects independently of our experience of them, but, as a feature of our experience of objects, is a quality which objects have for us. Values are, thus, perfectly real characters

of events, as real as any others; and, like all such characters, they have their own peculiar effect upon subsequent events. They are known and remembered and overlooked and forgotten like other objects that human beings experience; and, like many other objects, if not known at the time of their occurrence, they may often, nevertheless, be discovered subsequently by reconstruction of the circumstances in memory and attention to the nature of the activity involved.

When such reconsideration of a value experience occurs, the question at issue is always that of whether the nearer and remoter ends concerned were really in harmony or only apparently so, and whether the remoter end with which the nearer end was in apparent harmony was itself in harmony with other, more important, ends so that there should be no disharmony even to the most ultimate end concerned. Under such re-examination the appearance of value which an experience had at first worn may be entirely changed, or value may be seen to reside in an experience where it was not at first recognized. We then regard the later and more reflective estimate, in which account is taken of the more ultimate ends, as the true one. At each stage of such a consideration of value it is the *apparent* harmony of nearer and remoter ends that gives to the experience its apparent character of value. But at each stage it is because this apparent harmony is believed to be real and ultimate that the existence of the value is asserted as a fact. That which we assert when we assert the value of an *act*, therefore, is the existence of a harmony between the nearer and remoter ends with which the act is concerned; and when we assert the value of a *thing* we assert a harmony between the nearer and remoter ends affected by the activity to which that thing stimulates us.

It must not be thought, however, that the explicit cognition of the ends concerned and of the harmony between them, is necessary to the value experience. *The value experience is the experience of the harmonious operation of the ends concerned in present activity.* In so far as this is the case the experience bears the character of value. At the moment of the experience the individual may or may not be aware of the value when he explicitly attends to the act or object and finds it characterized by that peculiar quality which, upon analysis, we find to depend upon the apparent harmony of ends. It is not necessary to recognize the ends concerned and explicate or educe the relation of harmony between them in order to be aware of the character of value in the experience. The remoter end especially may remain merely implicit in the total experience, but, as do other implicit elements, it nevertheless contributes to the meaning attached to every part of the experience that is explicitly attended to, and to the meaning of the experience as

a whole. Thus in many of our value experiences, and especially in those elusive experiences of the higher values—aesthetic, ethical, intellectual, and religious—the remoter end with which the act harmonizes remains very obscure. But the character of the act as being in harmony with this end may be very clearly present to consciousness. So, too, may the disharmony of ends be clearly recognized even though it is found impossible clearly to explicate the nature of any of the ends concerned, still less to formulate them in propositions. This is, indeed, the most difficult task to which the philosophy of values applies itself.

I wish, in the brief space remaining, to indicate the insight into these problems which may be gained from the standpoint of the conceptions of interest and of value outlined above.

The value of an object, then, is the harmony of the nearer and remoter ends with which the activity directed upon it is concerned; and the remotest or ultimate end or interest is the progressive penetration or grasp of the world in which we live. This penetration or grasp is both cognitive and conative. Cognitively it involves the effort to observe, know, or think all the actualities and possibilities of our world. Conatively it involves the effort continuously to create, i.e. to take effective part in the changing, growing process of the malleable world. It is in the harmony and conative aspects of this ultimate end that our higher, or ultimate values are experienced. Once we recognize this fact of the essentially active nature of mental life, we see that it is quite unnecessary to look to the specific instincts for the explanation of the interests involved in these higher values.[1] We see them instead to arise from the essential nature of mental life. We discover that they are final because they are the experiences in which that life finds its fulfilment; and they are objective, or public, because the nature of mental life is essentially the same in all of us.

Truth value is experienced in the cognitive effort to grasp the *actualities* of the world. Those judgments and propositions which seem to us to do this appear to us to have the quality or value we call truth. Not *any* judgment appears true, but only those which can be assimilated with that body of accepted judgments we call our knowledge. Each judgment is formulated in pursuit of some immediate end, the guidance of present activity, or the solution of some present problem. But each judgment, if true, is also a contribution to the ultimate cognitive end or interest, the extension of the cognitive grasp of the world. And because of the harmony of the nearer and remoter ends involved, explicitly and implicitly, in the judgment it wears for us the quality of value. The criterion of truth which determines the appearance of value is thus purely

[1] As does Prof. Alexander: *Beauty and Other Forms of Value.*

subjective. We have already a body of judgments which are accepted as a genuine grasp of the world. The new judgment, if it appears consistent with these, is also accepted as such. If it is noticed to be inconsistent with one or more of them, then one of the inconsistent judgments has to be rejected. But, though the criterion is purely subjective, the truthvalue is a quality of the judgment, which can be made objective or public in the form of a proposition. And the meaning of the judgment and proposition refers to the objective world. Each judgment formulates experience of that world and is tested by further experience of it. The world that exists independently of our thinking, and that is grasped in our thought, therefore determines the objective standard of truth. And that objective standard is one that we approach more and more as we enlarge our experience and formulate and compare the judgments describing it, accepting those that, by their consistency, appear true and rejecting those that, by their inconsistency, appear false. The criterion of value is subjective. But the use of the subjective criterion is a valid means, and our only means, of discovering, in increasing number and certainty, propositions which are objectively true.

Aesthetic value, or beauty, is also experienced in cognitive activity, but, as R. G. Collingwood has pointed out,[1] in the special cognitive activity of imagination. To recognize the truth of this we need to distinguish carefully between the aesthetic value of an object and the pleasure derived from its sense qualities (colours, sounds, etc.) and from instinctive interests which it may arouse. These latter may be quite essential to the aesthetic value and enhance the enjoyment of the total experience. But beauty is more than any combination of these. The supreme merit of the Mona Lisa and Michael Angelo's Moses, for example, lies not in colours and shapes, nor in any instinctive tendencies that they stimulate and satisfy, but rather in the effect they have upon the imagination. The same may be said of a sunset or the song of a lark. The beautiful object has power to stimulate the imagination and to stimulate it in such a way that it proceeds harmoniously as pure imagination, introducing no elements that are inconsistent with the whole.

Now, just as logical thinking in pursuit of truth seeks to grasp the actualities of the world, so imagination seeks to penetrate its unrealized possibilities and so contributes its quota to the satisfaction of the ever-present, fundamental interest of life. The beautiful object stimulates an interest in elucidating a meaning or following a suggestion contained in itself. These meanings or suggestions are not concerned with facts to be assimilated to the body

[1] R. G. Collingwood: *Outlines of a Philosophy of Art.*

of knowledge and so accounted as true. But they are developments of possibilities latent in the object and its circumstances, and so, so far as they are self-consistent (for we cannot think two contradictories as even possible), they are an elucidation of genuine possibilities of the world. And so the pursuit of the nearer end, concerned with the immediate object, is (providing the imaginative process is self-harmonious) in harmony with the ultimate end of life—the progressive penetration or grasp, in all its actualities and possibilities, of the world in which we live. And this harmony of nearer and remoter ends gives to the experience its sense of value —and an ultimate value because in harmony with our ultimate end.

As with truth the value experienced is the value of the object contemplated. But the criterion of the value judgment is subjective. It is the subject's own experience and upon analysis is shown to consist in the degree and harmony of his imaginative activity. Because individuals differ so their aesthetic experience also differs. But in that they have experience of the same object, and in that, in its essentials, the nature of mental life is the same in all, particularly as to its ultimate ends, it becomes obvious that they perceive, from so many different points of view, the same beauty. And it is also obvious that, in spite of the differences in point of view and experience, there are in all cases certain objective standards of beauty which can be discovered and applied. Thus, even in the difficult case of aesthetic experience, our interpretation of the nature of value, and our principle of the ultimate goal of all interest, enable us to understand both the subjectivity and objectivity of our value experience.

As Truth and Beauty arise from the cognitive aspect of our ultimate interest, so Moral and Religious Value arise from its conative aspect—the effort continuously to take effective part in the changing, growing process of the malleable world. Moral value is a quality of acts. We experience it and its negative (moral disvalue) in relation to our own acts. We call it the good and bad conscience. We also observe it as a quality of the acts of others which we then consider they should perform with a good or bad conscience accordingly. This moral experience or conscience varies greatly from individual to individual, yet the subjective criterion determining it is always the same. Those acts appear to us to be ethical which are in harmony with certain accepted standards or tendencies of our personality. For the most part these standards are traditionally defined. But occasionally we criticize our previously accepted moral principles and when we do so it is always in the interests of a more complete inner harmony. The aim of all ethical thought and discussion is so to formulate the principles of behaviour that, being followed out, there may be harmony in the soul, all

the motives and practices of life so co-ordinated that conflict of impulse is gathered in a higher harmony and the major motives mutually support each other in the fullest possible expression of the personality, i.e. in taking the most effective part possible in the changing, growing process of our world. In brief, an action is felt to be right when its immediate end appears to us to be in harmony with the ultimate end of the individual life, the continuous active participation in the growing process of our world. And because those acts which are disruptive of the established order of the personality (and not contributory to a new and higher order) are most plainly out of harmony with the ultimate end they are most clearly felt to be evil, while those acts which contribute in a difficult situation to the strength of the personality are most clearly felt to be virtuous. This is very plainly to be seen in Greek ethics, e.g. in Plato's four cardinal virtues (Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice), in the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean, in the Stoic wise man, and even in Epicurus.

The moral conscience, then (or subjective moral criterion), is limited to this experience of internal harmony of ends under the supreme or ultimate end of the progressive, active penetration of the world. But the acts take place in an objective world, common to all of us. And human nature and its ultimate end are essentially the same in all of us. Therefore there are certain objective principles or standards to be discovered and applied in the lives of all of us. But these objectively stated principles can only be guides in the pursuit of the inwardly experienced value. And different circumstances determine that the line of activity in the maintenance of that inner consistency of personality on which our sense of moral value depends can not always be the same for each person and each occasion. No refinements of casuistry can replace the principle that each must be true to his own conscience. Moral disintegration begins when a man sells his soul to any, even a moral or ecclesiastical, authority. But in thus being true to his own subjective criterion the moral person rightly feels that he is discovering a genuinely objective value, determined by objective conditions. His act is concerned with objective things and objective results which are not entirely subject to his present determination; and not the least objective and independently presented to him, among these, are that moral tradition and those habits and sentiments which play so large a part in determining what he must do to preserve his own personal integrity, i.e. in giving to certain contemplated acts the appearance of moral value and disvalue. In the light, therefore, of this analysis the objective criterion of moral value can only very tentatively be formulated in terms of specific types of act. Its essential character is rather that of the duty of each individual to

be true to the consistent and enlightened development of his own personality. Once again the subjective criterion of value must be the light by which we pursue the objective.

Now nothing have we said, so far, of the place of altruism in the moral life. For our moral satisfaction, it is only necessary that our altruistic aims should find a sufficient place in a well-knit and consistently lived personality. It is noteworthy that the Greeks gave no such prominent place to the virtue of benevolence as do modern thinkers, some of whom are inclined to define moral good as social good. It is, indeed, to the founder of Christianity that the world owes the conception of the supreme value of universal brotherly love; and it seems to me that the recognition of a peculiar worth in altruism depends upon a value experience which is religious rather than merely ethical. An action is characterized by the experience of moral value when its more immediate end appears to the subject to be in harmony with the ultimate end of the personality, implicitly or explicitly present to consciousness. It is characterized by the experience of religious value when it appears to the subject to be in harmony with a wider end to which his personality itself is to be regarded as a means. I would agree with Durkheim[1] that when the savage in his totemic ceremonies sinks his individuality in that of the tribe he has an experience of genuine religious value even if the totem is no more than a symbol of the tribe. And I think we must agree with Auguste Comte that Humanity may be a real object of religious devotion. For the immediate criterion of religious value, as of all value, is purely subjective. So, if the totem or an idealized Humanity are conceived as constituting the supra-individual end, then the devotion of the personality, in what seems to the person to be harmony with that end, will constitute an apparent harmony of the nearer with this remoter end, and so wear the appearance of value.

In the case of the other types of value we saw that, though the criterion of each individual is subjective, yet there certainly are objective conditions determining objective standards of value. But in the case of religious value the existence of these objective conditions is not quite so obvious unless we confine ourselves to the standpoint of Positivism, or, as it is now called, Humanism. Some people have convinced themselves that they may be discovered by metaphysics; and the historic religions teach that they are revealed by miracle. But the real touchstone by which man has felt his way to the formulation of objective standards in religion (i.e. to the definition of the nature of the supra-individual end and the conditions of its existence and of individual harmony with it) is the subjective criterion itself, i.e. the actual experience of value in the

[1] E. Durkheim: *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.*

submission of his personality to a supra-individual end, variously conceived. The conception of that supra-individual end—totem, Humanity, Zeus, Brahma, the Christian God—which contains in his religious experience the greatest possibilities of value is the one which he regards as objectively sound. The religious man treats his value experience as a clue to the nature of reality of an importance equal to that of his sense experience.

Thus in religion, as in all other realms of value experience, while the immediate criterion is subjective, the value is experienced as a quality of the object concerned and is seen to be affected by objective conditions, more or less clearly perceived, which determine objective standards, which are themselves tentatively approached in critical experimentation with the subjective standard. The understanding of value as the harmony of nearer and remoter ends, and the recognition of interest as having its own continuous and ultimate end, enable us to explain the knotty problem presented by the elements of subjectivity and objectivity in our axiological experience, without entirely surrendering the standpoint of the interest theory of value.

PHYSICAL INFLUENCE AND MENTAL REFERENCE

Professor C. LLOYD MORGAN

In a scientific discussion of the processes which we (or some of us) designate "vital," attention is concentrated on an interpretation of that which happens within a relational system of physical influence. In a scientific discussion of the processes which we reflectively distinguish as "mental," attention is directed to what occurs in a relational system of psychological reference. We should seek to distinguish each from the other in any given context where both are in evidence.

In such a psycho-physical or psycho-biological context, that which observably happens often calls for a blended interpretation in terms of physical influence and in terms of psychological reference. One may, for example, act in response to some current mode of physical influence but also with mental reference to some future state of affairs. None the less, each relational field should be carefully distinguished from the other. And in dealing with those living organisms which differ in status from ourselves we should distinguish their biological status, as recipients of physical influence, from their psychological status, as centres from which mental reference is "projicient." In plants, for instance, there may be little or no prospective reference on their part to a future state of affairs. To inorganic things such as molecules, crystals, or photographic plates, we do not impute either retrospective reference to the past or prospective reference to the future.

Let us, then, briefly consider influence and reference as differing but co-related kinds of relatedness within that which we speak of as the constitution of nature. And let us take physical influence first. One commonly thinks of it (or of what I here mean by it) as *passing* from some "this," it may be a distant source of radiation, to some "that" which is recipient thereof, for example, a photographic plate. Not until the radiant influence impinges on the plate does something new and noteworthy happen. And what then happens and is then specially noteworthy is a reaction of the recipient plate. This reaction discloses to an adequately trained observer the chemical nature of the plate and that specific kind of physical influence to which it responds in accordance with this nature.

So too if in place of such a sensitized plate the recipient is a human eye backed up by a highly organized nervous system, what

then happens is a yet more complex reaction which discloses the biochemical nature of the living recipient and the kind of physical influence to which it is so organized as selectively to respond.

In this case, however, there may be (let us now assume that there is) not only the physiological outcome of that specific kind of radiant influence which adequately stimulates the retina, but contemporaneous therewith, psychological reference to that which we speak of as an object of vision. One here turns from body-story to mind-story. In this case perceptive or unreflective reference betokens the relation which (as we commonly say) connects someone seeing, for example, and somewhat seen. In other cases reflective reference connects someone knowing or thinking with somewhat known or thought of. But in either case reference (or what I here mean by reference) as such has its genetic origin within the confines of the living organism on receipt of some physical influence and in alliance with physiological changes, neural or other, consequent thereon. And in any case if there is no one in some way minding, perceptively or otherwise, there is nothing minded—nothing to which there is the psychological relation of reference. Hence in the absence of a mind in concomitant alliance with a living body no psychological system of reference is in being.

This does not imply that in the absence of what we speak of as reference thereto there is no system of influence—no physical world. It implies only that in the absence of such reference thereto there would be no knowledge of that world based on acquaintance therewith.

Our reflective aim, then, should be carefully to distinguish that closed system of influence which we call the physical world from that complementary system of reference on which our knowledge thereof is founded.

As a matter of perceptual experience one commonly claims to be a receptive of physical influence and thereon distributive of such influence. But though perceptive reference is directed to that which one speaks of as some source of influence—to what we call "Sirius," for example—there is no *passage* of reference from one's mind to the star Sirius analogous to the physical passage of influence from the star to one's retina. None the less, in this typical transaction the psychological relation of reference is opposite in "sense" to the physical relation of influence. The former is *to* Sirius; the latter is *from* Sirius. Here, too, the terms in relation under influence—Sirius and the retina—are both physical. Under reference, however, at least one term in the cognitive relation is not physical but mental. And it is an open hypothesis (which I for one accept) that both terms as *thus* related are mental.

Let us assume that in interpreting influence one starts with the common-sense belief in the continuant existence of a physical world in which there are diverse "organisms" (under Mr. Whitehead's extended usage of this word) each of which is receptive of influence from others and distributive of influence to others. One may subsequently try to keep in touch with that new thought-picture of the deeper relational tissue of physical events which has thus far been disclosed by modern science.

But in concurrently interpreting reference one starts with the no less common-sense belief that some "organisms" other than ourselves are referent centres (i.e. centres from which reference is "projicient"). On further inquiry, however, one may perchance have been led by Leibniz and others in the past and by Mr. Whitehead and others to-day to go beyond this common-sense belief; or, at any rate, to consider the grounds on which they have been led to believe that *all* "organisms," not-living and living without exception, are (in what after Leibniz one may call their "monadic" capacity) in some wise referent centres or centres which exemplify that which Lotze probably meant by "taking note of" and that which Mr. Whitehead now speaks of as "prehension."

This may be regarded as a speculative theory. The basal assumption is that, throughout nature, correlative with the physical influence of "this" pattern of events on "that" recipient "organism" (living or not-living) there is reference (of an incipiently mental kind) projicient from the recipient organism to the objective situation. Presumably such monadic reference (if such there be) is neither prospective nor retrospective but is restricted to a momentary "now" in the fluent phase of the reception of influence in passage. If so, it is hard to see what empirical evidence can be adduced in support of this imputation of reference as occurrent on the part of a not-living thing—on the part of the moon, for example, as receptive of a pattern of gravitative influence.

Let us, then, relegate to a philosophical suspense account any further consideration of this speculative vision of one all-embracing system of reference co-ordinate with, and complementary to, the all-embracing system of physical influence. That leaves us with that which I mean by mental reference on the part of living organisms, or at any rate some of them.

But what are we to include under mental reference in the sense here intended? I should distinguish, in ascending order, three modes of reference—sentient, perceptive, and reflective. But others—Mr. Broad, for example, in his able book on *Mind and Its Place in Nature*—restrict their use of the word "reference" to the reflective stage of mental development. Justifiably, no doubt, from this point of view Mr. Broad regards the sensing of a sensum (the pure sensa-

tion of a noise or a patch) as objective but non-referential (pp. 305–6, cf. p. 151). From my point of view such sentient relatedness is typically referential as genetically contributory to the evolution of an emergent system of reference which, in us, becomes in due course reflective and is then characterized by judgment and belief.

On this understanding the question arises: To what is there reference at any stage of its expanding development? The traditional answer to this question is: That to which there is such reference, in any mode thereof, is what by common consent we speak of as "objective." And it is thus objective to him whom we agree to call "the subject." Such, in brief, is the classical manner of reflectively interpreting "the cognitive relation" which, on these terms, holds between "subject" and "object," whenever someone minding is in face of somewhat that is then and there minded.

On these terms the traditional differentiation of the subject as minding from objects as minded—a distinction now so familiar as to be commonly taken as typically primitive—is known by us only as a late outcome of our reflective thought. And for this reflective thought the subject as minding (or, at any rate, somewhat adequately representative thereof) must itself be objectively minded. It must itself be an object of thought. That object of thought which thus represents the subject as minding, say, on some past or some future occasion, is what we have learnt to call the conscious "self" to which there is now objective reference—retrospective or prospective—in a reflective field of thought. Hence only at the self-conscious stage of mental development can subjective minding be not only "enjoyed" but also contemplated in representative form.

But genetically preceding, and thereafter underlying, such reflective procedure is the unreflective cognition which we attribute to the infant and the animal at an earlier stage of naïve perception. A further question thus arises. When the cognitive relation (of someone minding to somewhat minded) is in being at the non-reflective stage of mental development, what is it that we speak of as a mind. To this question one of two answers may be given. Let me thus state them. Some may elect to define a mind as that system of processes which constitutes the subject's experience in minding. These processes (in perceiving, for example) are typically mental; but that which is minded or unreflectively perceived, is, they say, no less typically non-mental. Others elect to define a mind as the whole system of relational reference which includes not only the subject in process of referring to this or that object but also those objects to which there is cognitive reference on his part.

There seem, then, to be two definitions of mind and of that which is designated "mental." Each of us should say frankly which of them

he accepts as a stance for further discussion, without presuming to demand of others like acceptance.

I am one of those who accept the latter. For me, therefore, any given object of reference is no less mental than is the subjective procedure of him who refers to it. As objective it is "in mind." But, for me, it is thus "in mind" (as Berkeley said), "by way of idea," in contrast with "in mind by way of attribute"—i.e. as characterizing the subject in process of minding.

But that which is thus in mind by way of idea (in Berkeley's sense) may indicate the presence of something that is physically non-mental within the system of influence. This or that somewhat, say "Sirius," may be a radiant centre of influence on the body *and* a focal centre of reference from someone as subject. Hence it is legitimate to claim that any given somewhat may be *both*, so long as due stress is laid on the radical distinction of physical things in the field of influence from psychological objects in the field of reference.

In thus including within the mind not only all processes of subjectively minding but all that is objectively minded as together constituting a psychological system of reference to be abstractively distinguished from the physical system of influence, one no longer asks whether the so-called primary, secondary, or tertiary qualities assigned to this or that object (say its shape, colour, and beauty) are mental or non-mental, for one has already defined them as objectively mental within the system of reference, whatever may be the non-mental status which may be assigned to their physical counterparts within the system of influence. For us, then, the cardinal point for emphasis is that, apart from the cognitive relation, no one of them comes into being in such wise as to be designated "objectively mental" in the psychological sense of this expression; none can afford an instance of the emergence of novelty (if such there be) within the system of reference—that is, within that system which we on our part define as a mind.

Two rather technical questions here arise. First, is that which is subjectively in mind—when one is perceiving Sirius, let us say—"identical" with some vital process (predominantly neural) which concurrently occurs within one's body? Secondly, is the sensible quality of that which is objectively in mind, as perceived, "identical" with a physical property of the material thing which stimulates some sensory organ of the body? Before one says Yes in either case one must inquire what such an "identity hypothesis" is held to imply. If its acceptance entails the rejection of so radical a distinction as is, for us, that between physical influence on and within the body and mental reference from subject to object, then in neither case can we, on our part, say Yes.

But we, on our part, may substitute for this identity hypothesis a different hypothesis. On this hypothesis we submit that "concomitant with" seeing, for example, there are physiological processes in the living body; and that "co-related with" colour, as seen, there was a foregoing event in the more or less distant source of radiant influence which has entailed a specific biochemical reaction consequent on the reception of stimulation by the selective retina. The point for emphasis on our part is that, alike in minding and in the genesis of that which is objectively minded, *the accompanying vital processes are within the body.*

Within the body, then, are those biochemical events in the system of influence which are concomitant with the appearance of colour in the accompanying system of psychological reference. Until such biochemical events are in being there is, on *this* hypothesis, no reference of colour to anything external to the body. In other words there is, on *this* hypothesis, no transmission of colour, as a property of a material or non-mental thing—a ruby or sapphire, for example —by means of that radiant influence which is received by the retina.

On a different hypothesis, however (nowadays widely accepted), colour as non-mental *is* thus transmitted; it *does* in some way pass from the material thing which influences the retina to the biochemical constituents of the living organism; it does *not* have being (as colour) only within the psychological system of reference.

The latter hypothesis leads us back to that definition of mind in accordance with which the adjective "mental" is applicable only to the subjective processes that occur when someone is minding with consequent emphasis on the non-mental status of the secondary qualities of material things as given to perception. Here then the question arises: Should we (on *this* hypothesis) speak of the non-mental material thus perceived as thereby "possessed by mind"? And, if so, what does such "possession" imply? For an answer one naturally turns to *Space, Time and Deity.* One there learns that the phrase "possession by mind" is so used by Mr. Alexander as to carry a specialized meaning. It is so used by him as always to imply that the mind which enters into possession is distinctively *reflective* in its exercise of *judgment* (Vol. II, pp. 217, 242–3, 294–5, 304).

In so far as, or so long as, any instance of minding is assignable to the lower and predominantly sensory status in instinctive or unreflective experience, what is concurrently perceived is still, for Mr. Alexander, typically non-mental. On these terms, therefore, the secondary qualities of things—their colour and scent, for example—are wholly of "material" origin and nowise depend for the character of their being on the compresence of someone who has sensory acquaintance with them. Here no "intrusion of mind"

(p. 216) plays any part in their natural genesis. They afford "real appearances" (p. 184) of the non-mental system of events and thus partially or selectively reveal the physical nature of the "material" given to one's mental perception.

But whenever an appearance is in some measure tainted by "illusion," in that measure there *is* such intrusion of mind, though it is not always so designated. Still "our illusions," so we are told, "are always in a manner artefacts of our own and their reality in the form which they possess is owing to the mind which entertains them" (p. 227). Hence in the genesis of all *illusory* appearance a new factor—a distinctively mental factor—plays a noteworthy part. This mental factor entails some distorted misacquaintance with the non-mental thing, or the material situation, as it "really" (i.e. physically) *is* independently of such intrusion of mind. The salient point for due emphasis here is that in illusory perception, as such, there is always some modification or distortion of the non-mental world as it actually or physically *is*, independently of our reference thereto. Nay, more. In so far as revival in memory is *always* in some degree distorted (p. 218), such distortion in all perceptive expectation is attributable to the "intrusion of mind" (or its equivalent), as generating a mental "artefact."

When we pass, however, from unreflective to reflective procedure, and feel justified in recognizing the effective presence of judgment and what this entails, then, and not till then, does there come on to the scene that later "possession by mind" which implies far more than the precedent "intrusion of mind." Not only is there some distortion of "the real appearance," there is also a "blend" of reflective minding with the non-mental material thus minded. This "blend" of the mental and the non-mental in a reflective field of reference gives genetic origin to that which we name "value" which has no being in evolutionary existence save as possessed by some mind in which there has been developed the requisite capacity of thoughtful judgment.

On these terms and from this point of view that which we commonly speak of as "value" comes into evolutionary existence (or, as I say, emerges) in a specialized field of reference. In this field it takes form as a new empirical character which, under judgment, we assign to such psychological objects as are possessed by mind in the manner described. And the natural genesis of this distinctive character is interpreted as a blending of mind (as possessing) with some pattern of material, not only afforded to perception through appropriate channels of physical influence, but so possessed by mind as thereby to acquire value.

It may, however, be said that no such interpretation of the natural genesis of value as an empirical character can throw any light on

the ontological status of value in an abiding hierarchy of generating forms which are (in Mr. Whitehead's phrase) so ingressive into actual situations in concrescent advance as to render them expressive of the relevant Potentiality of Ultimate Being. That is so. Value as an empirical character which is new in temporal advance cannot be identical with (though it may be due to) that which has eternal subsistence in an abiding Realm of Forms. If empirical value is, as I say, "emergent" (cf. *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 304), it should be distinguished from ontological value as "ingressive." All that one can (and may still) claim is that, since ontological value does come within the wide domain of philosophical thought, it (or some concept representative thereof) comes also within the field of psychological reference and thus becomes known by us as reflectively possessed by mind with the reality which such possession by mind entails.

For it must not be supposed that the dependence of the commonly recognized instances of empirical value on the evolutionary advent of full possession by mind as capable of judging, excludes them from the expanding realm of comprehensive reality. On the contrary, through their genesis, this realm of evolving reality (not only *physically* "real") gains a new empirical character which had no being prior to that blending of the mental and the non-mental which possession by mind implies. Hence, consequent thereon, the object itself acquires value as possessed by the subject; the subject acquires value as possessing the object; and on both counts the blended reality is newly enriched (cf. p. 302).

If, as I venture to hope, my brief summary of the salient points in this thesis is substantially correct, it does, I think, lay due emphasis on certain characterizing features which distinguish the more highly reflective from the unreflective levels of referential experience; and it does show how reflective possession by a mind which is capable of judgment makes a real difference in that which is thus minded in bestowing on it a so-called tertiary quality, such as beauty or truth or goodness, for example. There may be difficulties which preclude my acceptance of the underlying definition of mind as subjective only and therefore restricted to enjoyment (cognitive and other) in process of minding. I may find it hard to grasp the exact manner in which the mental process concerned in appreciating the beauty of a melody can "blend" with the non-mental material transmitted from a distance by means of wireless influence. Still some kind of blending there is. And for my thought it takes form in a blended *interpretation* in terms which do justice alike to influence and to reference. Such a *blended interpretation* in terms of influence *and* of reference does seem to be what physicists, biologists, psychologists, and logicians endeavour to formulate when they meet in

joint session to consider the modern outlook on natural science as a whole and as seen from diverse points of view on complementary lines of approach.

But rather than here attempting more explicitly to indicate some of the difficulties which preclude me from unreservedly accepting a blend of the mental and the non-mental as defined by one whom in large measure I follow as my guide and master—difficulties which he and others are able to surmount—let me in conclusion revert to the alternative definition of mind in accordance with which the adjective "mental" may be applied (with suitably adverbial qualifications), both to the processes which occur in all instances of subjectively minding and to that which is in any way objectively minded. On this definition whatsoever is minded, whether reflectively or unreflectively, is thereby in some wise "possessed by mind." As thus possessed (in this comprehensive sense) it is no longer what it was aforetime—that is, prior to and independently of such possession. That which has beauty, or truth, for example, does no doubt acquire this referential value as possessed by mind in reflectively appreciating it with aesthetic joy, or in intellectually judging it to be worthy of belief. But the shape of an object of vision or of touch is also, in a wide sense, possessed by mind in unreflectively perceiving it. Colour, too, is possessed by mind at the yet lower level of direct sensory acquaintance therewith. One may say: Anything that is in some way objectively in mind—seen, heard; imaged, thought of; remembered, expected; aesthetically appreciated or intellectually accepted—is in that way possessed by mind, and in that way comes within a field of psychological reference.

It is thus within a system of *reference*, as distinguished from the co-related system of influence, that minding and what is minded alike have being, and alike, as I think, afford evidence of the emergence of novelty in the genetic advance of evolution both physical and mental.

But the evidence in support of unpredictable novelty as emergent on both sides of the account—subjective novelty in minding no less than objective novelty in that which is minded—presupposes a "blended interpretation" in which neither influence nor reference is abstractively ignored. Few evolutionists ignore the part which influence plays in the concrescent advance of world-events. But there are some who are prone to ignore the complementary part which reference plays in a scientific interpretation of these events.

So we must ask this final question: Can we enter on a discussion of the system of influence, as physically interpreted, without retrospective *reference* to events which, as we infer, have existed in the past, and prospective *reference* to events which, as we believe, will exist in the future?

If we cannot do so—and there are many who hold, with David Hume of old and with Professor Max Planck to-day, that any consideration of relational causation involves a discussion of the validity of prediction under prospective reference; if we cannot do so, it is only as in some way "possessed by mind" that the nature of the system of influence in the physical world is partially "revealed" to scientific knowledge and thought or even to unreflective perception.

PHILOSOPHIC HISTORY AND PROPHECY

Professor Arnold Toynbee's Outlook

HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.Lit.

Professor Toynbee observes in his *Study of History*[1] that as he walked down Whitehall one day in the spring of 1918, and passed the Board of Education offices which had been commandeered for a new department of the War Office, "improvised in order to make an intensive study of trench warfare," he found himself repeating the passage from St. Matthew's Gospel:

"When ye therefore shall see the abomination of desolation spoken of by Daniel the Prophet stand in the holy place (whoso readeth let him understand) . . . then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time. . . . And except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved."

The prophecies of religious genius which seize upon our imagination when first heard so that they can never be forgotten but recur at historic moments, often seem to have a historic fulfilment, because their spiritual intensity rhythmically meets an experience similar in profundity to that which called them forth, and the factual differences fade away. Strict fulfilment of religious prophecies there has not been in history. Neither have all the methods of philosophy, or of scientific history when turned towards the future, taken us much beyond the question, "Watchman, what of the night?"

Successful prediction is a means of verification of hypotheses in science. The type of prediction based on a survey of history which seeks to understand its essential significance, and the true nature of civilization, would be different. On the one hand, no such exact verification of law or generalization in occurrences as science demands is conceivable in history, unless in very narrow fields, of special events. This is primarily because the ultimate constituents of history are wholly individual, and once for all. On the other hand, the aim of historical prophecy would be to discern whether the real and inner sources of historic development are such as necessarily to operate in the future as in the past, rather than to examine the question what events may be expected to occur assuming that those sources remain unchanged. The immense difficulty and the failures hitherto of historic prophecy are due, then, not so much to the inconceivable complexity of the data, as to the nature of the subject with which the forecast would be concerned. The data are only to be found

[1] Volume III, pp. 167–168.

in experience, but what the experience has to reveal is the nature of those forces which have made history, the human selves struggling to transcend animal experience, and realize more fully the values which they find in the event process, the alien, contingent, or "senseless" conditions,[1] of which they must take account or perish spiritually, if not physically. The inquiry then demands categories of investigation of another type than those of science. The investigator is assisted by all his human knowledge. The great interpretations of life which have proceeded from genius in drama and epic, in religious myth and moral philosophy, will help to equip him. By the art and literature of different races light may be thrown on the nature of the creative mind in the experiments of civilization. These various sources of interpretation of man's endeavours to enrich his experience with value may be more illuminating if compared with each other. Nor must the fields of historic fact, in records, in archaeological remains, in scientific histories, be neglected.

Since it is the function of philosophy to criticize the forms and categories which make knowledge possible in the various departments, the examination of the categories or principles for the interpretation of history which result from insight gained in the ways thus indicated would seem to be the business of philosophy. It is a very different relation of philosophy to history from that assumed in the philosophies of the *a priori* schools. For these start from the postulate that metaphysical, logical, or ethical principles necessitate that history should be of such and such a character. They compel therefore the reinterpretation of historical phenomena which appear inconsistent with the required conclusions, or resort to the faith that with complete knowledge the inconsistencies would disappear. Such philosophies are discredited to-day. Equally with the attempts to treat the sequence of history as capable of being brought under universal laws, comparable to those of the empirical sciences, they exhibit the fallacy pointed out by Aristotle in his rule of method.[2] "It is not possible to demonstrate (in one kind of knowledge) with the principles belonging to another." Yet in the case of historic knowledge, on account of the very universality of the subject-matter, since everything comes to us as history, the more manifold and varied the sources of our categories the greater their adequacy. Even certain *a priori* postulates may be found indispensable. Such is the postulate that "value cannot perish out of the world,"[3] which, in relation to human experience, signifies that civilization in some form will endure.

[1] "Senseless" in Professor Whitehead's terminology (*Adventures of Ideas*). I have elsewhere used the term "blind."

[2] *Posterior Analytics*, Book I, Chapter VII.

[3] Belief in this principle is Höffding's definition of religion.

Professor Toynbee's analysis of the genesis and growth of civilizations exhibits in a strikingly original way the power referred to above of using the fruits of profound experience of life in its great aspects for the construction of principles of explanation. He has so far published only the first three volumes of a work which is to comprise thirteen. But there is enough here to enable some estimate of the philosophical value of the categories employed, and to inquire whether they are such as to make possible prophecy of the kind proper to history. Only a few examples can be selected for this inquiry, but the spirit of the interpretation, in spite of the rich variety in the choice of symbolic ideas to illuminate the unconscious processes of a people's development, seems fundamentally the same throughout.

First it must be noted that Professor Toynbee takes as the "social unit" societies, not states. These societies which have a common civilization form "the intelligible objects" of historical study, whilst "national" or "city" states are parts of these. But, again, all the societies which history proper studies, are related to each other in the sense that "they are all representatives of a single species of society." This is the species of civilized societies, or civilizations, as distinguished from primitive societies. Of the species there are five living civilizations, Western, Orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu, and Far Eastern—and fourteen that are now extinct.[1] He rejects emphatically the misconception of "The Unity of Civilization." The thesis that the present unification of the world on a Western basis is the consummation of a single continuous process which accounts for the whole of human history requires a violent distortion of historical facts and a drastic limitation of the historian's field of vision." Perhaps to the historical grounds he gives for this negation of the doctrine of the Unity of Civilization we may add one based on the philosophic principle (which Professor Toynbee also recognizes) that the ultimate sources of civilization are the creative selves in any society. In my view it is the subject selves who are the true constituents of history, but I should agree with him that societies must be taken as the main objects with which history as a great branch of knowledge is concerned, for the individual selves are not fully knowable. Now these ultimate sources are in their very nature unique, and all events in which they are concerned are individual and never repeated. It follows that when through the pioneer advance and fellow-working of such personalities in the construction of higher forms of living, civilizations have arisen, they will be essentially individual in their character. A unity of civilization would then mean that all forms except one

[1] The number is later given as twenty-one by division of the "Orthodox Christian" and the "Far Eastern" Societies.

were extinct. This distinctness will not, of course, as Professor Toynbee points out, prevent their comparison. His views that (*a*) all representatives of the species civilization are philosophically contemporaneous, and (*b*) all are philosophically equivalent, are also important. The first follows from the position that Time is relative, the second from the position that value is intrinsically subjective, and the members of each civilization will hold, if not that theirs is the only civilization that exists, at least that it is the only civilization that possesses any value. The relativity of value to the age and society must be admitted. The problem whether this relativity can be overcome, to the point of asserting one principle that shows itself to be absolute, is the chief philosophical problem in relation to the continuance of civilization and the survival of any one form. It appears that if there is such a principle it must lie in the nature of personality, the ultimate source of civilization. Some comparison of civilizations in respect to their value would then be philosophically justified, the criterion being the presence of creative personality and the promise of its increased control of alien factors. This is, I think, in harmony with Professor Toynbee's main views as to the genesis and growth of civilizations. He insists, indeed, in Vol. I, that all civilizations hitherto developed must on a philosophic view be regarded as "approximately equal to one another." Yet in a later volume (III) he is able to state the conclusion that "a given series of successful responses to successive challenges" (which make possible any civilization) may be taken as a manifestation of growth, "in so far as the action tends to shift from the field of the external environment—to the *for intérieur* of the growing personality or the growing civilization." And this would enable a comparison in respect to value.

Let us now examine certain of the principles of explanation which run through the work. The first broad distinction between the primitive and the civilized society is that the former appears to be static, the latter dynamic. But this contrast is found to be not permanent and fundamental, but an "accident of the time and place of observation." All human societies must be, at different stages, both static and dynamic. The primitive must once have been in motion, those that have entered upon the process of civilization will at some time come to rest. The mutation of primitive societies into civilizations, however, involves a "transition from a static condition to a dynamic activity." Professor Toynbee illustrates the recognition of this process as a kind of alternation of states in the universe, from modern philosophy (General Smuts), from psychology, sociology, Greek philosophy in Empedocles' ebb and flow of Love and Strife, and from the Chinese opposition of "Yin and Yang." Civilizations in their genesis he describes as "particular beats of a

general rhythmical pulsation which runs through the universe." If we compare the conception thus arrived at with Herbert Spencer's idea of progress as the passage from an undifferentiated, incoherent, indefinite homogeneity to a differentiated, coherent, definite heterogeneity, we feel in Professor Toynbee's method the concreteness, the value quality, the spirit of the great experience of mankind, which is necessary to historic interpretation. Spencer gives us in contrast an abstract formula which can only be equated with real progress by means of the hypothesis that increase of complexity is identical with increase of value. But this cannot be verified. The "dynamic and static" formula does not necessarily signify the human contrast of the struggle to a higher, and the passive acceptance of existing conditions. But that this is the nerve of the contrast between civilization and primitive society is suggested by Professor Toynbee's image of the rock-climber who is going on to a higher ledge, whilst another lies prone on the ledge he has once reached by effort. This image reminds us that we must not ignore the gigantic effort of "primitive" man in rising from the sub-human to the human. Another formula which even more essentially belongs to history, as intrinsic to human experience, is that of "challenge and response." Professor Toynbee's introduction of this conception is still more philosophic in Plato's sense of the philosopher as "contemplating all time and all existence," than his introduction of the dynamic-static formula. It is, however, time and existence as interpreted by religious and poetic genius that he surveys, finding in the greatest myths, allegories, and dramas of human destiny the "challenge and response" motive. The plot of the myths to which he refers is an encounter between two superhuman personalities from which vast consequences result for man, as in the Old Testament "Fall of Man," the New Testament "Redemption of Man," the theme of Job, of Goethe's *Faust*, of Aeschylus's *Prometheus*, etc. He finds even in the astronomer's account of the origin of the Planets[1] once more the old myth of the encounter between the sun-goddess and her ravisher. Also in Darwinism with its internal factor of Variation and external factor of Natural Selection the conflict reappears.

The outcome, in the language of mythology, is that "when one of God's creatures is tempted by the Devil, God Himself is thereby given the opportunity to re-create the world. . . . The Devil's intervention has accomplished the transition from 'Yin to Yang,' from static to dynamic." The rest in a state of seeming peace and bliss, could not give way to a new activity of creation until the divine equilibrium has been upset by the Satanic instability. The idea of the conflict between God and Satan, of the ordeal and suffering

[1] Sir James Jeans.

of the human protagonist, are gradually applied by Professor Toynbee to the harsh experience of the human race through its highest members in the genesis of civilization. Thus the savages who had wandered into a cold climate lacking clothes, houses, fire, and instead of retreating south, began to use their minds in invention, made the first response to the challenge of the environment and learning through suffering took the first steps towards civilization. This idea is worked out in Professor Toynbee's analysis of the origins of the known civilizations. In every case he shows that it is the people who chose the harder way, the harder climatic conditions, relying on their own endurance and inventiveness, who started or hastened the advance to the higher human life. The "challenge" came to them in the shape of difficulties which without new and unpredictable efforts could not have been overcome, whilst the overcoming brought with it other unforeseen gains. We may perhaps ask, Is the keynote of these events truly given in the myths and dramas? It is at least clear that these are true expressions or symbols of certain universal characteristics of history, and of spiritual experience, the vicarious sufferings of individuals and communities, the learning and strength won through suffering—if it is not too crushing (as the path of some races has been too hard). The meaning of the author may be taken to be that genius having insight into the inner and universal principles of human life and history, the spiritual currents into which its raw material is taken up, expresses these in great imaginative creations. The experience of "challenge and response" clearly begins in the ultimate historic factors, the individual lives. From the point of view of the present writer, this is the reason for its display on a great scale in the building of civilizations, for the first reality lies in the personal striving. Nor is this inconsistent with Professor Toynbee's standpoint. But there is a tendency in his work to personify "civilization" or treat it as something more than the individuals who, like many Atlases, "bear it up." In a sense it *is* more than the individuals of any one time, for it consists in institutions and traditional modes of life the objectification of the energies of many generations. Yet it is nothing but stocks and stones and fading memories, except in so far as upborne and ensouled by the living minds of the present. Professor Toynbee does not conceive a society as a being which has a life of its own beyond that of its members —such as Professor Hartmann's "Objective Mind"—to take an example from recent philosophy.[1] It is constituted, in his view, by the activities of all its individuals. But for the student who takes as his central theme the idea of nation, empire, civilization, etc., as he must from the standpoint of history as record, the tendency

[1] *Das Problem des Geistigen Seins.*

is almost irresistible to treat these as the ultimates, and thereupon constructing "laws" of their processes, which are valid as postulates for knowledge, lose sight of the possibility of historic freedom.

An interesting but rather doubtful analogy or even identity of principle between the experience of the individual soul and the process of civilization is drawn by Professor Toynbee in the method of "withdrawal and return."[1] This principle is shown to be at work in the lives of the most remarkable personalities. It is obviously found in individuals, prophets, saints, mystics, saviours of their people, great artists, and writers. The withdrawal from the world is followed by the return to be of signal service to their fellows. The concept is then transferred to societies and nations. Here it seems to me the analogy fails. "Penalized minorities" withdraw, as for instance the English non-conformists after the Civil War, from the time of the Restoration to that of the passage of the Reform Bill. They "withdraw into the realm of private business to return omnipotent as the authors of the Industrial Revolution." The English Nation withdrew from continental entanglements in 1558 to return to European relations in 1914. The vital aspect of the withdrawal of the individual, is that he retreats from the world in order to find his own soul or perceive some vision or discover some truth which is hidden from him in the constant social distraction of his superficial nature. There is no parallel motive in the society. It withdraws from one type of activity no longer successful, and, concentrating on another by intensive cultivation, may make of this a new talent. This happens also in the individual life, but the withdrawal and return features in this kind of process are only similar in unessentials to those of the mystic, etc. Here it appears to me Professor Toynbee overlooks the fact that the deepest experiences of personality cannot be transferred to a group of persons as such.

As regards the problem of historic prophecy, more light will no doubt be cast on this author's position in later volumes. The method, as it has been indicated in the first three volumes, would not admit of any strict forecasts in a scientific sense. By what means shall we gauge the quality and degree of creative energy in the response of a people to the challenge of its environment, inanimate and human? This is the more impossible since Professor Toynbee takes the position to which, in his view, history has testified again and again, that it is the creative minority, namely individuals of genius, who are responsible for the origin and growth of civilizations. But the method does not inherently preclude a conclusion of probability that certain most universal features in the history of civilization will endure. Such is the principle that all civilizations will enter

[1] Volume III, p. 248.

upon a period of decay when the stage has been reached at which sufficient success prevents the further and fresh display of creative energy in response to new challenges. In his investigation of the principles of growth in civilizations, Professor Toynbee deals elaborately with expansion, and assembles many illustrations, from that of the Egyptian civilization to those of America before European invasion, in support of the position that expansion is no criterion of growth. He inclines in fact to the view that in the majority of cases true growth is found to be in inverse proportion to the expansion of a civilization. There appears to be some ambiguity in the notion of expansion and its relation to decay. In the early days of a people's development expansion to some extent seems a necessary movement, and Professor Toynbee dwells upon the cultural inspiration of the contact with new ground (Vol. I). Once the character of the civilization is determined, he appears to argue—expansion in general is concomitant with social disintegration (Vol. III). It may be, however, that the seed of disintegration did not lie in expansion, but in some other attendant condition, as for example, militarism—an instance which he himself gives. The phenomena included under expansion in fact require analysis, as do also the phenomena included under disintegration. This is especially evident in the criticism of the American civilization, where it is not clear whether Western civilization as a whole is lowered on account of the expansion over America, or whether the significant fact is the failure of the "new" countries to originate a new civilization, or to develop in fresh forms the finer things of the old. It is evident that in relation to this phenomenon of expansion the severest test of the permanence of the Western civilization must be applied by Professor Toynbee. We are experiencing the unprecedented event of the expansion of a single civilization in some of its aspects, especially the economic and political—(the more superficial in his view)—over the whole globe. Is there any way of avoiding the conclusion that Western civilization is approaching its end in spite of the brilliance which still attends its activities? Is this the brilliance of a setting sun? He can point to many signs of disillusionment in regard to the mechanical triumphs in which it has excelled, and many cases in history in which a high culture has not been characterized by a high level of mechanical development. The problem will clearly receive further consideration in the later part dealing with "The Prospects of the Western Civilization." At present the chief outcome of his remarkable Study seems to be as follows. The principle of historic necessity is in the ascendant where the historian's voice alone speaks. On the one hand a survey of the rise and fall of civilizations shows no single one to possess enduring conditions of stability. On the other, profound analysis

does not support the view, that all former civilizations were but preparations or steps in the ladder culminating in our own, which therefore might be an exception to the general law and expected to survive. Professor Toynbee does not appear to give much weight to the consideration of the incalculable fragmentariness of our knowledge of history in relation to the lost knowledge of the past and the unknown of the future, but he recognizes it as a historian in so far as he never takes up a dogmatic position in the limitation of possibilities of the future. And when his voice is that of a philosopher, the principle of historic freedom appears on the horizon. By this I mean that in the words of the philosopher to whom he most frequently refers, M. Bergson, the "gates of the future are open." From this standpoint the essential is, as he very finely argues, that the spiritual principle of personality is the true source of civilization. The philosopher is not abandoning experience in affiming this truth, but he is viewing experience on its inner side as the subject who is akin to its deeper origins can view it. He may see therefore possibilities of novelty of which the historian cannot take account. The philosopher's experience, whilst it cannot contradict the historian's, may have a quality which suggests a deeper and more universal principle than the historian's "social law." This principle gaining strength in the contest with the last "challenge" of the human environment, the mechanical civilization may, before it is too late, create a "response" which will save civilization. It might be suggested, in conclusion, that Professor Toynbee's *animus* against some of the forms taken by the Western civilization seems to cause him to pass over certain signs of the reaction against these inspired by the personal principle, and to give insufficient recognition to its remarkable expressions in modern life.

ON ABSTRACT ART

IVAN W. BROOKS.

SINCE the death of Cézanne in 1906, there has been throughout the world of European art a general reawakening of a sense of the necessity for *constructive* qualities in painting. Whereas our fathers were content to speak of the "composition" of a picture, in our own day it is more usual to speak of its construction. Composition, after all, is a comparatively loose and elastic term implying a generally harmonious arrangement of the massed effect of light and dark, a juxtaposition of contrasting and balanced tones, sufficiently logical in their placing as to give a general sense of repose and unity to the work as a whole. Composition was generally understood to be dependent upon instinct and good taste on the part of the painter, and, as such, it was looked upon as a thing that could not be taught by rule of thumb. Like a sense of colour, a student either had it or he had not; and, beyond attempting to guard him from glaring error, there was little that a teacher of art could do for him in this department of his training. Perspective, which is governed by definite mathematical rules, could be taught in detail as an aid to composition, but the sense of composition itself must be allowed to develop in the student according to his talent for this side of his work. Composition classes were indeed a part of his curriculum, but the criticism which a student received at such classes amounted, in practice, to little more than general advice, given by the teacher, from his ripe experience and his developed sense of the right and wrong in this matter, to the unmatured taste of the student. It was understood that composition could not exist without a general sense of order, but it was understood in a much looser sense than is implied by the comparatively modern use of the word "construction" that has replaced it. The artist of the modern school or schools of thought (for there is no one modern school) will have none of the old happy-go-lucky, loose thinking in the matter of construction. He has realized a need for architectural qualities in his work, and has gone so far as to seek a defined trigonometrical basis for the constructional side of it. The works of Poussin and of the painters of the Renaissance period have been analytically examined in the hope of discovering the secrets of perfect construction, and it has even been asserted that mathematical formulae were preserved in certain studios of the past, as jealously guarded secrets, only imparted to the pupils at a certain period of their artistic initiation. Mr. Sava Popovitch, in a series of

articles in the *Burlington Magazine,* made ingenious and complex mathematical analyses of certain works of the old masters, and the same writer has inferred a mathematical basis for the work of the ancient Chinese.

Cubism, and other movements in the regions of abstract or semi-representational art that have followed the era of Cézanne, is deeply concerned with the constructive question, with or without the co-operation of mathematics. Perspective and drawing (in the sense of drawing *ex vero*) are among the things that have been laid aside in order that a profounder and more satisfying sense of construction might be achieved. The painter has sought, not only a more architectural or logically constructed quality for his work, but also a profounder expression of truth, both by purposely distorted perspective and purposely distorted drawing. And in doing so he has not been without precedent. The absence of true perspective does not detract from the work of the Primitives, and among the masters of the late Renaissance so great a painter as El Greco knew well enough that academically accurate drawing would by no means always serve his purpose. But the question of a defined mathematical formula as a basis for construction in painting is still a matter of private speculation and theory, and the time has not yet arrived when instruction upon this point can be given in the schools. Construction, then, like "composition," is still dependent upon instinct. It is more self-conscious and insistent, however, than its predecessor, and from its insistence it has gained a certain strength, but for a foundation it must still build upon instinct rather than upon reason.

But the very fact of the artist's search for a rational, as opposed to an instinctive basis for the constructional side of his work, goes to prove in him the awakening of a quickened sense of the necessity for order in that work. For the attainment of an orderly arrangement, both in the things pertaining to the world of thought and to the things of the physical world, is an end towards which a great part of man's energy is constantly directed. In every walk of life this insistent desire for order appears; in the work of politicians and of policemen, of gardeners, grammarians, and tradesfolk; and of this natural inclination towards order is born the very artistic impulse itself. To man the created world presents a problem of infinite and incomprehensible variety. He is unable fully to grasp the sense of order underlying the whole. Consequently much that is, in reality, subject to the law of divine order will appear to him as disordered or chaotic. His comprehension will embrace only a partial recognition of the orderly arrangement of the physical world, but such fractional parts as he can appreciate he will take very particularly to himself. As a scientist, he will desire to classify these details; as an artist, he will seek to capture their rhythm. The artist in man will, in fact,

desire to respond to as much of this physical expression of order as with his limited comprehension he has been able to grasp. By reason, of his free will he is able to exercise his power of selection, and out of what is apparently chaos he can respond to and record that which he has understood. Being made in the image of God, he can respond to God's thought.

The work which he produces becomes a symbol of the orderly beauty of the created world, a symbol which is limited in its nature and extent by his own temperament, by his own selection, and by his own power of response. His temperament may incline him towards the contemplation of trees and of landscape, and the orderly arrangement thereof; or, on the other hand, towards an appreciation of the mysterious order and harmony of the human head or of the human body, and out of these elements he will construct his symbol. But, in truth, the symbol which he is able to construct, in two dimensions or in three, is an emblem of the ordered reality of the whole created world in so far as he has been able to grasp it and to embody it in one work of art. A great artist, therefore, being a man of higher responsive intelligence than a mediocre artist, will produce a work that is not only nearer in likeness to the model, but more intimate in its response to the law of order governing the created world. It will be a better symbol of God's will and of God's creative power than his less gifted brother is able to produce. The better the artist, the truer the symbol. And from these data we are able to make our definition of a work of art as a symbol of God's creative will, a symbol brought about by man's response to the song of creation. In making a work of art, the image of God has responded to the creation of order. Man, in his turn, has defeated chaos.

In the representational art of the past, the principal sphere of the artist's intellectual activity has been in the perception of natural forms. The recording of that perception by means of the pencil or the chisel, difficult enough of itself, is nevertheless a secondary matter, and can, to a large extent, become a mechanical process between brain and hand. It is the use that he makes of perception itself that marks the artist. It is by the keenness of his perceptive sense that he is able to exercise his power of selection, and it is by his tireless, scrupulous, and insatiable quest for the very truth of a line or of a shade of colour that he has been able to produce great, as opposed to commonplace, work. The untrained or the unpractised eye does not see the lines of a piece of drapery or of a human profile as the artist does; and, in this sense, there is much truth in Blake's aphorism, "a fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees." For this reason a great and sincere artist is frequently unrecognized in his own day and among his own people. His work, although it expresses truth in the essential and absolute sense, is perhaps unin-

telligible to his contemporaries, simply because he has perceived more clearly than they have been able to do. Consequently his work will frequently appear to them as a distortion of truth; they are presented with a symbol which is of a new kind, and the natural inclination is to reject it. But it is here that the element of time enters into the matter, for after a certain lapse of time, men will become accustomed to this new aspect of essential truth of form or colour, and will acclaim the clear and original perception of its originator. It is probable, too, that he will have imitators who, by copying his mannerism, consciously or unconsciously, will tend to accustom the eyes of the public to the new symbolism which he has evolved. This was the case with the early Impressionists, with Whistler, and especially with Cézanne, who during his lifetime was not only unable to dispose of his work at any price, but was looked upon by his brother artists and by Zola, the friend of his boyhood, as a grotesque and incompetent painter. In the eyes of the general public he was little less than a madman. Yet in a few short years after his death, we find the works of this same Cézanne in every gallery of importance in Europe and America, and the least scrap of his painting or drawing eagerly sought for by those same collectors and dealers who, during his lifetime, would have none of him. Not only that, but so great has been his influence on subsequent painting that it is commonly said that there are very few students or artists living to-day who have not at some time, or to some extent, come under this influence. From a chance remark of his the whole Cubist movement is said to have taken its rise, though it is very doubtful if he himself would have appreciated the compliment of this implied fatherhood. Form, in its strictest and truest sense, the importance and emphasis of solidity, was his greatest concern, but he refused to allow colour to become subservient to it. He aimed indeed at presenting solidity *by means of* true colour, rather than by concentrating upon "light and shade" as painters had done in the past. He was deeply concerned with exploring the realms of shadow for the discovery of the colours secreted therein. So greatly did he value the concentration upon perception necessary to the art of painting that the least movement on the part of his sitter would exasperate and madden him. He painted a very large number of "still lives," since here at least his model could not fidget and sigh, but his apples and oranges would become mouldy and rotten long before he had gazed his fill on them.

Cézanne was no aesthete. He made no frontal attack upon Beauty for its own sake. His was the *impulsus ad similitudinem ex vero effigendam*, the passionate quest for recorded truth, both with regard to colour and to solidity. He sought eventually to impress his own acute and hard-driven sense of perception of natural form and colour

upon a framework of the structural dignity attained by Poussin, "*à faire du Poussin sur nature.*" But this aspect of his genius (and it is by far the most important one) has been strangely neglected. There have been few among those that have followed him that have had the courage to attempt this heroic road. On the contrary, the name of Cézanne has been used to sponsor many a movement or group of the aesthetic or "Art for Art's sake" school, dependent for its momentum upon the *impulsus ad pingendum* pure and simple, the urge to paint for the sake of painting, to weave designs from the inner consciousness, to dot the canvas with a geometrical shape here and with half a fiddle there, or with half a human head wearing half a bowler hat, with scraps of newspaper and with the inevitable neo-Picassoesque guitar.

Such painting as this is less easy than that of Cézanne to reconcile with our original definition of a work of art; for we have defined a picture as a symbol of God's creative will, brought into being by man's antiphonal response to the song of creation. But in the type of work that we have indicated, it is chaos rather than ordered thought of which we are conscious; and this in spite of its studied "construction." For a work of art is more than a mere arrangement. It is a manifestation of an ordered reality in the mind of man, a statement by man concerning existing truth; furthermore, it is a public confession, made voluntarily, of the condition of the perceptive keenness of the painter. We may grant that the approximation to perfection in a picture will be dependent upon its approximation to essential truth, and that the degree of truth contained in a picture will be most easily perceptible to those that are most nearly akin in spirit to the painter himself. We may grant that the truth, presented to us by a painter of highly original mind, may not be at once perceptible to the many. We need not deny that the facets of divine truth are innumerable, nor that it has been wisely said that every great painter has concentrated upon but one of them, nor that this particular facet of truth has sometimes been presented in the past in a new and emphatic way, an *exaggerated* way, as it at first appears.

All this we may concede. But the abstract or non-representational painter, the weaver of designs from his inner consciousness, is starting his work from a different hypothesis to that of the great painters of the past. He discards the thought of the *similitudinem ex vero,* the extraction of the rhythm from existing, objective, physical truth, and puts in its place the projection of self, or, as it is commonly called, "self-expression." The truths expressed in the physical world (which are difficult enough of perception, for all their apparent obviousness) are for him insufficient and unsatisfying. It is his aim to preserve his art intact from a vulgar entanglement with matter, to elevate it to the sphere of abstract thought, and above all, to give

out to the world an unsullied symbol of his own personality. He would be known, above all things, as a "creative" artist, the source and originator of newly created thought-forms, exclusive to himself. He is solicitous for the architectural qualities of his work, for he is essentially a "constructionist" and a man of order. He would take upon his shoulders, if not the physical and practical, at any rate the metaphysical and abstract labours of the architect, the mathematician and even the musical composer. All this he is prepared to embody in a two-dimensional work of painting, without so much as a passing glance at the physical phenomena around him. When he is at leisure to consider her, he perhaps expresses a love or even an admiration for Nature, but it is love of the kind bestowed upon an old and worn-out mare, no longer fit for breeding or for work, but given the run of a grassy paddock, where she may eke out her days in peace.

His desire for order in his work is not dependent upon the perception of order in created natural forms, and we should therefore seem to be justified in looking for its roots in the supernatural. Here it would seem that a logical union between art and religion must be hinted at if not actually achieved. But since the cultural disturbance of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, since the beginning of modern times, a definite parallel between art and the supernatural has not been easy to trace. While this essential and immemorial union has been lost to mind in a great part of Europe, religious thought and artistic thought have strayed apart into many by-ways and not a few blind alleys. The separation of art from religion has finally brought art, by way of Humanism and Classicism, Realism, Impressionism, and Post-Impressionism, into the realms of the abstract, suspended, as it were, in the ether, unsupported either by reference to nature or to religious thought. It is a curious and perhaps a healthy sign that, by means of abstract form, painting is seeking a realliance with architecture, although her method of doing so is open to question. Her strange wanderings since the Renaissance have been briefly and neatly indicated by Mr. R. D. Laxon (in a letter to *The Times* of May 23, 1933) commenting upon the views of a distinguished modern painter. "Mr. Paul Nash," he writes, "implies that 'architectonic quality' is a discovery of the 'new type of professional artist.' As the progenitor of all the visual arts architecture has, of course, handed on her qualities to her great family, of which painting has become the prodigal daughter.

"As the renaissance of painting spread westward through Europe, the easel picture, that *fille de joie*, was more and more divorced from her mother and sister arts, becoming at times a splendid courtesan as in the eighteenth century in France, but containing the seeds of decay, as anti-social things must, until in the nineteenth century

she was such a homeless wanderer that her only hope of survival lay in rejoining her family. It seems, however, hard on her long-suffering parent and her family that now, when she is thinking of returning to the fold, she should come claiming to teach her sister arts precisely those family virtues which she profaned, but which they have never forgotten; and losing sight meanwhile of her own peculiar function of representation with emphasis and selection. Surely 'architectonic' is not a becoming word in the mouth of the fair penitent."

The abstract art of ultra-modern painters, starting as it does from a different hypothesis from that of the representational art of the past, is seeking a spiritual union with architecture, in which the original principles of architecture become integrated into the new painting itself. In this way it seeks eventually to subject the principles of the new architecture to those of the new painting. The modernist painter, by discarding his ancient function of representation, throws aside his old established method of achieving spiritual fellowship with his fellow-men. It is true that a form of sympathy can still be attained by the abstract painter among those who attempt to follow him into the strange regions where he snatches his designs from the ether; but *since his work is no longer based upon natural perception,* he has departed from the fundamental principles whereby a universal sympathy has been possible towards the art of the past. The painters who have come after Cézanne have not been faithful to the principles upon which his work was based. They have been content to discard the intimate visual contact with the natural order which he so passionately sought. The teaching of the last of the great masters has been misconstrued or falsified. No painter to-day attempts to *faire du Poussin sur nature* in the great-hearted manner envisaged by Cézanne.

Modern painters, as we have seen, have sought to achieve order in their work by means of concentrating upon the problem of construction. But their quest has led them into the regions of mathematical or abstract thought, and away from the contemplation of the physical universe. The modernist painter has looked upon Nature only to distort her, and to distort her beyond all reason. No longer a goddess, nor yet an acknowledged mother, she has become a subject for experimental contortion and for analytical dissection.

But even the brutal torsion of Nature is preferable to her utter abandonment. To make of art a thing of mental abstraction only is the last insult that can be offered to the created world. It is, moreover, the last stage upon the anti-sacramental and anti-liturgical road upon which European art set forth after the sixteenth century. From that time forth a "homeless wanderer," she sought protection in the houses of the great; but divorced, not only from architecture but from the high liturgical office that had once been hers, she

inclined her ears to the whispers from the half-forgotten past, to the voices that had inspired her in her pre-Christian days. Pagan and Pantheist tendencies were soon to become apparent, but neither the Classical school of eighteenth-century France nor the Pantheist school of eighteenth-century England could be inexhaustible as a source of artistic fertility. It was inevitable that in her restlessness other influences should be brought to bear upon the forms in which her thought should be expressed. And it is here that we seem to find an echo of some of the ancient heresies, long since condemned, but still present upon earth, seeking, like art herself, a habitation and a form of expression.

Unless art is quite meaningless, and simply to be regarded as a luxury and a decoration, the forms that she takes to herself must be of some intellectual significance and must derive from some form of belief in ultimate things. If this is so, it is not from Pagan but rather from Manichaean thought that modernist abstract art would seem to derive. The contempt and mistrust of the natural order is found in Calvinistic Puritanism as well as in abstract art. This contempt is the antithesis of the mental attitude of the early Catholic painters, Italian, French, or English, with their tender love for the natural forms of birds, beasts, and leaves. It is the antithesis of the sacramental system and the antithesis of the apostolate of St. Francis. And nineteenth-century scepticism towards the book of Genesis would seem to have inspired a school of art that has lost its faith in the fundamental doctrine of physical creation.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY.

In the course of 1935 several books were published in Italy dealing with English philosophers. In this survey we shall take note of three of them, on Bacon, Hume, and Reid respectively. In the *Notice* prefixed to the first of these[1] we read that "the author's reason for publishing it is the lack of a complete and comprehensive biography of Bacon in his various aspects which would take into account the most recent studies of his life and thought. The author has sought in every way to realize the character of Bacon, even to seeking out the places which formed the scene of his life, in order to draw from them whatever inspiration they might give." However, after reading the book we do not think that the author has succeeded in his purpose. Rossi's essay does not make any really new contribution to Baconian studies that might modify any of the generally accepted judgments of modern criticism, nor does he succeed in giving us a synthetic, vivid, and effective view of the philosopher's personality. This latter defect results in great part from the fact that Rossi has confined himself to the examination of the more schematic and scholastic parts of Bacon's work (induction, the doctrine of forms, etc.), neglecting that rich harvest of pithy aphorisms, of evocative images, and of epigrammatic sentences, in which the genius of their author stands most fully revealed, and that explains the profound influence he exercised over his contemporaries and over posterity. Equally deficient, in a publication that lays claim to completeness, is the exploration of the contents of the Baconian works. The wide scientific panorama of the *De Augmentis*, so characteristic in its meticulous inventory of the sciences cultivated at the beginning of the seventeenth century and of those that were wanting, has been completely neglected. No mention is made of the *New Atlantis*, in which the new ideal of learning takes on a vivid semblance of real life, though the realism is transferred to Utopia. A bare mention in passing is given to the *Sylva Sylvarum*, the knowledge of which could throw much light on Bacon's confused and higgledy-piggledy manner of working, and on the strange hotch-potch of old and new that he heaps together. Finally, the bibliographical survey of modern literature is very insufficient; for example, there is no mention of the writings of Brochard and Cassirer, who have posited some of the most important problems of Baconian exegesis.

To confine ourselves to the more positive contents of Rossi's essay, the philosopher's life is narrated here with great wealth of detail—in fact it alone takes up nearly half the volume—and it helps to confirm that moderate opinion, midway between those that extol and those that denigrate his character, in which all historians are now agreed, that is that Bacon, both in public and in private life, was not endowed either with great virtues or with great vices, but was in every respect a man of his own time. He was somewhat servile with the powerful, venal in order to satisfy an inordinate need of magnificence and pomp, and not immune from those forms of corruption that customarily spring up under absolute governments. But the austere life of

[1] Mario M. Rossi: *Saggio su Francesco Bacon.* Napoli, Guida editore. 1935 (octavo, pp. 245).

his last years, after he had been driven from the political arena by a dishonouring condemnation, and the ardour of the scientific labours with which he was able to overcome his disgrace, redeem him in the judgment of posterity, as they redeemed him in the eyes of his contemporaries. In his examination into Bacon's doctrines likewise, Rossi's study confirms well-known interpretations and criticisms. A meagre appreciation of mathematics, a judicial and forensic, rather than scientific, conception of the methodical process of thought; excessive formalism in the articulation of the various stages of induction—such are the principal deficiencies of the *Novum Organum*. In the matter of induction, Rossi assigns particular importance to that stage that goes under the name of *vindemiatio prima*, which he identifies with what modern scientists call "working hypothesis" (p. 173). There is undoubtedly a noteworthy analogy between the two, but to speak of identity is perhaps exaggerated, because the *vindemiatio prima* is already an ascertained result and not a mere theoretical premise. And as for the goal of induction, Rossi denies that Bacon aimed at the discovery of the laws of natural events. Instead he "aimed at discovering something substantial and natural: not only the manner of happening of phenomena, but an entity, a reality concealed beneath the things and their properties, and causing them": that is, the form or forms of the real. This conclusion also seems to me excessive, because it tends to limit the value of the Baconian form to a sense which is too restricted, antiquated, and scholastic. On the other hand, Rossi recognizes elsewhere that the term "form" has at least three meanings—"a gnoseological concept (form as reality in opposition to nature as appearance); an ontological concept which depends on dynamism of the Heraclitean stamp, which, if not the only fundamental theory of Bacon (we remember his leanings towards atomism), is certainly one of the motives of his natural philosophy; and a metaphysical concept by which form is the inner law, the seminal reason of natural being of the Stoics." In our opinion this third meaning is the most valid one, but, even leaving the question undecided, its mere existence beside the others legitimizes a modern scientific interpretation of induction as a mental process having as its end the discovery of the laws of phenomena.

The second essay mentioned deals with the philosophy of Hume.[1] Its thesis is thus summed up by the author: "An examination of the doctrine of the *Treatise* and the *Inquiry*, and a comparison of them with ancient and modern scepticism, allow us to conclude that Hume was not a sceptic, not even a moderate or academic one. That is to say, there is in him a scepticism of the reason, but this is connected with his dogmatism of feeling, and is a functional and inseparable aspect of it (as, for instance, the anti-intellectualism of Bergson is an essential preliminary moment of his intuitionism). That this scepticism, or rather criticism, of the reason has, on account of the importance of its results, been isolated from the dogmatic system in which it is incorporated, and that it has become the pretext for designating Hume's system without further ado as sceptical, is understandable but not justifiable. The fact remains that Hume's doctrine is founded on truth, and precisely on the truth of the empiric, of sentiment, of intuition, as Hegel already suspected when he confronted Hume's scepticism with the scepticism of antiquity, which was far from considering sentiment or intuition as the source of truth, and, furthermore, it showed itself primarily hostile to the sensible. This dogmatism of the irrational likewise excludes any unilateral interpretation of Hume in a purely pragmatistic and biologistic sense, according to the widespread traditional tendency of which K. Smith is the latest and most subtle

[1] G. Della Volpe: *La filosofia dell' esperienza di D. Hume*. Firenze, Sansoni. 1933–1935 (2 vols. in octavo): I, pp. ix, 191; II, pp. viii, 206.

exponent. The treatment of the problems has an essentially theoretical significance. Hume is the philosopher of the instinct, of natural beliefs, of common consciousness, in brief—of human nature" (I, pp. 188–9).

Such is the principal thesis of Della Volpe's long and elaborate study on the philosophy of Hume. And it is a substantially just and acceptable thesis, with some reservation, however, with regard to the too sharply drawn antithesis with which it is conceived, in comparison with the traditional view. Every sceptical negation always has in fact a positive counterpart which re-establishes the disturbed equilibrium of the life of the mind. In this aspect even the scepticism of antiquity differs only in degree from the scepticism of Hume, and from it likewise a positive philosophy of belief or "animal faith" can be drawn. As to Hume, the reintegration of this aspect of his thought presented itself as a particularly new and important task for the very fact that the Scottish philosopher has generally been studied as a preparatory stage in the philosophy of Kant, and in consequence he has had an inadequate and too restricted part in history. From the advent of positivism he began to be viewed in a wider perspective, when he was recognized as the progenitor of that movement of thought; and now Della Volpe's study takes up the same motive, developing it more amply so as to consider Hume as the founder of a philosophy of integral experience.

The revaluation of the positive elements is conducted by the author on parallel lines, along all the branches into which Hume's speculative activity divided itself. Thus in theoretical philosophy, the critique of the concept of cause is based on a synthetic view of the causal nexus, in antithesis to the analytical conception of Descartes, in which the effect is understood as identical with the cause and deducible from it analytically. On the contrary, Hume "has already a true intuition of the causal nexus: that it is an identity of the diverse, and, properly speaking, the unity of an empiric multiple. The capital examples of critiques (in the Kantian sense) against the causality of the rationalists are therefore to be found already in Hume. To the identity of cause and mathematical reason maintained by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Hume opposes the identity of cause and the empiric law; to the *causa-ratio* he opposes a type of legal cause" (I, p. 140).

Analogously, in moral philosophy the positive elements are focussed in feeling as the motor impulse of actions; in the philosophy of religion, the field having been cleared of speculative theism, philosophical criticism and religious consciousness remain in its place, clearly distinguished, "religious consciousness being rooted in the essential and universal properties of the human spirit as an awe-inspiring fantasy which unfolds in positive historical forms, from polytheism to popular theism" (II, p. 163). In this latter field the author's comparison of Hume's conception of religion with other views nearer to our own time, for instance that of Otto, is very suggestive. Indeed, there is in both the same tendency, not only to explain the fact of religious experience by immanent psychological reasons, but also to see these reasons in the awful sense of mystery with which the numen reveals himself to the consciousness of the believer.

In the third essay on Reid and the Scottish school[1] a philosophy which has been too much neglected is brought once more to light. Much esteemed and discussed in the eighteenth century, it flourished a second time a century ago through the agency of French eclecticism, which appropriated its method of psychological introspection and of eclectic reconciliation of the historical systems of philosophy, in the feeble light of the criterion of common sense. Nowadays it is forgotten and only recorded in the manuals as a fleeting and

[1] M. F. Sciacca: *La filosofia di Tommaso Reid.* Napoli, Perelli. 1935 (octavo, pp. 247).

secondary episode in the midst of the upheavals of the great speculative movements of the eighteenth century. However, to contact it once more through Sciacca's penetrating analysis is to gain the impression that the negative and almost contemptuous judgment that has condemned it to oblivion is far from just. Although formulated in a perhaps excessively simplified and condescending fashion, which weakens its effectiveness in part, it yet succeeds, even in opposition to the great systems of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in giving validity to certain profound exigencies, which have since been given a new lease of life, with a savour of novelty, by some philosophers of our own time, notably in England. Thus, whilst almost all the thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries posited ideas as the immediate object of the mind in perception, Reid was perhaps the only one to dispute this fallacious intermediary between the mind and its objects, which in his view renewed the age-old errors and futile multiplication of entities to which the forms and species of intention of the Scholastics had given rise. We perceive objects directly, not the ideas of objects: this was the impelling motive which drove Reid to attack the ideologues, and which was to assist in shaking their scepticism. Indeed, to posit ideas as the sole immediate object of the mind was to preclude the latter from all contact with the full reality of things and to entangle oneself within the circle of one's own fantasies. Reid's good sense did not overlook the fact that from Locke to Berkeley and Hume speculative thought had done nothing but apply the principle of ideas with ever-increasing rigour, that is to say it had cut away one by one all the bridges (substance, causality, etc.) thrown by common sense between the mind and reality. And he wished in consequence to retrace to some extent the path of philosophy, restoring what speculative subtlety had annulled. There was certainly some ingenuousness in his pretension. That we perceive things immediately is sooner asserted than explained; if we ask how the qualities come to inhere in the objects, and how an immaterial spirit can take direct possession of a material reality, Reid is compelled to answer that this is a mystery. His faith in the reality of objects perceived is akin to that of the coalheaver. But this does not lessen the importance of at any rate the polemical part of his doctrine, which wages effective war against the "bifurcation of nature" into two separate and incommunicable kingdoms, to use the expression of an English philosopher of our own time, who has restated Reid's argument with great vigour. To this anti-ideological theme there is a corresponding one which completes it. The ideas having been removed, the problem remains: how is it possible to admit a reality outside ourselves, when our consciousness identifies itself with the immediate impression. Reid replies that, beyond sensation and perception, there is another faculty of the mind, an instinct, a suggestion, which causes us to believe in the existence of an external reality. It would have been interesting to examine whether, and up to what point, Reid was influenced by Hume in postulating this primitive and irrational force in the life of the mind, which was to receive ever widening recognition in the philosophies of the following ages until our own days (the "animal faith" of Santayana constitutes its latest expression). But Sciacca's interpretation does not seem to me correct when he makes an *a priori* element of consciousness in an almost Kantian signification; the *a priori* is an intellectual, logical value, which has nothing to do with instinct.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(*Translated from the Italian by* CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

NEW BOOKS

Value and Existence. By N. O. Lossky and John S. Marshall. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 223. Price 7s. 6d.)

Readers of *Philosophy* will probably remember Professor Lossky's article on "The Limits of Evolution" in the October number of 1927. The present book may be regarded as an application of the philosophical view, there stated in brief, to the problem of Value. This view itself is of great interest at the present time as a development of that which underlies the theology of the Greek Church and which is finding other forms of expression in such writers as Dean Inge and Dr. Temple among ourselves. It has the additional personal interest of being that on the ground of which Professor Lossky has been driven from his native country of Russia.

The first two chapters are devoted to a particularly well-informed and lucid criticism of current theories of the foundations of value. The author has little difficulty in dealing with psychological theories which trace the origin of the idea of value to subjective sources in pleasure, desire, or striving. Striving in all its forms presupposes sense of value and cannot be the source of it. Subtler, more objective theories, such as we have in G. E. Moore and Nicolai Hartmann, give him more trouble. His objection to them, as I understand him, is twofold: first the separation which they make between existence and value, as though "to be" was not in itself a value; and, secondly, the division they make between subject and object, as though there could be any value in things apart from a subject *for* which the value exists. Having thus cleared the way, he goes directly to a statement of the "Conditions that make Value possible." These are, in the first place, that there should exist substantial agents, relatively independent of one another, yet of such a nature that every one of them is "immanent to" every other, and is oriented to the fullest life that is possible to it within the limits of its finitude. ("That they may have life and have it more abundantly" is the motto of the book.) In the second place, that there should exist a Being or Absolute, in whom as the goal of all their striving this fullness actually dwells—in other words, in whom existence and perfection or value are one. Although he is prepared to show that these conditions hold throughout the universe from the electron up to man, Lossky confines himself mainly to the exposition of them as they are illustrated in beings like man who are endowed with the possibility of love and freedom, enabling them to apprehend absolute values and by realizing these in their behaviour realize also personality. Owing to the principle of the "immanence of all in all," such personality is impossible of achievement through isolation from nature and one's fellow-men, yet is something which, owing to freedom, is attained in different degree from the lowest to the highest. None is without the possibility of it; none under temporal and spatial conditions can ever attain it completely.

Ideas like these are familiar to us in our own idealistic writers, and one might have expected the authors to have illustrated them from this analogy. They prefer to go to Aristotle and the great medieval theologians from St. Augustine to Thomas Aquinas for confirmation. The reason, I think, is partly because they feel themselves more at home in the warmer religious atmosphere of these writers than in the colder stratosphere in which post-

Kantian speculation habitually moves. But I think it is also partly because of a certain misunderstanding, on the part of both, of the meaning of that movement. We find Hegel accused in the Preface and on p. 200, along with Spinoza, of denying the element of transcendence in reality, Bradley and Bosanquet on p. 203 of "equating existence and value," in entire oblivion of the distinction between existence and "reality" on which the whole idealistic view is founded. Yet I should be the last to complain of the historical setting that is claimed for their doctrine. In spite of the expansion which British and American philosophy received by its alliance with Greek and German thought, I believe it has suffered from a certain insularity by failing to connect itself with the great medieval doctrine of the world as *totum, verum, pulchrum, bonum,* and I welcome the claim the book contains to find in the best thought of our own time only a continuation of that tradition.

I have left no space to follow the extremely interesting and instructive application of the central doctrine to the details of value theory contained in the later chapters; but I hope I have said enough to induce some readers to go to the book itself for further acquaintance with the kind of philosophy which Bolshevist Russia is seeking to crush to its own intellectual and spiritual impoverishment.

J. H. Muirhead.

Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Edited with an Introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, D.Litt, LL.D., F.B.A. (London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. ix + 284. Price 10s. 6d.)

For any philosophy which starts from ordinary experience the only argument for the existence of God which can command interest or assent is the "argument from design." Hume's *Dialogues* are the classic discussion of this argument. The disputants are Demea, who stands for a narrow and othodox religious position; Cleanthes, who is a sensible and thoughtful theist resting his belief on the argument from design; and Philo, a destructive sceptic. Pamphilus introduces the speakers and reports the discussion. The interest for philosophy and theology lies in the question whether the argument from design survives the attack, and for history in the question whether Cleanthes or Philo represent Hume himself. Pamphilus introduces Cleanthes as "accurate and philosophical" and Philo as a "careless sceptic," and at the end he awards the victory to Cleanthes. On this evidence, and on Hume's acceptance of theism in the *Natural History of Religion,* the great majority of commentators and historians of philosophy rest their conclusion that Cleanthes is Hume, and that the *Dialogues* therefore represent the triumph of moderate and reasonable theism over both extreme views. Professor Kemp Smith maintains in his introduction to this edition that the argument from design is completely destroyed by the sceptical attack on it and that Philo is Hume. In defending this position he shows again that happy combination of textual research, historical detective-work and philosophical insight, which on a larger scale marked his work on Kant. After a general discussion of Hume's religious upbringing and his general attitude to religion, he works out an analysis of the *Dialogues,* with comments of his own interspersed, which is as fascinating as the *Dialogues* themselves. He shows that the apparent supremacy of Cleanthes is a masterpiece of ingenious deception. Throughout the *Dialogues* his weaknesses are ruthlessly exposed and then as carefully concealed. Whenever he is in danger of exposure, Demea interrupts with a red herring to save him. He makes his strongest points by adopting arguments of Philo which,

if carried through to a logical conclusion, would destroy his own position. In that position he remains firmly ensconced, meeting Philo's onslaught only by reiteration and an occasional change of metaphor or illustration which does not essentially alter his case and which Philo instantly exposes. The motives which led Hume to practice this brilliant deception on his readers are said to be two: The artistic one of bolstering up Cleanthes in order to give life to the dialogue form and the practical one of placating the zealots. In both aims he has succeeded superbly. In no other philosophical dialogues can anyone doubt where the author's sympathy lies. And his deception of the zealots has deceived the world. As for Hume himself, we can no longer picture his life as a transition from the scepticism of youth to the theism of maturity. The transition was a change not in his mind but in his manners, from the recklessness of youth to the *adresse* and caution of the man of the world. The commendation of Cleanthes which closes the *Dialogues* is the translation into Presbyterian language of the dedication of Descartes' *Meditations* to the Dean and Doctors of the Sorbonne. If Hume was wrong about the soul, he must have had much quiet enjoyment during the last two centuries in observing how successful his ingenuity had been, but after this edition there is no longer any reason why he should be given cause to chuckle.

J. D. Mabbott.

Losing Religion to Find It. By Erica Lindsay. (London: J. M. Dent & Sons. 1935. Pp. xii + 270. Price 6s.)

I wish to recommend this book warmly to everyone who cares for the vitality either of philosophy or of religion. I cannot myself believe that either can be truly alive apart from the other. The divorce between religion and philosophy has been inevitable, no doubt; but it is none the less a scandal. Modern philosophy has received from science that freedom of thought which would rather be wrong with the available evidence than right by accident. It cannot run in harness with a religion which remains traditionally dogmatic. But the separation isolates it from a set of data which is crucial for its own success.

Mrs. Lindsay seeks to release religion from its dogmatic bondage, and to express its substance in a shape which philosophy can recognize, and by which it can be nourished. Hardly a paragraph in the book fails to convince the reader that it has been formed out of patient and direct observation. This in itself guarantees fresh insight. Yet such sincerity in the expression of religious experience is not uncommon. In this book, however, we have to deal not with an individual's awareness of her own subjectivity, but with a direct experience of objective spiritual constants which determine the structure of human life in society. Such an approach inevitably discovers the central problems of philosophy in their concrete human setting, where they are religious problems. They can then be illustrated, and not merely argued about. In its eagerness to achieve an efficient formulation of our central experience of reality, modern philosophy is apt to overlook the prior necessity of observing, in patient, concrete immediacy, what it is attempting to formulate. This, far more than any faults of logical analysis, is the source of the failure of our philosophy. Mrs. Lindsay's effort to remedy it makes this a constructive contribution both to philosophy and to religion where they are weakest; and brings them together at the point in which they meet.

Her success, in my judgment, is real but limited; and the limitation is one which might prevent a patient hearing in the quarters to which the book

is most urgently directed. She has a sure recognition of the spiritual constants within the range of experience in which she is at home; and that range is fairly accurately defined by the romantic tradition of the age that is passing. The insurgent life of the new generation is in revolt against this tradition, and the forms which the spiritual constants take in their manifestation through it are antithetical to the older forms. The eternal values manifest themselves only through forms that change, and they can be recognized only from within. The external observation of a new form of life must fail to reveal them, and so produce the impression that its negation of their old forms is a sheer rejection of eternal Good. A person who has learned to recognize the constants of beauty within the range of expression of a Turner or a Constable finds it not easier, but more difficult, to see the same constants in the painting of a Picasso. The very sureness of intuition which enables Mrs. Lindsay to distinguish counterfeit from genuine value within the forms of life to which our society still belongs, makes it difficult for her to see and to discriminate the values in the forces which are destroying them.

I trust that those who feel with me in this will refuse to be blinded to the insight that is embodied in this book. We may believe that we shall have to lose religion more completely if we are to find it fully. But if we dismiss what Mrs. Lindsay offers us as unsuited to our sympathies, we shall lose something that we sorely need. The old manifestation of the eternal constants is not merely genuine; it is ripe and full. The new, too, may be genuine, but it is still harsh and crude.

JOHN MACMURRAY.

Plato's Theory of Knowledge. By F. M. CORNFORD. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. xiv + 336. Price 15s. net.)

There will be a warm welcome for this admirable book from all students of Plato and of the history of philosophical thought in general. It is a translation, with Introduction and Commentary, of two of the most important and difficult of Plato's dialogues, the *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist*. The method of exposition is unusual in published work, though it is precisely that generally followed by a teacher in expounding any particular text. That is to say, instead of having the dialogue summarized and discussed in an introduction and the detailed points of exposition relegated to footnotes and appendices, we have a passage translated and then an explanation or discussion of it following in the main text. The commentary on the *Theaetetus* probably occupies about as much space as the translation, and on the *Sophist* considerably more. The translation is, needless to say, scholarly and accurate, and what is more it is easy and pleasant to read. The commentary is admirably lucid, and the views on doubtful points always well balanced and judicious, though naturally no two scholars would agree on every question of interpretation.

I am not, however, altogether convinced that this method of exposition is the ideal one. At the least, I should have liked a general introduction to each dialogue, or to the two taken together in which the results of particular discussions were brought together and summarized and a general picture of the place of each dialogue in Plato's thought attempted. There is an introduction, but it is concerned with a historical sketch, which brings the situation up to the time of publication of the *Theaetetus*. It serves its purpose excellently, though I should personally hold that Professor Cornford greatly exaggerates the importance of the *Parmenides*. But it does not take the place of a general essay on the two dialogues.

Criticism of the work would have to take the form of a discussion of detailed

points which would be out of place here. In general, I have found myself convinced by Professor Cornford's arguments, though there are still points which I find puzzling, and I should still disagree with him on certain historical questions. But his general statements on the purport of the two dialogues are admirable. In particular, he shows very judiciously why the Forms do not come into the main exposition of the *Theaetetus*, and how the *Sophist* sets out to answer the difficulties of the *Theaetetus* by the introduction of the Forms. I am very glad to see, by the way, that Professor Cornford will have none of the introduction of "propositions," in the Cambridge sense, into the interpretation of Plato, nor of the identification of Dialectic with Formal Logic, though I doubt whether Professor Taylor is really guilty of this latter confusion, in spite of some unfortunate phrases.

Altogether, one may confidently assert, whatever criticisms may be made in detail, that this book will be found a valuable, indeed an indispensable help to the interpretation of Plato.

G. C. Field.

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(1) *Septimana Spinozana. Acta Conventus oecumenici in memoriam Benedicti de Spinoza diei natalis trecentesimi Hagae comitis habiti curis Societatis Spinozanae edita.* (*Hagae comitis apud Martinum Nijhoff, MXMXXXIII.* Pp. xii + 321. Price 8 guilders net.)

(2) *Spinoza Festschrift.* Herausgegeben von Siegfried Hessing. (Heidelberg: Karl Winter. 1933. Pp. xviii + 224. Price GM. 10.)

(3) *Spinoza, the Man and His Thought.* Addresses delivered at the Spinoza Tercentenary sponsored by the Philosophy Club of Chicago. Edited by Edward L. Schaub. (Chicago: The Open Court Pub. Co. 1933. Pp. x + 61. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

The tercentenary of Spinoza appears to have been celebrated far and wide, even in China and Japan. It would be interesting to have a complete bibliography of the extensive literature evoked by the occasion. There must be numerous papers which have not been collected in volume form. However, only the above-mentioned collections of addresses have reached the reviewer, and it may be of interest to Spinoza students to have an inventory of authors and subjects. Inevitably the contributions vary enormously in value. It would be quite easy to fill much space with criticisms of the interpretations given in some of the addresses, even if one passed over in silence the many praiseworthy things which they also contain. What is perhaps most interesting is the evidence of a widespread appreciation of the character and philosophy of Spinoza during recent decades. These collections of addresses, however, contain much more than that. They contain many happy suggestions for new lines of research, and may be recommended especially to students of philosophy who are inclined to do something in the history of the subject, and are waiting for hints as to suitable subjects for investigation. The mere enumeration of the titles of the various essays contained in the above volumes will show what a feast they spread for those who are interested in the philosophy of Spinoza.

(1) The *Septimana Spinozana* must occupy the place of honour among the collections of papers and addresses in honour of Spinoza's tercentenary. The representatives of many different nations and of many different schools of thought have contributed to its pages, and the volume is worthy of the great occasion. The volume opens with commemoration addresses by Leo Polak, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Léon Brunschvicg. These are followed by twenty-five essays on various aspects of Spinozism, and written in Dutch, English, French, German, and Italian. The Preface is written in Latin. The

following is a list of the writers and their subjects: Carl Gebhardt: *Spinoza in unserer Zeit, Religio metaphysica,* and *Domus Spinozana*; Adolfo Ravà: *Il pensiero di Spinoza e i problemi dell' ora,* and *La pedagogia di Spinoza*; J. H. Carp: *De spinozistische Gemeenschapsgedachte*; Léon Brunschvicg: *Physique et Métaphysique*; J. Clay: *Physik und Metaphysik*; Gaston Bachelard: *Physique et Métaphysique*; S. von Dunin Borkowski: *Die Physik Spinozas*; George Santayana: *Ultimate Religion*; Ferdinand Sassen: *Wijsbegeerte en Godsdienst*; S. Alexander: *Spinoza and Philosophy of Religion*; Charles Appuhn: *Mysticisme et Humanisme*; Irwin Edman: *Poetic Insight and Religious Truth*; J. A. de Mattos Romão: *Philosophie et Religion*; J. Segond: *La philosophie du polisseur de verres*; Albert Rivaud: *Quelques remarques sur la notion d'essences dans les doctrines de Descartes et de Spinoza*; Ferdinand Tönnies: *Hobbes und Spinoza*; Julius Ebbinghaus: *Über den Grund der Beschränkung unserer Erkenntnis auf die Attribute des Denkens und der Ausdehnung bei Spinoza*; Pantaleo Carabellese: *Il concetto spinoziano dell' errore*; Johannes Hoops: *Einflüsse Spinozas in der Literatur der Englischen Romantik*; I. Myslicki: *Spinozas Modell*; Leo Polak: *Spinoza und Kant*; H. F. Hallett: *Benedict Spinoza.*

(2) The *Spinoza-Festschrift,* though in German and published in Germany, is a tribute from Rumania. Many, though not all, of the contributions which it contains were written by Rumanian scholars, some of whom enjoy international fame. Many of the writers are Jewish *savants.* The authors and their subjects are as follows: J. Brucar: *Spinoza und die Ewigkeit der Seele*; Martin Buber: *Spinoza und die chassidische Botschaft*; Fritz Droop: *Fünf Szenen aus dem Leben Spinozas*; S. Dubnow: *Die Gestalt*; C. Gebhardt: *Der gotische Jude*; Vasile Gherasim: *Die Bedeutung der Affektenlehre Spinozas*; Max Grünwald: *Der Lebensphilosoph Spinoza*; S. Hessing: *Die Glückseligkeit des freien Menschen*; J. Klatzkin: *Der Misverstandene*; J. Klausner: *Der jüdische Charakter der Lehre Spinozas*; Marc Marcianu: *Ein Bekenntnis*; I. Myslicki: *Spinoza und das Ideal des Menschen*; I. Niemirower: *Spinozaverehrung eines Nicht-spinozisten*; I. Petrovici: *Eine Spinozahuldigung*; Romain Rolland: *Der Lichtstrahl Spinozas*; K. Sass: *Vom grundlegenden Dualismus in Spinozas System*; N. Sokolow: *Der Jude Spinoza*; A. Zweig: *Der Schriftsteller Spinoza.* The volume concludes with three brief appreciations of Spinoza by Einstein, Freud, and Wassermann.

(3) The Chicago volume is much less ambitious than either of the preceding two volumes, but it does credit to the University of Chicago, with which the contributors are associated. It contains addresses by C. W. Morris and President Chase, and papers by the Editors of *The Monist* and *The International Journal of Ethics.* The former writes on *Spinoza, his Personality and his Doctrine of Perfection*; the latter writes on *Spinoza's Political and Moral Philosophy.* There is also a paper on *Spinoza and Religion* by S. B. Freehof.

A. Wolf.

God: A Cosmic Philosophy of Religion. By John Elof Boodin, Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Los Angeles. (New York and London: The Macmillan Company. 1934. Pp. 240. Price 8s. 6d.)

"This volume," Professor Boodin tells us in his Foreword (p. 5), "gives the author's constructive effort to furnish an idealistic world-view in line with the progress of history and science." He "believes that it is consistent with the fundamental intuitions of Christianity, if not with its traditional theology." Protestant Christianity, indeed, "has," he thinks, "never had a theology of its own," is now "in a process of dissolution theologically," and "sometimes grasps at materialism, sugar-coated as emergence, sometimes

falls back on a vague cosmic emotion, sometimes satisfies itself with a general humanitarianism, leaving God at most the rôle of Santa Claus." While acknowledging the greatness of the "official theologian" of the Catholic Church, St. Thomas Aquinas, he yet holds that "in the intellectual climate in which we live," there is "need of a fresh interpretation" of the synthesis which St. Thomas reached, and "in attempting such reinterpretation" he "has found the Platonic tradition in which early Christianity took form especially congenial."

No reader of Professor Boodin's book can fail to be impressed by the writer's profound sincerity, by his truly religious spirit, and by the genuine eloquence into which he sometimes rises. But the present reviewer at any rate has found himself at the end—it may be by his own fault—far from clear as to the precise nature of the "dualistic cosmology" which Professor Boodin puts forward.

It is easy to agree with him that "the God of religion cannot be conceived as merely the whole of things" (p. 22); that neither a speculative "Absolute," on the one hand, nor "a deity which emerges in the evolutionary process," on the other, is a satisfactory object of worship. "We recognise," as he says (p. 23), "a deity which is an active guiding factor in the process and through whose grace we can be saved."

He does not find such a deity in Professor Whitehead's "conceptual god," which "is supposed to furnish the principle of concretion in a multitudinous world of occasions." Yet his own notion of God reminds us in some important respects of Professor Whitehead's, for he is, if we understand Professor Boodin aright, the source of *form*, of whom it can be said (p. 179) in the language of poetry that he "breathed waves of form" into a "wild sea of chaos," which did not itself owe its origin to him. But Professor Boodin does not seem altogether content with the ultimate dualism with which he sometimes appears to leave us. It is indeed expressly affirmed (p. 187) that "the cosmic tragedy," "the failure of creation," is not "a limitation in the creative Spirit, but in the material with which the Spirit works." This is a hard saying; for does not such an intractable material constitute a limitation for the Spirit whose action it restricts? When, however, it is added (p. 188) that "God creates in order to save," and that "in a real sense there is never complete chaos" (p. 207), since Spirit, which "exists eternally in its own right," is "ever present in the cosmos," the "orderly process" of which the so-called "chaos" "is only chaos when viewed without reference to time"—in abstraction, that is from a temporal process in which it "sets the stage for the future drama"—we surely find ourselves presented with a view which has a very doubtful claim to be called a "dualism" at all.

What Professor Boodin has, I think, really at heart is to combat a tendency which he (like Dr. Schweitzer in his recent Hibbert Lectures) discovers in modern idealism from Hegel onwards to "justify the order that is" (p. 19), and so to abandon to its materialistic critics the task of presenting a programme of reform which is, in his opinion, the proper business of idealistic philosophy. A good deal of evidence might be alleged to show that this tendency is far from being characteristic of all idealism of what may be called the Hegelian type; yet it cannot be denied that there is some ground for asserting that, when it is found there, its association with that school of thought is not merely accidental. Professor Boodin would counter the tendency in question by insisting upon a factor in reality which he sometimes, as we have seen, describes in terms suggestive of a "matter" wholly alien to the Spirit which is ever seeking it to mould it to its own purposes. But sometimes he speaks of this factor otherwise—as the *individual*.

"The individual," we are told, "has a say in the comedies and tragedies enacted in the cosmos, whether the individuals be electrons or human beings or stars" (p. 85). "Throughout nature, from matter to spirit, the individual retains the power of initiative and choice, therefore, to paraphrase Plato, God is justified and the individual is responsible" (p. 94); and again, "throughout the scale of nature there is this dualism of predictable structure and a certain individual indeterminacy" (p. 127). The world in which we find ourselves is thus "dualistic" and "we are not called upon as philosophers to create the world, but to try to understand it." Professor Boodin does not identify the indeterminacy which is thus the material of God's shaping activity with freedom. On the contrary, indeterminacy and freedom "are really opposed concepts" (p. 154). "Both, it is true, imply spontaneity as contrasted with routine. But freedom in the true sense means the capaclty and will to determine one's conduct with reference to structure" and of "structure" God is the source. Unlike M. Gilson in his Gifford Lectures and Mr. M. B. Foster in his recent articles in *Mind*, Professor Boodin holds that we must rid "the scholastic tradition of its *a priori* excrescence of creation out of nothing" (p. 145). "God is present everywhere and always, as creative spirit giving form to our world." The need of redemption, which is so prominent a feature in the religion with which the belief in "creation out of nothing" has been generally associated, arises, according to our author, from the presence—not, as we have seen, of *freedom*, properly so called, but of *indeterminacy* in the matter of the world. Yet—and it is here that we feel Professor Boodin to be in the last resort less "dualistic" than he is prepared to profess himself—this "indeterminate" matter is an essential element in the eternal purpose of God. "In a large way the play goes on, one cosmic epoch preparing the stage for another, whatever may be the tragedy of individual performers. Yet the master of the show may care more for the individual actors than for the immensity and scenery of the stage" (p. 160). The plot must be to produce "free creators." "God," we read (p. 163), "is transcendent in that He exists in His own essence, always and everywhere. He is not an integration of finite parts, but enjoys a life of His own of absolute perfection. But God is immanent in that He is present to and in all finite individuals to guide, to heal, to transform into beauty, so far as the individual permits. . . . Salvation means that the finite individual may eventually become so transformed as to incarnate the intention of God in itself and thus become immortal through the love of God, though such support can be reached only prospectively under our finite limitations." This passage seems to sum up Professor Boodin's theology. We may agree with him when he goes on to say that "when we have reached the limits of our little knowledge we must confess in awe with the ancient poet: 'Clouds and darkness are round about Him.' "

No one who has meditated on these great subjects will think lightly of the difficulties which have induced Professor Boodin to abandon the conception of a creation *ex nihilo*. Yet one may doubt if this abandonment does not really result in a doctrine of God which falls short of that implied in that sense of absolute dependence which (as Schleiermacher taught) lies at the heart of the religious experience, and which finds an expression in the words " It is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves."

Why does Professor Boodin say (p. 203), speaking of the truth that "the true mystery of the cross is that love is victorious through suffering," "This is the eternal *but forgotten* truth of Christianity"? (the italics are mine). It is the more surprising that he should write thus, as he goes on in his concluding chapter, on "Divine Laughter," to attack St. Paul for his success in interpreting a "religion of joy" into a "religion of sin and expiation." Many will

agree with him that Christianity has in the past laid a disproportionate emphasis on the aspect of man's earthly life as a "vale of tears"; but he himself is inclined, I cannot but think, to minimize unduly the importance of that sense of sin whereof this melancholy outlook is the one-sided expression.

Why, by the way, is the name of God described (p. 22) as "charged with the racial aspiration of all *Aryan* history"? If the *word* "God" is meant, not all "Aryan" languages use it; if "God" stands here for all words with the same meaning, surely others than "Aryans" aspire after such a Being as we call "God." Indeed, one does not (outside of Germany) expect to hear nowadays of an Aryan *race*.

On p. 120 it is assumed that the "man" who is made the centre of the world by Kant and by Protagoras is in both cases the *individual* man; but of Kant this is surely not true. And does Hegel mean (as Professor Boodin intimates on p. 57), in the famous simile of the owl of Minerva, to suggest that it has taken its flight before philosophers arrive on the scene? Is not the wise bird's flight rather a metaphor for that very arrival? What has already happened is that the shades of evening have begun to fall upon some phase of historical life which is drawing to its close.

Professor Boodin's choice of words to describe the distinguished person to whom his book is dedicated—"an inspiring and constructive leader in liberal religious thought"—indicate his own ideals and the qualities which are exhibited in his work.

C. C. J. Webb.

Art and Morality. By O. de Selincourt. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. ix + 284. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Mr. de Selincourt endeavours in his book to show that the spheres of Art and of Morality are distinct and yet intimately related, both with one another and with the other values. He begins by revealing, without much difficulty, the inadequacy of the Platonic or Tolstoian view that art is subject to moral standards (a view assumed in current controversies about censorship). He points out, *inter alia*, that art is subject to aesthetic standards only, that moral questions arise only in relation to some arts, that art is not, any more than knowledge and religion, "selfish"; that, positively, art is approved as "good"; and that morality itself has some aesthetic value.

He follows this up by two important chapters on emotion and meaning, on the liberating effects of art, and on the "revelation" which it is alleged that art gives. Assuming, with Croce, that emotion is a material for artistic form, and denying the "aesthetic emotion" hypothesis, he points out that the emotions of everyday life are the material for art, these being transformed in the work by something "happening" to them, in which they become detached and "general." Meaning, again, is primarily non-aesthetic, but is, likewise, transmuted by form: the final expressed meaning is aesthetic, but the "subject" is not. The expression is a liberation, not merely in the Aristotelian sense (which is examined critically) of elimination, but by helping us to know our emotions through the imposition of form on them. They are not ejected or repressed, but related to our whole experience, and we become released. So the arts (and this is true not only of literature) *reveal*, not didactic truth, or Absolute Spirit, or anything of that sort, but, in a combination of thought and emotion, an attitude of mind which gives insight into our place in the world. Art can reveal something not unlike truth, but it is contact with a part of reality, namely personality.

Morality is now distinguished from the personal intercourse with which it

is sometimes confused, and which, along with art and science, forms in a sense morality's material. But morality, strictly speaking, "has no processes of its own." It is not even a "good" (neither is religion), and the value of morality is utterly dependent on the intrinsic non-moral values of art, science, and personal intercourse. This being so, the real conflict arises, not between art and morality, as if they were two things of the same kind on the same level, but between art and the other intrinsically valuable activities of contemplation.

Such a view, the author holds, in no way "degrades" morality, and he defends his thesis against those who believe in "morality for morality's sake," against deontologists; as also against utilitarian views of morality as "production." The concluding chapters contain useful comments on the problem of Good, of the definability of Good, of its nature as what is ordered, coherent and rational; and on the interrelations of goods.

I have found Mr. de Selincourt's book in many ways suggestive, but on the whole not markedly illuminating. I may be unduly prejudiced by the fact that the style and manner of approach seem to me to be involved, disfigured by too long paragraphs and by the irritating habit of doing certain phrases to death. (I counted phrases like "Nor would it be difficult . . ." till I got tired.) And Mr. de Selincourt is so anxious that what he is *going* to say shall not be thought incompatible with what he *has* said, that the reader has often to search hard for what *is* being said. I wished often that he would be more direct, more crisp, more clear.

And although I am in agreement with some of his main conclusions, I found much to question too. Of course emotional states of mind are involved in the production and appreciation of art, and are in some sense embodied in the work. But what *are* "emotions," and why do so many people assume, so easily and without analysis, that art is the expression of them? And is autognosis one of the chief functions of art? And *is* the meaning which is "revealed" chiefly an attitude of mind, the self of the artist? I am not quite clear what Mr. de Selincourt's view of "revelation" really is, and the problem is indeed a difficult one; but it needs more thorough treatment than Mr. de Selincourt gives it. The notion of "imposing" form on material, again, needs a further analysis of matter and form. As for morality, whilst it is certainly not a good apart from other goods, it seems to me false to think that a good man is a man who simply regulates well the (non-moral) "goods" of man's life. Does he not possess a "spirit" over and above these which may make of their goodness a new thing? May not morality be more like than unlike art in its transforming relation to its "material"? And if it is true that morality transcends other goods, religion seems to do so more still. To say (p. 191) that religion is not separate, but penetrates all experiences, is exactly half true.

LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

The Life and Writings of Giambattista Vico. By H. P. ADAMS. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 236. Price 8s. 6d.)

The author deserves almost as much congratulation for realizing that an English book on Vico was overdue as for the very unusual excellence of the book he has supplied. For Vico has been much neglected in this country. Hitherto the only monograph has been R. Flint's in *Blackwood's Philosophical Classics* (1884, reprinted 1901). There are restricted essays in J. G. Robertson's *Studies in the Genesis of Romantic Theory* (1923) and C. E. Vaughan's *Studies in the History of Political Philosophy* (1925), and T. Whittaker con-

tributed three articles to *Mind* in 1926 (reprinted in his *Reason*, 1934). To these I can only add the English translation of Croce's *Filosofia di G. B. Vico*. However, we have been only slightly more negligent than Germany, and even in Italy Vico did not come into his own until the nineteenth century. Nowadays the Italians make him their chief philosopher, and the new idealism there may with much truth be characterized as a synthesis of Hegel and Vico.

Mr. Adams tells admirably the story, outwardly meagre, of the poor Neapolitan professor of rhetoric who had to eke out his stipend by private coaching and by composing complimentary Latin verses for the worldly great, and who sold his diamond-set ring, probably the only valuable he possessed, to cover the cost of the printing of his masterpiece. By this masterpiece only, the *Scienza Nuova* (1725), did he wish to be known, and the eventual achievement of it was one of the few consolations of his depressed career. Why he was denied promotion to a more important chair (the stipend of his own was a sixth of that of the chair of jurisprudence) and, until shortly before his death, some sinecure with emoluments, is not clear; Mr. Adams shows that in his own city, and in Venice, too, his large talent was admitted and appreciated. Vico's life was the struggle of an impecunious, self-educated, and ailing man to compass, with a prodigy of effort and stamina and intelligence, the whole field of knowledge and subdue it to the order and light of a philosophy. In depicting this inner drama the biographer has been preceded and enabled by the autobiographer. The *Vita di Giambattista Vico*, written in the third person, was at once pronounced to be a model and is still among the most remarkable of its kind. Mr. Adams has used it well. I wish that he had also appended it in translation; though a little long for an appendix, it would not, I imagine, sell separately, yet it ought to be made available.

The book is essentially a biography and therefore takes up each of Vico's many writings in its temporal place in the life-story. For a systematic presentation of Vico's thought the student must turn to Flint or Croce. Although Vico's interests and works embrace a multiplicity of fields which are now divided among specialists, Mr. Adams discusses them all with understanding and learning. By profession an historian, he writes with authority on Vico's historical interests, and on the people and happenings of the Naples of that day, though he never allows Vico, the inner Vico, to disappear or dwindle in a wilful picture of the *milieu*. It is a long time since I came across a new book in which such varied learning is handled with such restraint, sense of proportion, and modesty. Whether the subject be the authorship of the Homeric poems, the origin of language, poetry and religion, the evolution of law in a developing society, or the content and affinities of Vico's philosophy, it is treated with relevant knowledge. His exposition of Vico's theory of poetry, for example, is a paragon of sympathetic and lucid compression. His account of the philosophy is, so far as I am able to judge, very just in general—a Neoplatonism enriched with a scrupulous curiosity and respect for historical fact, seeking in history both the *rationale* and the mental faculties through which this *rationale* moves towards realization; a philosophy reacting in the spirit of Plato and of Bacon (one of Vico's heroes), the one prescribing metaphysical system, the other inductive conscience, but both encyclopaedic and humanistic, against the dominant Cartesian emphasis on the physical world and on the dry light of reason as the only lamp of knowledge. Only when he comes to a comparative philosophical estimate does Mr. Adams lay himself open to question by philosophical specialists. For instance, Vico's doctrine that we know only what we make does not constitute him a precursor of Kant: that mathematical entities are fictions and are perfectly known because they are fictions is much older than Vico, is not distinctive of Kant,

and in Kant results from a different stimulus and procedure and rests on a subtler and deeper ground—and it is the ground that makes Kant Kant. Mr. Adams accepts whole-heartedly the current Italian estimate of Vico, as he has every right to do, but I wish he had had space to try to vindicate its validity outside the context of nationalist sentiment in which it has grown up. The wish, however, may be unfair, since such a task would involve comparisons too closely and technically argued to be in place in a general biography.

Books of this kind, learned but well-proportioned, brief, and really filling a gap, are all too rare nowadays. So also is the distinguished style of Mr. Adams's writing, the quiet and pregnant style of a mature mind too sensitive to use devices and too gifted to need them. It has been a high pleasure to read his pages.

T. E. Jessop.

Civilization and the Growth of the Law. By W. A. Robson, Ph.D., LL.M. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1935. Pp. xv + 354. Price 12s. 6d.)

Like all the work which comes from the pen of Dr. Robson, this book possesses a creative assurance which is peculiarly grateful in a field of study much liable to aridity of treatment. The author has set out, to use his own words, "to show how legal and political institutions have been influenced by magic, superstition, religion and science." With this object in view, he proceeds first to consider the origins of law. "However far back we go into the twilight of history, there is always some form of law in existence." The code of Hammurabi of Babylon, two thousand years B.C., is already a mature one, restricting vengeance and providing that wrong be redressed by law.

If indeed, as Dr. Robson says, without law men cannot live together, it would seem that the rudiments of law are to be found in all societies, however primitive. The ruler is always associated with the administration of justice and the notion of the divinity of the ruler, which survives in the modern constitution of Japan and is implicit in so much tradition, indicates the close association of the lawgiver and expounder with assumed supernatural authority. From the case of isolated decrees received from a Divine Agent, law develops into a general code of rules, but, nevertheless, the opinion that such rules reflect a superhuman origin is maintained. The mosaic precepts and the assumption by the ancients of Apollo and Jupiter to be the real lawgivers rests upon this superstition. The digest of Justinian approves the speech of Demosthenes that law is devised and governed by God, and when it is recognized that laws are not directly God-given, yet they come from human beings upon whom God has conferred secular authority. Such a view, says Dr. Robson, is expressed in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans. Divine revelation and human necessities form the double foundation of early Roman Law, and of course Jewish Law is even more definitely theological.

The notion of Divine Justice develops later, but as distinguished from arbitrary ordinance as an ideal of abstract perfection, it is implicit in mediaeval legislation, becoming concrete in such criminal jurisdiction as ordeal by battle or by fire.

With the progress of human thought, says the author, the idea had developed that Divine Will is identical with perfect Justice, and once it was believed that Justice was an inherent attribute of the heavenly power, the business of establishing it became a task to which man could address himself without misgiving.

Dr. Robson sets out in the second part of his book to explain how the

framework of ideas of any particular society concerning the constitution of the universe affect their legal conceptions. In mediaeval eyes the world was a single organism, an incarnation under the sovereign rule of God, but, side by side with this belief was the Aristotelian notion of the law of nature as the guiding principle of the universe. It is indeed in contrast to the religious outlook, a pantheistic idea making the universe itself the immanent Deity, and excluding His transcendence.

Under scholastic influence, particularly that of St. Thomas Aquinas, these two notions of the natural and the divine law were temporarily reconciled, but with the loss of the full Catholic philosophy, views more or less pantheistic, become dominant. To Spinoza, nature is God; and from a law of nature it was not difficult to extract a municipal law for each growing nationality, a juridical conception so characteristic of society after the breakdown of the unity of Christendom. Thus the universality of justice and law both divine and natural was in danger of being lost, and the notion of the sovereign state tends to take its place.

This book assists the reader to realize all the legal consequences which followed upon the decay of the notion of universal justice. Relativity in ethics as in science react upon juristic conceptions and international law becomes a thing of shreds and patches. Dr. Robson does not point out the final consummation of this development, which some now assert has ended in the virtual disappearance of law in a large part of Europe, so that in so many places to-day it may be sadly said there is no certainty of tenure either for property or for life, and no philosophy of general jurisprudence to help to regain it.

May it be that the decay of process ultimate supernatural sanctions which Dr. Robson appears to regard without disquiet, is the ultimate cause of the present collapse of law and legal institutions over so vast an area, and may it not be possible that post-mediaeval development, so far from being a progress in the civilization of man, is indeed a reaction to a more savage and irrational state.

The final impression derived from this book is that until recently man has not tried the experiment of conducting his affairs without some system of law or custom. This conclusion may be considered alongside the statement of Mr. Lippman, the American publicist, that until recently man has never attempted to live without some religion.

HENRY SLESSER.

An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method. By MORRIS R. COHEN and ERNEST NAGEL. (London: G. Routledge & Sons. 1934. Pp. xii + 467. Price 15s. net.)

It is a curious fact that whilst the progress of Logic is in the direction of increasing rigour, increasing generality, and increasing system, the best contemporary expositions leave us with a certain impression of disorder. To visualize the matter the procedure is as follows. The contemporary logician sets to work by excavating and restoring some very venerable foundations. There follows the erection of some scaffolding, and through this scaffolding one begins to see the severe but elegant outlines of a very modern building. But before this structure is complete something curious happens. Work commences on a strange and incongruous wing. This is apt to grow and spread and encircle the principal structure with rambling excrescences until the whole assumes a form combining the features of a power station with those of a Victorian Gothic mansion. In point of fact it is a temple constructed to the

honour of Aristotle, Frege, and John Stuart Mill. In fairness it must be stated that for its peculiarities its architects are in no way to blame. The construction serves its purpose in so far as it reflects the state of contemporary logical studies, and more particularly contemporary examination needs. It is the best that can be done in the face of an extremely difficult problem.

For some considerable time prior to the current thirties it was the monotonous refrain of teachers of the subject that there existed no adequate introduction to contemporary logic. Logical studies were in transition, and no one seems prepared to assume responsibility for a premature crystallization in textbook form of doctrines still in process of development. Moreover, even a very provisional formulation would not be easy to present. But the attempt could not be indefinitely postponed. In 1930 there appeared Stebbing's pioneer work, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*. This was soon followed by Eaton's *General Logic*, which was followed in turn by the present reviewer's *Principles of Logic*. And now we have *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method* from the joint pens of Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel.

Obviously, the present writer is not the appropriate person to attempt any estimate of the relative merits of these works for the purposes for which they are intended. He is, however, sufficiently well placed to appreciate the significance of some of the features which represent alternative solutions to a common predicament.

The predicament was this. The "crying need" was for an exposition which should be (i) reasonably up to date, (ii) reasonably comprehensive, (iii) reasonably simple, and (iv) reasonably brief. The saving adjective here is "reasonably," since without it there is little doubt that these authors would have been committed to attempting the impossible.

From internal evidence it is clear that on the general questions of content and on the general lines of reconstruction these several independent writers find themselves enjoying a rather remarkable measure of agreement. They agree, first of all, that the point of departure must be the traditional Aristotelian system, and that of this a considerable body of doctrine must be preserved. They agree further that the main lines of reconstruction are those presented by the generalized theory of deduction as exhibited in *Principia Mathematica*. They appear to agree, moreover, that rather radical "reconditioning" is required in the theory of induction, though the form such reconditioning should assume is a matter on which they display their greatest independent variety. The most extreme divergence is that between the exposition of Eaton's *General Logic* and that which is offered in the present volume. In the former the bias is in the direction of simplification and exclusion, whilst in the latter the problems of induction occupy the larger half of the volume.

The work opens with a lively introductory chapter on *The Subject Matter of Logic*. Thereafter the exposition is divided into two books—a smaller Book I: *Formal Logic*, and a larger Book II: *Applied Logic and Scientific Method*.

Book I commences with a lucid and simple exposition of some of the principal current notions relevant to the analysis and classification of propositions, and of the relations between propositions (Chs. III and IV). Then follows, in two chapters, a straightforward and conventional (as it should be) exposition of the doctrine of the syllogism and its elaborations. Chapter VI contains an introductory treatment of *Generalized or Mathematical Logic*, and Chapter VII a rather more advanced but very interestingly presented discussion of *The Nature of a Logical or Mathematical System*. Chapter VIII introduces *Probable Inference*, and in this one form of the frequency theory

is defended. The concluding chapter of Book I, *Some Problems of Logic*, is somewhat of the nature of a collection of odds and ends—the Paradox of Inference, the charge of *petitio principii* against the syllogism, the Laws of Thought, and the basis of logical principles in the nature of things.

Book II is the Victorian mansion lavishly furnished and full of interesting nooks and corners, but in which it is a little difficult to find one's way about and preserve a sense of direction. With few preliminaries a good start is made by a discussion of the rôle of hypotheses in science (Ch. XII). Progress is arrested, however, by a chapter not so much irrelevant as disproportionate for its context on *Classification and Definition* (Ch. XIII). We move forward again at a brisker rate in a reasonably detailed but not too detailed chapter on *The Methods of Experimental Inquiry* (Ch. XIII).

In Chapter XIV something of a nature of fresh start is made in raising the question: What is inductive reasoning? This chapter introduces the problem of sampling and of reasoning from analysis. Then follows a chapter on *Measurement* and a chapter on *Statistical Methods*. At this point the authors might with advantage, perhaps, have proceeded direct to the concluding chapter of their book, but this is delayed by the intervention of discussions on *Probable Inference in History and Allied Inquiries*, on *Logic and Critical Evaluation*, and a chapter on *Fallacies*. To what extent discussions of the applications of logic to specialized branches of science should find a place in a general introduction to the subject is a matter on which there can be reasonable difference of opinion, but it is difficult to see why the historical sciences should be selected for special consideration, and still more difficult to justify excursions into the sphere of morals and aesthetics. The trouble is that such topics cannot be treated to advantage without considerable preliminary expositions wholly inappropriate to a general textbook of logic. The difficulty serves to draw attention to a really serious gap in logical literature. What is needed is a whole series of works on the applications of the science, on mathematical logic, on the logic of the physical sciences, on the logical problems of psychology, of sociology, and so forth. The lack of adequate literature of this kind has reacted unfavourably on the balance of many otherwise orderly expositions of general theory. This is not the place in which to open a discussion of the details of logical doctrine contained in this work. Contemporary logicians are not unanimous, and on the controversial issues the authors are entitled to their opinions, which are always clearly presented and defended.

They have produced a work which should contribute much to a revival of a general interest in logic. To a greater extent than in any other work with which the reviewer is acquainted, a fair balance is struck between the interests of the university student and the interests of the general reader—to both of whom the work should serve to communicate its authors' appreciation of "the realistic formalism of Aristotle, the scientific penetration of Pierce, the pedagogical soundness of Dewey, and the mathematical rigour of Russell."

C. A. Mace.

The Origins of Religion. By Rafael Karsten, Ph.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1935. Pp. vii + 328. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book might almost be described as the protest of a consistent animist against the heresy of "pre-animism"; for the subject crops up on every other page. My difficulty as a reviewer is that I am myself credited with the origination of the heresy in question, and so have to bear the brunt of a good many of the author's strictures. I would plead in self-defence that a short

paper read before the British Association in 1899 and published in *Folklore* in the following year does not represent the last word that I have said on the subject; having, for instance, devoted no less than three volumes to it within the last three years. I cannot but hope, then, that some day—say, about 1970—one of my brother-anthropologists may happen to read one or another of these latter-day efforts of mine, and will thereupon discover that my views have undergone a certain development in the course of the twentieth century. In fact, Professor Karsten's criticisms make me suspect that he takes me for one of his ghosts who has long given up all interest in living and growing.

Having spent some six years among the Indians of South America, Professor Karsten has come to be recognized as not only a first-hand but a first-rate authority on the institutions and beliefs of this part of the world; and, if he finds that animism will suffice to explain their religion, I for one would not venture to question his opinion. But outside his special province he has, like the rest of us, to deal with second-hand evidence; and even as near as North America he has to explain away notions of the *orenda* and *manitu* type to which others more familiar with that religion have certainly given a pre-animistic sense. In any case, moreover, he professes to expound the "origins" of religion, and to analyse the workings of the "primitive" mind —nothing that he is likely to have met with in his travels. Now I think it a pity that we anthropologists are not more ready to acknowledge the speculative nature of our attempts to reconstruct the beginnings of culture, even if we go no further back than a generalized savage composed partly of authentic prehistoric remains and partly of presumed ethnological survivals. I should, indeed, feel more respect for Professor Karsten's animism if he were not so dogmatic about it. As it is, he stands somewhat alone, since in taking over animism from Tylor he convicts the latter of intellectualistic leanings; while, although a follower of Westermarck, he is shocked to find him pre-animistically inclined in the matter of animal worship. If only, then, he would insert the word "perhaps" a hundred times in the pages of an excellent book which I have read with great profit to myself, and, I admit, with not a few heart-searchings, all would be well. My immediate object, as I explained at the time when first formulating the notion of a pre-animistic form of religion, was to provide a provisional heading under which could be classified a number of facts hitherto more or less neglected. Perhaps it has served this purpose all too well, so that animism has been robbed of some part of its legitimate heritage; in which case Professor Karsten's work ought to go far towards readjusting the balance. But that Man could not feel awe, and act upon it, in regard to objects of outstanding interest until he had discovered a soul in himself, and could impute it as such to the objects in question, is a contention at once very sweeping and very difficult to prove.

R. R. Marett.

Aesthetic and Psychology. By Charles Mauron. Translated from the French by Roger Fry and Katherine John. (London: Hogarth Press. 1935. Pp. 110. Price 4s. 6d.)

This translation was planned and begun by Roger Fry before his death. He had a great admiration for M. Mauron's work, and if, as we seem justified in supposing, he found himself in substantial agreement with the development of his own view of the function of art which we have here, the book, small though it be, is of importance in any attempt to estimate his contribution to aesthetic philosophy. True, M. Mauron makes no claim to speak

as a philosopher. In the first sentences he disowns the metaphysical attempt to find a standard of aesthetic values, and would fain confine himself to psychology. But, as is common in such cases, he finds himself before the end carried beyond psychology to a view of art as the revelation of "a reality richer in unforeseen correspondences than the ordinary world," whose "inward voices" it seeks to "echo," or whose "inner landscapes" it seeks to paint. And if this is not a metaphysic, one may ask what is? M. Mauron takes as his point of departure Roger Fry's well-known view that in every true work of art there exists in the total impression which it makes "an original kernel" which is not resolvable into anything that springs from the satisfaction of instincts or desires, but which is in its essence purely contemplative. Assuming, as he did, that science also is contemplative, Fry was thus led to compare aesthetic pleasure, as resulting from the recognition of order and the harmony of relations, with that derived from "the contemplation of intellectual constructions united by logical inevitability," such as we have in science. But, sensible of the difference between the cold-bloodedness of science and the warm emotional character of art, he was tempted to seek for a solution of this contrast in the suggestion that beauty gets its force from the appeal to vague reminiscences of the substratum of emotion that colours man's practical life.

Starting from this apparent ambiguity in Fry's teaching, M. Mauron, while admitting that both science and art are contemplative, tries to show that there is nevertheless an essential difference between them. Though the scientist is "personally disinterested," his intelligence is not, seeing that "the necessities of foresight created science and still govern it," and that thus in the end "the spiritual attitude of the scientist is that of a man of action." The artist, on the other hand, "contemplates the universe without any idea of making use of it," with the consequence that "his eyes are so focused as to concentrate his whole attention on the present." In the central chapter the author goes on to develop what he calls the "Consequences" of this the aesthetic attitude under the three heads of "increased sensitiveness; the multiplication of echoes; and the dissolution of the practical organization of reality giving place to other possible organizations," that may satisfy the ceaseless urge of rational mind to find order and interrelation in apparent Chaos. In successive chapters under the suggestive titles of "The Pleasures of Sensibility," "Expressive Art," and "The Pleasures of Organization," M. Mauron develops his thesis with a subtlety and a wealth of illustration from music and painting which baffle reproduction here. But I hope that the editor will find room for a single quotation from the "Conclusion," characteristic alike of the author's modesty and his insight: "There is nothing to prove that the division, sensibility—mental echoes—organizing reason, is the right one. It merely seemed to me the most convenient and the closest to my own experience. Similarly it seemed to me that every mechanism in us had its own pleasure in living—if I may so call it; that if we supplied our sensibility with differences to perceive, our instincts or memory with motives of activity, our reason with correspondences to distinguish, the performance of those functions would inevitably give birth to primitive and simple pleasures, like those of a child excited by its own restlessness. This view is strongly supported by the fact that pleasure accompanies the stimulus rather than the satisfaction. Indeed, it may be that all excitement which is free from fear and does not absorb the whole energy of the organism so as to cause suffering to the other mechanisms which remain inactive is necessarily accompanied by joy. It may even be that joy has no other definition."

As said at the beginning, a view of this kind, with the emphasis it lays on

the stimulus coming from the world without rather than on the satisfaction of any instinct or desire that owes its origin to practical needs individual or social, is a welcome contribution to aesthetic philosophy, aligning the author with the sound tradition that finds in the works of poet, artist, or musician a revelation of the inner nature of the world he seeks to portray. It need hardly be added that a translation in the names of Fry and John is itself a work of art. J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Religion in Virgil. By CYRIL BAILEY. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Price 15s. net.)

There are books to which one refers from time to time because of their learning; others which are kept at hand, when they have been read through, to read them again for their charm, as a friend's conversation is sought. This modest volume, the permanent record of the Sather Classical Lectures in 1932, has a claim to appear in both these categories. It combines erudition with total absence of pedantry, and literary appreciation with critical insight and powers of analysis none the less real because they do not display themselves in long rows of statistics or formidable tables of the relative frequency of this and the percentages of that. It is a man of taste talking about a poet to those who are minded to hear him; and it happens that the taste is fortified with scholarship and a knowledge, not only of Latin and literature, but of philosophy and ancient religion.

To know what one of the great minds, ancient or modern, felt concerning the world and its inhabitants, visible and invisible, can never be a matter of indifference, nor can his conclusions become obsolete, as those of a scientist may. Vergil has the added importance that his influence, both in his own age and later, has been enormous and continues to be great, reaching many who are not sympathetic to formal philosophical teaching and impatient of dogmatic theologies. To ask, therefore, what his religion was is to treat a problem which has permanent interest, but a problem complicated by the necessity of seeing him against the background of his time and disentangling what is personal in him both from mere echoing of current ideas and from conventional mythological machinery which he, as a poet, could no more avoid using than he could express himself in a language not then spoken.

Therefore the author goes very properly to work when he begins by defining, in his first chapter, what is meant by "magic, omen, and prophecy," spends the next two chapters over old Italian religion, passes to the State cult of Rome, deals in Chapters V–VII with the Graeco-Roman gods, in Chapter VIII with deities Oriental and cosmological and with emperor-worship, gives another chapter to the question of "Fate and the gods," with an appendix on "the meaning of *Fortuna* in Virgil," treats next of "the dead and the underworld," and then gives us sixteen pages of "conclusion," in which the results arrived at are excellently summed up. Throughout the work an attempt is made to differentiate what Vergil thought and felt, his own personal religion or religious philosophy, from what he merely echoed. The instrument used is a simple one, little more than the author's necessarily subjective impressions; but, when handled by a trained mind long and thoroughly acquainted with the subject, such an instrument is quite as potent as many which make a greater parade of scientific accuracy and cold-blooded analysis.

Dr. Bailey's feeling, then, is that Vergil had for the old traditional Italian cults, the so-called "religion of Numa," a "tender affection" (p. 303), founded, not on mere sentiment for the practices among which he had been brought

up, as a modern who no longer has any connection with an organized religion may still have a liking for a hymn learned in childhood or a liturgy reverenced by his parents, but on a "recognition of its spiritual value," that value consisting largely in its very vagueness. Vergil has an affection for the traditional deities of the woods and fields; but he is still more interested in and devoted to the ancestral ritual, which he knew with a thoroughness that impressed ancient commentators and furnishes welcome material for moderns who would learn the forms which the piety of the countryside took. For the conventional great gods and the conventional manner of approaching them he had much less deep feeling; for the picturesque anthropomorphic figures he had least of all; they were pretty, even beautiful, subjects for his fancy, but not objects either of solid belief or of profound emotion; nor had they been so, to any educated man, for centuries. But, for Vergil as for Varro and many other men of good will just then, even the State cult was not dead and might yet be the vehicle, albeit in a form which the understanding would interpret after their own fashion and not as its originators had done, of high thought and spiritual values. Apollo and his divine archery might be no more than a lovely figure of venerable tradition; it by no means followed that no superhuman power had watched over Augustus or guided the fortunes of the decisive day at Actium.

So also with the beliefs concerning the dead. No one, certainly not Dr. Bailey, supposes that Vergil imagined it literally true that, if one went through certain prescribed rites and knew where to find a particular opening in the ground, he would come to a place where the ghosts of his ancestors flitted about in unsubstantial happiness or lay in supernatural torments. But this is not to say that Vergil assumed merely for poetical purposes the existence of the human soul. Rather "he takes the traditions of folk-lore and myth and using them as his framework, refines them to the measure of his own philosophic vision" (p. 315). That the soul, that man, dead or alive, was capable of "ultimate triumph coming through suffering" (p. 318), the author supposes to have been a serious belief of the poet, and the reviewer entirely agrees with him. In the case of so exceptional a man as the Emperor, Vergil did not flatter when he hailed him as a god, but rather, in the expression of a real belief, "outran the official pace" (p. 196), and was rather checked than incited by his knowledge of the official views on this subject. The Providence which ruled his universe, whatever traditional names of Fate and Fortune he might give it, could and did show itself through such a personality with such a mission; and such a man had genuinely in him not a little which could fairly be called divine.

These then, in barest outline and with omission of a hundred controversial points of philological, historical, or philosophic detail, are the ideas concerning God and man which Dr. Bailey finds in the poet who was hailed as a prophet and a saint by many centuries of godly men, much though their own beliefs differed from one another's and from his; who was to Horace an *anima candida*, while the Middle Ages greeted him with *da Christo testimonium*.

H. J. Rose.

The Relations of Morality to Religion. By W. G. de Burgh. Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, British Academy, 1935. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXI. (London: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. 27. Price 2s.)

The writer of this notice finds himself so closely in agreement with the view of the relations of morality to religion and of religion to philosophy which is expounded by Professor de Burgh in his recent lecture delivered

before the British Academy that there is little left for him to do, when he has given a brief account of the contents of the lecture, but to "say ditto" to the lecturer. Professor de Burgh shows very clearly that morality and religion are mutually independent forms of experience, and that the relation between them, "however intimate it may prove to be, is not one of necessary connexion" (p. 5). Morality is autonomous, as Kant held; and it is justly observed that this philosopher's "postulation" of God does nothing to imperil its autonomy (p. 4). Morality does not grow into religion by a process of mere expansion. The love of man which, for religion, is rooted in the love of God (p. 10), cannot be reached, as M. Bergson has pointed out in his recent remarkable book, *Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion*, by the extension over a wider area of the love we bear toward those who are fellow-members with ourselves of a "closed" society (pp. 10, 11). Religion again does not, like morality, essentially belong to the sphere of practice, as Bradley held, and as Mr. Oakeshott has recently "reaffirmed with uncompromising vigour" (p. 15). "While" it "implies conduct as well as knowledge, just as morality implies knowledge as well as conduct, the theoretical moment is for religion all-important" (p. 13). "In religious experience . . . action is always for the sake of knowledge." "The religious life in its essence is the life eternal, which is to know God" (p. 15). Bradley's own admission that "faith in the real being of God" is "the mark which distinguishes religion from morality" "is fatal to the view that religion is exclusively a form of practice" (p. 17). Yet Professor de Burgh will not identify religion with mysticism, and criticizes M. Bergson for sometimes seeming to do so (p. 11). Practice, if not primary in religion, is indispensable to it, since "only in worshipping God do we learn to know him" (p. 18), and it is "when, as in Plato and Spinoza" philosophy "proclaims a way of life" that "it passes over into religion" (p. 20). I may here remark in passing that, in his interesting observations on Spinoza (p. 22), Professor de Burgh finds in some statements of the *Ethics* more than I can convince myself is really there: but this is not to deny that the temper of the great Jewish thinker is, as Professor de Burgh says, profoundly religious, whether his doctrine be held fully to justify this temper or no.

Though metaphysics and religion are rival claimants to universal knowledge, "and neither claimant can brook the intrusion of a rival within its borders" (p. 24), yet a reconciliation is possible. "They traverse common ground, but they view the scene from a different angle, and, for all their co-operation, pursue different paths. Religion is theocentric, and regards the world and man in the light of the Creator's revelation of himself. Metaphysics, on the other hand, takes its start from within the created universe, and only at long last, if ever, and then by aid of religious experience, acknowledges its dependence upon God. Metaphysical knowledge, again, is impersonal; it is 'about' things, which it interprets through general concepts; while religious knowledge comes by personal contact between God and the individual" (p. 25). "It is because God is thus known by personal contact that the way of religion lies open alike to the learned and the unlearned, while metaphysics is the exclusive privilege of an intellectual *élite*" (p. 26). I might perhaps hesitate over one or two expressions in these sentences; but I believe that substantially they state the truth about the relations of philosophy and religion in their fully developed forms.

Professor de Burgh has the gift of coining phrases which stick in the memory. I will quote two such. One about Pascal's hard saying, "*Il faut s'abêtir*": "The great musician, too, will practice scales" (p. 12); another about "humanism": "If man would enter upon his kingdom, he must forgo the claim to be its king." CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

NEW BOOKS

The Philosophy of a Biologist. By J. S. Haldane, C.H., M.D., F.R.S. (Oxford at the Clarendon Press: Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xii + 155. Price 6s.)

This short book of 150 pages constitutes in some sort Dr. J. S. Haldane's philosophical *testamentum* and *confessio fidei*; and so, while it does not, I think, and does not pretend to, add much that is new to his former writings, it is a moving and impressively sincere summary of an eminent scientist and philosopher's reading of life.

After a short introductory chapter we have three chapters which "place" first the physical sciences, then biology, and finally psychology, in relation to that survey and appraisement of the whole of experience in which the author finds the essence of philosophy. A fourth chapter does the same for "religion," and a short "retrospect" ends the book.

The moral of the first chapter—the abstract and therefore partial character of physical science—is unexceptionable, but it contains statements of very dubious validity. It is not true (though often stated) that for modern physics time is merely an additional dimension of space (p. 18); nor that (p. 21) "there can be no greater velocity than that of light." Sir A. Eddington's example of the imaginary searchlight casting a beam upon Neptune and rotating once a minute reminds us of the error of this. The end of the beam will have a much greater velocity. Dr. Haldane's further remark (p. 21) that "the universe which is capable of being perceived is the only universe which has any meaning for us," is, as it stands, quite untrue.

In the next (biological) chapter he is upon ground that he has made his own, and expounds the view commended at greater length in his longer works. Neither mechanism nor "vitalism" are satisfactory types of interpretation of the facts of life. The former leaves unexplained the capital fact of maintained co-ordination of structure and function: the latter presents us with an irruption of a new principle into a "mechanical" world; and this does less than justice to the status of biological science. If I may put it so, Dr. Haldane holds that the biological interpretation does not intervene upon, but supersedes, in large measure, the mechanical, as our grasp becomes more concrete and intimate; just as it is in turn superseded by the psychological point of view, in which the key-conception of personality replaces that of organism. This is a familiar and attractive point of view, but it is not without its difficulties. I have no space to develop them here: a central one is the fact that the lower category has both to be superseded (because the higher cannot be confined to a mere department of experience), and yet retained to provide an environment or matter to give scope and meaning to the higher. And I do not think that Dr. Haldane has at all done justice to the significance of "organic" philosophies like Whitehead's, which seems to me to avoid certain difficulties that beset his own.

The chapter upon Religion strikes a familiar note, for here the author writes in the "idealist" tradition. To-day it is good to hear the case for a "religious" interpretation of experience put with such candour and such conviction.

Finally, mention should be made of the clear and expert account of what may be called the psycho-physiology of sensory processes, especially the susceptibility to light and to colour. This is a field of research which was neglected by the traditional psycho-physics, and it certainly constitutes an important contribution to the philosophy of organic process.

J. W. Harvey.

The Metaphysics of Berkeley critically examined in the Light of Modern Philosophy. By G. W. KAVEESHWAR. (High School, Khandwa, Central Provinces, India: A. Kaveeshwar. 1933. Pp. vi + 360. Price 5s. 6d.)

Berkeley, it appears, has been extremely well received in Indian universities as a guide to the study of philosophical problems. The boldness of his conclusions, the ingenuity with which he reaches them, their untenable but almost irrefutable character, the teasing ambiguity of his central terms, and the simplicity and enduring charm of his language, make him one of the best of philosophical pedagogues. It is interesting to find our western experience confirmed in the East. Mr. Kaveeshwar has accordingly undertaken to provide an exposition of Berkeley for Indian students. At the same time he has tried to make them conscious and appreciative of the treasures of their own national heritage by indicating parallels between Berkeley's thought and that of one of the ancient Indian schools. On these parallels, which the author regards as the special feature of his book but which are not so prominent as the preface seems to promise, I can make no comment, for I have no knowledge whatever of Indian philosophy and could not hope to have without mastering the Sanskrit from which it appears to be largely inseparable. The book, however, is entirely justified without reference to any local need or interests: it is an admirable exposition of the leading themes in Berkeley's *Principles* and *Dialogues*. The alternation between exposition and criticism is sometimes so swift that perhaps the line between them will not always be clear to a beginner; repetitions are rather numerous, but have probably a pedagogic value; and the level of the discussion varies from elementary to advanced as though the author had not kept one audience constantly in view. But the competence is constant, the English smooth, idiomatic, and graceful, and the whole is enlivened with imagination and enthusiasm. I respect the achievement. The author's only fault is a curious deference to western authorities ("modern psychology" is one of them), not in following them but in the way he refers to them: he gives ample proof of right to stand without their support and to differ from them without apology.

Since the book deserves to pass into a second edition, I venture to ask Mr. Kaveeshwar to consider the following points: (1) on pp. 124 ff. he supposes that Berkeley had defined *all* "esse" as "percipi" and therefore convicts him of an absurdity. But when Berkeley said that the "esse" of things is their "percipi," the general context shows that he was speaking of perceived things only. The "esse" of spirit is for him always "percipere." The emphasis on perception falls only where perceptible entities are alleged. (2) On pp. 64 f. and 77 the usual charge is repeated that Berkeley's doctrine of "notions" was introduced only in the second edition of the *Principles* and that it contravenes his first doctrine. But it was only the term, not the doctrine, that the second edition added, and there is no inconsistency unless we wrongly suppose that Berkeley's fundamental view is that *all* objects of knowledge are sensory ideas. The sentence added to the end of sec. 27 of the *Principles* goes no further than the previous sentence; and, by the way, the italicizing of "notions" here in Fraser's edition is Fraser's doing, not Berkeley's. (3) On pp. 107–117 the charge that Berkeley after all relapsed into the error he was trying to refute, namely, the supposition of an imperceptible cause of ideas, surely rests on a confusion. He refused to believe in a cause which is both an idea and imperceptible because an idea is essentially perceptible. He accepted a spiritual cause because his empirical logic required him to assign ideas whose cause was not directly experienced to the only *type* of cause that is directly experienced. Idea as cause goes beyond the analogy of

experience; as unperceived it is a contradiction in terms; whereas spirit as cause and as unperceived is free from both these objections. It is not an unperceived but an unexperienced type of causality that he would not countenance. (4) I notice two trifling errors—a statement on p. 329 that Berkeley italicized "consider" in *Principles*, Intro., sec. 7, and the title of Adamson's work listed in the bibliography has gone awry.

I hope that a second edition will be needed, and that it will be produced by a professional publishing house. The present edition has been courageously carried out by a small country printing press.

T. E. JESSOP.

Law and the Social Sciences. By HUNTINGTON CAIRNS. Foreword by Roscoe Pound. (International Library of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xiv + 279. Price 12s. 6d.)

The author of this book is strongly impressed with the change that in recent times has come over legal theory and practice owing to the abandonment in many responsible quarters of the view that the law should be as independent as possible of the social sciences; and he has set himself the task of making explicit the consequences of this abandonment by describing some of the more important bearings of the social sciences on legal questions. He selects for consideration the sciences of anthropology, economics, sociology, psychology, and political theory, devoting a chapter to each of them. The chief difficulties in the way of any such enterprise are perhaps the great extent of the ground to be covered and the consequent temptation to draw over-hasty analogies between the two fields that are being compared. Of both these difficulties Mr. Cairns is well aware; and he has been notably successful in avoiding the second of them. As might be expected, however, the first has proved somewhat more intractable. Many of the discussions contain interesting matter, and they are usually well-informed, especially in respect of the recent literature of the subjects with which they deal; and it is perhaps inevitable that the book should contain no general thesis beyond the bare idea that there are relations between law and the social sciences. But there is little continuous argument, even in the separate chapters; and many of the discussions are not obviously relevant to the main purpose of the book. In fact quite a number of questions belonging to the different social sciences are discussed at considerable length—often indeed quite suggestively—without any attempt to exhibit their bearing on questions of law or jurisprudence.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

Psychology and Psychotherapy. By WILLIAM BROWN. (London: Edward Arnold and Co. 1934. Pp. vii + 252. Price 12s. 6d.)

Dr. William Brown first published a book with this title in 1921. It was deservedly successful and was re-issued later. This is now called a "Third Edition"; but as the author himself points out it is to all intents and purposes a new work. In the first book, hot on the heels of the Great War, there was more psychotherapy than psychology. In this one the balance is restored. Every serious reader will see that psychology and psychopathology are not

two subjects, each with its own, sometimes conflicting, set of principles, but a single consistent study of human thinking and behaviour. Six of the primary chapters of the book and almost all of the Appendix are entirely new, and a considerable part of the remainder has been re-written. Even now there is room for a more explicit connection of some of the topics dealt with: one moves perhaps a little violently from The Psycho-Neuroses of War to the Treatment of Alcoholism; from a study of Personal Influence to the Psychology of Peace and War; from The Relation of Mind to Brain to Psychical Research, and especially from a Record of a Deep Mental Analysis to three chapters on statistical psychology. But the thread of connection is present, and a reader who will take the trouble to do some thinking for himself will perhaps learn all the more from the fact that he is left to explore for himself considerable stretches of pathway from one topic to another.

I find the new parts of the book definitely the more stimulating and attractive. More than most psychologists, Dr. Brown has kept his psychological thinking in close touch with pressing problems of real life, and he has much to say about the muddles of our present social order which is worth the most careful attention. One thing is to be regretted. Several of the chapters in the book are based upon single lectures or articles each of which deals in a rather general way with some very wide topic. Hence, though they are full of most interesting suggestions, nothing is very thoroughly worked out. Here, for instance, one finds the germ of an excellent psychology of social leadership, many significant remarks about psychological influences that work towards war or peace, a briefly sketched but attractive theory of suggestion. It is much to be hoped that some day Dr. Brown will find time to work his views on these and other matters of great contemporary interest into a more thorough and systematic discussion. For example, that suggestion may be an outcome of aggressiveness as much as of submission is certainly true, and deserves fuller consideration and illustration than it is given. And again, that many of the social dangers of war spring far less from fear and inferiority than from assertion and vigorous self-development seems to me to be indisputable. In these, and in many other ways, this good book is perhaps a promise of a still better one to come.

The three final chapters of the Appendix deal, in a somewhat technical manner, with original developments of the statistical work of the London school. The trouble about these is not that they are really out of place, for they represent contributions of great value to a movement which is of vast and practical importance in modern psychology. But they are introduced and presented practically without comment, and without any attempt to link them up with the more general discussions which form the bulk of the book. Hence they seem to stand apart from the main text, and even to be hauled in by force, as if they had to go somewhere and might as well go here as anywhere else. All this could, and perhaps will, be set right some day. In the meantime, this new edition of an established book is vastly better than the preceding issues, and should be widely read and highly valued.

F. C. Bartlett.

Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre. By Dr. Hans Reichenbach. (Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij, N.Y. 1935. Pp. ix + 451. 11.50 H.Fl. Brosch.)

This work is certainly the most important treatise on the Theory of Probability which has appeared since Mr. J. M. Keynes's book; in some ways,

indeed, it may justly claim to be the most important treatise ever published on the subject, combining the highest degree of logical rigour with great comprehensiveness, and considerable philosophical profundity. It completes and corrects the work of von Mises, Tornier, and others, including the author's own, in attempting to fit the Theory of Probability into the framework of modern formal logic, and to clarify it by the use of the mathematical theory of sets. This work has been largely carried on under the influence of the philosophical school of Carnap, to whom the author expresses his indebtedness. The present book is particularly valuable for the full discussion of most of the objections which have been raised against a frequency theory of probability, and the clear and modest evaluation of what such a theory can achieve.

Dr. Reichenbach starts with a short exposition of those parts of formal logic which he uses in the book. He then defines probability, not as frequency, but by a purely axiomatic method. Probability consists, in this way, of a relation between certain types of proposition, a relation satisfying certain axioms—which he has reduced to a very small number and easily intelligible form. He proves that the frequency interpretation does satisfy these axioms, but the separation of the two has the greatest value in helping the reader to understand at each stage what are the assumptions made. The philosophical remarks in the early part of the book are, however, rather sketchy, and should not be taken too seriously.

The main bulk of the book consists of the purely formal development of the mathematics of probability from the axioms, illustrated in terms of the frequency interpretation, and extended to the field of "continuous probability." The notations used are extremely compact, and the mathematics always elegant as well as exact. The most important section is that on Bernoulli's Theorem, which forms an essential link in Dr. Reichenbach's discussion of the meaning and application of the idea of probability.

This discussion, which occupies the last quarter of the book, is extremely fascinating. We are presented, after eliminating a number of plausible solutions, with a dilemma. On the one hand, the frequency interpretation appears to be necessary. This arises through the use of Bernoulli's Theorem, with the help of which Dr. Reichenbach is able to show that the probability of an event must be equal to its frequency in a normal sequence, provided we accept what certainly seems to be the weakest possible link between probability and experience. A normal sequence in this sense, is one in which the probabilities (in the axiomatic meaning) of the event are properly independent of its position in the sequence. Dr. Reichenbach's method of giving precision to this intuitive idea will well repay attention. The link with experience is given by the special axiom that if an event has a probability unity then it will occur at least once in an infinite series of experiments! On the other side of the dilemma it is clearly shown that the existence, and still more the value, of a limit in the frequency of occurrence of an event cannot be established or disproved by any finite number of experiments; and therefore essentially cannot be decided at all.

In order to escape from this dilemma, Dr. Reichenbach is driven to the conclusion that statements about such limits do not fall under the logic of true and false, but require a "many-valued" logic to evaluate them. Such a many-valued logic, which corresponds to the idea of "plausibility" perhaps rather than to probability, can be given a strict formal basis. In its simplest form it is such that statements of higher order—statements that is about the exact values to be assigned to the elementary propositions of the system—do fall under the logic of true and false. Dr. Reichenbach shows, however,

that in order to fit in with the requirements of science and everyday life we must cut ourselves free from this limitation. All the statements we make then are not to be considered as "true," but as the best possible or as approximate statements, which, with only partial evidence, we "posit" or bet on. He shows that the laws of probability will give us best possible results, by means of the Principle of Induction, in the sense that *in the end* they will approach more and more nearly to the truth; and that we can approach the truth still more quickly if we make use of statements of higher order, in the form of inductions from inductions, to correct our first approximations in any one field. We can approach the truth, that is, if the truth is there; in Dr. Reichenbach's sense, if the events of the universe are arranged in sequences with limits, or in sequences composed of such sequences. If this is not the case, he alleges, there is no way of getting at anything, and so we are no worse off for using the method of Induction.

The essential assumption, it will be seen, is that the universe consists of infinite sequences of similar events, and that what we want for practical life, and for science, is to find out what will happen in the end. The method is capable of giving us no assurance that this will happen on the whole in the near future. It is surely arguable that no sequence of similar events can extend infinitely. Dr. Reichenbach instances taking the temperature at a fixed time every day at a certain spot of the earth's surface, suggesting that we can go on after the break-up of the earth by taking a definite region of space. But does not this example rather suggest that all prescriptions will after a time cease to prescribe anything? Is not the reference to infinity at best a device by which we fix on our best possible predictions, which we then take to apply not to the infinite future, but to the immediate future? And it seems as if we must be on surer ground in extrapolating our results only for a short time into the future than by always extrapolating to infinity.

It may be doubted, too, whether the faith in the method of Induction which Dr. Reichenbach proclaims, can really be justified by such a modest method as his. We shall get to the answer, he says, if the answer exists; which means, as he has proved, if the universe is so constituted that the Principle of Induction applies to it. But does this distinguish it from the Oracle, as he thinks? Will not the Oracle tell us the right answer if the universe is so constituted that oracles are sound? The only distinction is that the method of Induction cannot destroy itself, since it does not claim to be right every time.

A hope may lie in the possibility of removing the reference to infinity, which might perhaps be done almost without alteration of the notation and method of Dr. Reichenbach's book. Should this be so, we would be on the road to uniting the "subjective" theories of Probability with the "objective," by a method which would prescribe to us the best possible guess, and the degree of belief with which we should hold it, from the empirical data at our disposal.

A. G. D. Watson.

An Enquiry into Moral Notions. By John Laird, F.B.A., LL.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 318. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

Professor Laird's latest work on ethics consists of three parts, dealing respectively with the ideas of virtue, duty, and benefit; and the method of treatment in each runs on somewhat parallel lines. The words, however, which the author uses in reference to a portion of his own argument can be

applied to the whole discussion: the course of the argument is "too sinuous and too complicated to lend itself readily to condensation." Consequently, the nature of the contents can be indicated only in very general outline.

Each of the above ideas provides respectively the subject-matter of a theory of virtue, a theory of duty, and a theory of benefit; and as Professor Laird holds that virtue is not simply identical with duty or benefit, although connected with both, and since therefore theories of virtue, duty, and benefit are not coincident, he wishes to inquire how far each of these theories can be said to cover the whole field of ethics, or to provide the sole foundation for ethics. He conducts the reader, often tired and limping painfully, through a detailed analysis, attempting classifications of virtues, duties, and benefits; considering how far volition enters into virtue and obligation, or into morality; having an exhilarating tilt at the maxim "ought implies can;" insisting upon the distinction between final good and axiological good or value, and upon the fundamental character of the latter ethically; examining the question whether knowledge of value is a matter of insight or of feeling; and emphasizing the conception of "relational goods" as a class of goods, and finding much help from it in meeting difficulties in the theory of benefit.

In the course of the discussion it soon appears that benefit is a favourite in the race. An ethic of virtue, although freed from several untenable criticisms, is burdened with considerable handicaps; and the instances in which such an ethic seems strongest can be as effectively dealt with by a theory of benefit. An ethic of duty, though it can deal with the question as to which is the greater obligation in the case of a conflict, cannot, however, do so with the same confidence as the other theories, for considerations of virtue and benefit enter into the determination of gravity and magnitide of obligations; it is involved in difficulties because it assumes a highly questionable dogma regarding the voluntariness of every obligation and the non-voluntariness of every motive; and there is a *strong general presumption* that *one* of the requisites of every moral obligation is that it should aim at some benefit. An ethic of benefit, discussed first as utilitarianism, is defended on the point of moral arithmetic, for, while the deontological notion "righter" has no criteria, the utilitarian notion "better" has such criteria in the form of amount, degree, and kind. Nevertheless, the contentions of the New Intuitionists, whom Professor Laird keeps under review, do force the conclusion, based on a difficulty about what is included in the idea of an "optimific act," that utilitarianism, if not proved insufficient, is also not proved sufficient; and a further examination of it reveals its untenability on several counts. All three theories alike fail to formulate any clear test for a demarcation between the moral and the non-moral. The untenability of utilitarianism is not an argument in favour of either of the other two theories; nor does it close the door against another form of a theory of benefit, which, accepting the distinction between final and axiological good, is prepared to admit "relational good" into the conception of good, and which could therefore be made both tenable and inclusive of the substance of a theory of duty.

Such a summary fails completely to do justice to Professor Laird's exhaustive and illuminating discussion; and it were to be desired that a wider public than professional philosophers could be induced to read it. It is no doubt a study in what may be called Pure Ethics; but it does to the thoughtful reader bring out how involved and complex are some of the issues which many are apt to believe simple and precise, and on which they are prone to be very opinionative. It is doubtful, however, whether the book will make the desired wider appeal. Apart from Professor Laird's tendency to use a terrifying terminology, the reader, especially in parts one and two, tends amidst the

winding argument to miss direction, and is saved only by the help afforded by the preface; unsophisticated persons may feel that there is too much acuteness and subtlety, directed primarily against other philosophers like the New Intuitionists; and the present age is not one, although of course it may be mistaken here, inclined to accept patiently the implications of the term *axiological*, upon which Professor Laird insists. On the other hand, his insistence upon "relational goods" may find support in Plato, who, for instance, places justice under the conception of *good*, and defines it in relational terms. His discussion of virtue, however, seems to stop short and veer off at an interesting point, for, if it is held that virtue must be understood in terms of *acts*, and that the notion of virtue as something inward and durable is due to a questionable metaphysico-scientific procedure, an important issue concerning the relation of virtue to the other notions arises.

But various considerations, such as the idea of "situation" which the New Intuitionists and Professor Laird himself at times use, but which seems to be in need of much fuller analysis, the difficulty of a clear demarcation between the moral and the non-moral, and the author's own admission that "most ethical theories, pursued with relentless logic, would transform the received ethical code, and would not merely supply a reason for it," suggest that the question concerning the sphere of ethics has not been fully answered, and must be considered afresh. There is in the discussion a perplexing indecisiveness about *pros* and *cons* which probably reflects confusion in the moral experience of mankind. And what are the ethical notions with which ethics is concerned? Are they those of a particular epoch or class, or of philosophers like Professor Laird himself? It seems that there is a two-fold question at issue—one about the meanings of ethical terms, and one about the validity of these meanings. It does not appear that Professor Laird considers validity at all, unless he defends himself on the ground of having a genuine insight into value, but, this defence apart, what may be called his Pure Ethics does strike one as what a physical science would be if a physicist confined himself to a discussion of the elucidation and inter-relationships of popular ideas about the universe, and such a procedure might give rise to endless controversies, like those between moral philosophers, due to varying emphasis upon one or other of these popular notions. Though Professor Laird's treatment shows intellectual subtlety combined with literary force and clarity, and will appeal to all those who delight in these qualities and have been trained in dialectical gymnastic, it remains doubtful whether a discussion taking the form of a pure ethic has more than a strictly limited value.

B. M. Laing.

Transcendence and the Logical Difficulties of Transcendence: A Logical Analysis. By Bent Schultzer. (Copenhagen: Levin and Munksgaard; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xv + 301. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book is a treatise submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, though it is a much more important piece of work than the majority of such productions. It is published in English, into which it was translated from the original Danish by Miss Annie I. Fausbøll, M.A., and it was printed in Denmark.

It seems to me to be a highly promising contribution to philosophy: it is too much a systematic anatomy of a set of historical philosophical theories

for it to rank as itself a contribution of quite first-rate importance. But the exposition and application of the principles of this anatomy are such as to satisfy me that in Dr. Schultzer (I hope the title is correct) Denmark possesses a new philosopher of really interesting potentialities.

Before coming to the contents of the book I want to say a word or two about its production. It is very clearly printed and well indexed. The translator has done her work so well that there are very few passages where one is reminded that the book was written in another tongue. I personally dislike the practice, adopted here, of employing block-capitals for the printing of proper names, section-headings, and paragraph-headings. It makes me feel that the author is shouting at me "Do not skip this bit, whatever else you skip." But this is a trivial question of taste only. In all respects that matter, the publication seems highly creditable.

The book is an analysis of the central nerve of an argument or family of arguments which we find constantly recurring in a great variety of shapes and contexts throughout the history of philosophy, the argument, we may loosely call it, for the being of philosophic ultimates. Dr. Schultzer thinks that in any of its forms it contains the seeds of inevitable antinomies and paralogisms; and his object is to show how the formal structure of all arguments of the one general type entails these antinomies and paralogisms.

It is therefore both an essay in the history of a part of philosophy, or else of a trend in it, and a formalized and generalized logical analysis of a type of argument.

Dr. Schultzer's intellectual affiliations are, I gather, as follows. Chiefly he is influenced by Kant, and especially by the Dialectic in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Indeed, his programme, methods, and conclusions are in close and acknowledged liaison with those of Kant in that part of the *Critique*. Modern forms of empiricism, and positivism as well as modern formal logic are sympathetic to him, as "absolutistic" philosophies (as he calls them) are not. But he is not an election-agent for any particular "ism."

His knowledge and understanding of the history of philosophy seem to me to be full, though happily not exhaustive. I should mention that wide though he casts his net for typical cases of varieties of the argument for philosophic "ultimates," he does not vouchsafe any views at all about the sorts of "absolutism" which we might vaguely label as Hegelian. But that his range is wide is shown by the fact that he finds cases of the transcendence-difficulties all down the line from Parmenides to Husserl and the New Realists; and recognition of them in philosophers as different from one another as Kant, Schopenhauer, Mach, and Carnap and Zeno.

Dr. Schultzer's central doctrines are as follows. There runs, throughout the history of philosophy, a certain current of argumentation, taking different courses in different periods, and moving with different forces in different philosophers, which I loosely describe as the argument for the being of philosophic ultimates. Some argue for ultimate axioms, the sources of all demonstrations, but themselves indemonstrable. Others argue for ultimate indefinable terms, the elements of all definitions but themselves indefinable. Others for a First Cause, causing all else, itself the effect of nothing—unless of itself. Others for a First Substance; others for ultimate indivisibles such as Democritean atoms. Others for the Sufficient Reason; others for Absolute Space, Absolute Positions, and Motion; others for Ultimate Particulars; others for an Ultimate or Absolute End; others for the Double Ultimates of Form and Matter, Subject and Object; others for the Ultimate Given. And so on. Dr. Schultzer's first object is to bring out the several Notions of necessity which are more or less covertly and confusedly employed as the rails on

which run the typical philosophical arguments for the conclusions that there exist or subsist these several sorts of "ultimates." For, all the time, it is his central purpose to examine the common logical structures of whole families of philosophical theories. Indeed, it is this programme, together with his very considerable success in carrying it out, which gives his book that feeling of philosophic power which I find in it.

He exposes three notions of necessity which have separately or jointly underlain the historical theories which he is inspecting, though Dr. Schultzer does not affirm that all of these notions are valid. The three notions are: (1) the modal notion of necessity, namely the sense in which truths or judgments have been labelled as necessary or apodeictic by logicians, (2) the ontological notion of necessity, namely the sense in which some philosophers speak of the necessary *existence* of something; and (3) the relational notion of necessity, namely the sense in which philosophers speak of necessary relations or, more often, necessary connections. Their antitheses would be to (1) assertoric and problematic, to (2) contingent or possible, and to (3) casual or fortuitous.

A philosopher might have employed all three notions at once, distinguishing them. For example, he might say "It is a necessary (apodeictic) truth that there must exist a necessary connection between so and so and such and such." Doubtless we should frown at such a practice; but Dr. Schultzer's only point here is that the practice has occurred.

One or a combination of these notions is to be found, Dr. Schultzer argues, from a good selection of examples, in all of the typical arguments for the being of philosophic ultimates. For these arguments are all of the general pattern, "A presupposes B as its condition, B in the same way presupposes C . . . and *this presupposition-series must stop somewhere.*" Now "A presupposes B" can only mean "if or because A is, B *must* be." And this "must" will be the modal type if A and B are truths or propositions and of the ontological type if they are entities.

Thus philosophers have argued from destructible physical objects to indestructible parts, from observed relative motion to absolute Motion and Space, from causal series to a first cause, from fallible complex cognitive experiences to infallible sensings of sense-data, from introspections to a Pure Ego, and so forth. However, it is only to introduce his main subject of inquiry that Dr. Schultzer explores these notions of necessity and the historical types of their employment in arguments for philosophic ultimates. His main interest is in something which is the resultant of this process. Namely, when a philosopher's argument seems to have established the being of an ultimate he is forced to make propositions about this ultimate and these propositions will either be in contradiction with the nerve of the argument which seemed to establish it, or generate an infinite regress of the vicious kind, or generate a vicious circle. And this unhappy result is detectable historically in all the varieties of the argument which are historically eminent, however disparate the sorts of the ultimates may be.

Dr. Schultzer's problem of transcendence is to show why these antinomies and paralogisms are bound to arise in all cases of propositions about ultimates "established" by arguments of this pattern. He is, in a word, both generalizing and formalizing Kant's destructive arguments in the third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

I might here make two remarks about his use of the word "transcendence." First, he is not solely concerned, though he is partly concerned with the issue between Realism and Solipsism, to which issue the word is sometimes restricted. Whether there is a physical world transcending our sense-

experiences is only a relatively subordinate species of Dr. Schultzer's quite general problem. And, second, Dr. Schultzer is not only concerned to analyse the arguments and the resultant antinomies and paralogisms that belong to the old-fashioned rationalistic metaphysics; he finds perfectly analogous antinomies and paralogisms arising from the subterranean premisses of e.g., Newton, empiricist epistemologists and some neo-Kantians.

"Transcendence" is (if I interpret Dr. Schultzer correctly) the name which he gives to that character which an "ultimate" will be bound to have which makes it different from any of the members in the presupposition-series or determination-series which seemed to be bound to terminate in that "ultimate."

To use a metaphor, philosophers find a chain-link. They argue that it must hang off another such link and that to another. But if the chain is to hang at all, it must in the end hang off a hook which is not itself just another link in the chain. If they argue either that the hook supports the chain by being linked to something else, or by being linked to itself, or by not being or needing a support, their difficulties are transcendence-difficulties; for they are trying both to affirm and in the same breath to deny that the hook is a member of the links which it supports. And similarly if they argue that the hook can only support the top-most link if there is either another link or another hook between them. The hook "transcends" the links of the chain in that it is not one of them, and so that "hanging-off" cannot be asserted of it in the way in which it is asserted of them. But if not, the argument to the hook's existence from the suspensions of this or that link is already broken-backed. That is, the resultant antinomies and paralogisms are due to a fallacy in the argument by determination-series; and it is of the several varieties of this fallacy that Dr. Schultzer is trying to give a generalized and formalized account.

Take for example the argument for a first cause. We find events in the world, each of which we take to be an effect of a prior event in the world; we then argue to a first cause which for that reason cannot be analogous to the other cause-events in the world, namely that it is not subject to the principle which directed the whole argument, that whatever causes something else must be itself caused by something else. Had we not accepted that principle we should not have looked for the start of the causal chain; and having accepted it, we cannot then affirm the existence of an uncaused cause, if we take "existence" and "cause" in the same sense as we took them in our premisses. A first cause, then, "transcends" the series of ordinary causes and effects. By definition it both must and cannot be a member of that series.

Similarly philosophers have argued for absolute positions in absolute space. We observe one object as being in a certain spatial relation to a second, and this to a third and that to a fourth. . . . But this cannot go on for ever. Therefore there must be a final term, namely the relation of the first object; and so of all, to a fixed point in absolute Space. Now fixed points in absolute Space are not observable, so the spatial relations between a physical object and such a point (whether occupation or adjacency to or distance from) are not observable either. So the argument contained the two propositions: (1) only relative position is determinable; and (2) absolute determination of position is possible. That is, propositions about determinate positions in absolute Space cannot occur in the assertions of surveyors or astronomers and yet the original philosophical argument for absolute Space required by implication just this. Absolute position both cannot and must enter into actual position-fixations.

Let me take another case. Some philosophers have held that there must be ultimate axioms, from which whatever is demonstrable is to be deduced; but the axioms themselves are not deducible. They can nowhere appear as consequents. Of all other truths, or anyhow all other truths of a certain class, we know that they are true by seeing that they follow from the axioms. How then do we know the truth of the axioms? The only answers given are: (1) that they are self-evident, and (2) that we *feel* convinced of them. Both are vicious; for both generate the syllogism "What is self-evident (or else convincing) is necessarily true; this axiom is self-evident (or else convincing); therefore it is true." That is, the truth of the axiom has been *deduced* in a syllogism of which the major premiss is at best in no better plight than was the axiom itself. But, more important, the axiom has been restored to the fold of propositions of which the verifiability lay in their deducibility, which was just what we had promised ourselves to prevent. They both must belong to the field from which we made the regressive argument to ultimate axioms, and cannot belong to that field.

I cannot condense Dr. Schultzer's formal analysis of the types of arguments that have existed or might exist for the being of philosophic ultimates, nor with his exhibitions of the types of antinomies and paralogisms which inevitably ensue on those arguments. Nor can I expound the application of his anatomic principles to the numerous other specimens which he examines, such as the theory of indefinable terms, indivisible atoms, form and matter in metaphysics, form and content in epistemology, ultimate substance, the Pure Ego, pure data and so forth.

Let those who are uneasy about the soundness of the grounds on which the being of any of these ultimates rests, read Dr. Schultzer's own words on the matter. Naturally his analysis tends to be more penetrating in the case of theories of which time has given us some perspective. The rails on which our own speculations run are of necessity invisible to us who are travelling in the train. And anyhow it is, I think, a correct view of Dr. Schultzer, that the absolutistic temper of philosophic thought is at the moment in relative abeyance before the temper which he calls "relativistic." Which gives me an opening for one more word. Dr. Schultzer does not, in the main, profess to be defending a particular theory, so much as to be providing an anatomy of a family of philosophical arguments, which are all of one general logical type. He frankly allows, however, that he is himself inclined towards a "relativistic" solution of the problems of which, he thinks, the absolutistic solutions have been unsuccessful and unsuccessful by an internal necessity. The nature of such a "relativistic" solution is not fully expounded by him; though I think that the general line of it would be of this Kantian pattern. Substitute for theories which postulate that there are these transcendent "ultimates" regulative principles which shall hold up as the carrot before the nose of scientific inquiry determinate programmes of search. Change the "ultimates" from termini to routes and so secure charts immanent to the procedure of research instead of will-of-the-wisps external and sometimes treacherous to it.

Dr. Schultzer's next work should be in the direction of making definite his relativistic view, of which he (like Kant) at present only gives us hints. The systematic anatomy of a set of historical theories is valuable and educative work, but I want to get more of Dr. Schultzer's own positive thoughts —and I shall be surprised and disappointed if they are not forthcoming.

[As a possible help to Dr. Schultzer or his publishers I append a list of (chiefly) misprints which I have found. All but two are trivial, and I record

them for the sake of relative completeness only. Their fewness seems to me highly commendable, considering that the translation and printing are by Danish hands, and the work itself is rich in details of nomenclature, references, etc. Generally I shall merely give the page and the word, correctly spelled, which is misprinted in the text.

P. 13, *pictured*; p. 14, *universalia*; pp. 15 and 48, *universale* is the correct singular of *universalia*; p. 20, *false* instead of *fallacious*; p. 33 (line 9), *as*; p. 41, *necessaria*; p. 43 (middle), *progressive* for *regressive*?; p. 53 (middle), *hypothetical: if . . .*; p. 79, *axioms*; p. 85, *Anfangsgründe*; p. 101, *psychological*; p. 155, *Meiklejohn* and also pp. 161 and 34; p. 159 (second word) *an*; p. 185, *a fortiori*? p. 204, *separated*; p. 247, *physics*; p. 255 (line 6), *of* for *from*; p. 256, *Russell*; p. 273, *direct*; p. 277, *possess*; p. 282, *noumenon*; p. 289, *Bewusstseinslage*; p. 301, *Zeno* p. 269; and on p. 21 (last word) is *practical* correct?]

GILBERT RYLE.

Guide to Philosophy. By C. E. M. JOAD. (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1936. Pp. 592. Price 6s.)

This is a book which I should hitherto have been inclined to think could not be written. Even yet it is something of a mystery to me how Mr. Joad has contrived to pull it off.

The crucial difficulty is this. Since there is no common body of knowledge that can be labelled "philosophy," a philosophical *Baedeker* can fulfil its function only by giving an account of all the different theories entertained by important thinkers or schools of thought upon all the major issues of philosophy. Now if the account given be merely descriptive, presenting conclusions in comparative isolation from their premises, the field can, no doubt, be covered fairly easily in a single volume. But the resulting catalogue will not be a guide-book to "philosophy." The very meaning of philosophical doctrines is so inseparably bound up with the grounds of their adoption that a large measure of the "why" as well as the "that" must be vouchsafed to the general reader if the book is to guide rather than mislead. On the other hand, if one does seriously attempt to give a reasoned statement of all the important views on all of philosophy's important problems, one is much more likely to end up with a work on the scale of Hastings's *Encyclopaedia* than of Mr. Joad's *Guide*.

Yet the plain fact is that Mr. Joad has, in under 600 pages, managed somehow to cover at least a large part of the ground in an extremely effective manner. The general reader who gives concentrated attention to this book really will learn a good deal about "philosophy." It is true that Mr. Joad lightens his task by virtually restricting philosophy to metaphysics and epistemology. Ethical and political philosophy and the philosophy of religion find no place in the formal scheme, logic is dealt with almost solely in relation to the problem of knowledge, and the treatment of aesthetics is so brief and (as Mr. Joad admits) so personal that it can hardly be called a "guide." But even within these limits the book is a remarkable feat of compression.

A large part of Mr. Joad's success is doubtless due to his plan of procedure. In the first two of the book's three parts ("Theory of Knowledge" and "Critical Metaphysics") the issues raised, he tells us, "are treated on merits, and the views of particular philosophers are introduced only when they happen to be peculiarly relevant to the problem under discussion." By thus subordinating philosophers to philosophy, and by a very skilful arrangement of the order of his topics, Mr. Joad is able to observe strict economy of space

and yet expound a wide variety of theories in a way which leaves the impression of a genuine "march of reason."

In Part III, however, which is entitled "Constructive Metaphysics," Mr. Joad does allow himself some formal treatment of outstanding systems. A great deal of space is given to the Platonic theory of Ideas, and to the application of it, in a developed form, to the philosophy of modern physics and to aesthetics. We are offered also "outlines" of the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Bergson, and Whitehead. These outlines, while adroitly executed, are inevitably somewhat sketchy in effect. But no doubt something of the sort had to be supplied, if only in deference to the very proper respect in which these great names are held by the educated public.

It would not be useful to mention, without thoroughly discussing, the few instances—and they are few—of statements or interpretations in the text from which one feels inclined to dissent. But there are one or two slips of a presumably verbal character of which notice may be taken. On page 54 a "not" has surely gone missing, where Mr. Joad, speaking of Hume's doctrine of the Association of Ideas, says that "the uniting principle . . . is due to the agency of the mind." And the first footnote to page 371 will make sense only if for the words "a criticism of Berkeley's theory of abstract ideas" we substitute some such words as "Berkeley's criticism of the theory of abstract ideas."

This admirable book should have the effect, I think, of augmenting substantially the membership of the *B.I.P.* For it can hardly fail to whet the appetite of the reader who has any natural taste for philosophic inquiry. The intellectual sympathy which Mr. Joad displays in expounding views with which one knows that he disagrees is particularly valuable. Most writers of introductory books on philosophy, no doubt, have striven to be impartial. But impartiality, even if achieved, is not enough. One may make the very best case one can for an opponent's theory and yet—if intellectual sympathy be lacking—present a mere caricature. Mr. Joad's book seems to me conspicuously free from this defect, and I recommend it most heartily.

C. A. Campbell.

The Last Puritan. By George Santayana. (London: Constable & Co. 1935. Pp. 721. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Santayana's polished pen has produced soliloquies, poems, dialogues of the dead, and essays in characterization in addition to his substantial and famous books on aesthetics and on metaphysics. Now he has published "a memoir in the form of a novel."

Anyone who supposes that because Mr. Santayana turns his books on philosophy into works of art, he is bound to turn a work of art into a book on philosophy would be seriously mistaken in this instance. The memoir of Oliver Alden really is a novel. True, it may also be an allegory. "As to moral complications in Oliver," the author says, "you must allow me my diagnosis. He was the child of an elderly and weary man, and of a thin-spun race; from his mother he got only his bigness and athleticism, which notoriously don't wear well. A moral nature burdened and overstrung, and a critical faculty fearless but helplessly subjective—isn't that the true tragedy of your ultimate puritan?" Or, again: "In Oliver puritanism worked itself out to its logical end. He convinced himself on puritan grounds that it was wrong to be a puritan. . . . That was the tragedy of it. Thought it his clear duty to give puritanism up, but couldn't." These statements, however, occur in the

epilogue and in the prologue respectively. When the book is under way, its momentum prevents such detached scrutiny.

Certainly, there is some philosophizing. The "elderly and weary" Peter Alden had a mind. Caleb Weatherbee, because he was a cripple, was allowed to be expansive. One of Oliver's student essays upon Platonism is reproduced. Jim Darnley, a little too appositely called "Lord Jim," was full of philosophy. (The flaws in his character produced that outlet, and his father the vicar, without these flaws, was an Augustinian.) Something may be learned from the book regarding the philosophy of Harvard in the great days when the present century was young, something also of the contrast between American education and the education at Eton and in Oxford; and the theme of Catholic versus Puritan may be studied in the contrast between Mario and Oliver.

Nevertheless, the story can be enjoyed without its fable, and has a healthy tendency to smother the fable whatever that fable may be. The firmness of its grip, indeed (taken unallegorically), is rather surprising. The women, I think, are only characters dressed as such, always excepting Mrs. Alden. Oliver perhaps was unlucky in that matter, especially perhaps when he met the courtesan. But if the reader thinks of skipping he finds himself firmly but unobtrusively prevented.

The reason in part lies in the style. In his philosophical writings Mr. Santayana may be overfond of tempering the austerity of his metaphysical chambers with a profusion of small but precious *objets d'art*. In this book he resists that temptation. His characters, it is true, seldom chat; but they talk, nearly always, without preciosity, and the narrative matches them in this respect. Consequently I shall not quote from the book. My quotations came from the prologue and the epilogue; and these, except for the allegory they profess to explain, are only diverticula.

JOHN LAIRD.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi Fasc. XII, Questiones supra librum de Cansis nunc primum edidit Robert Steele, collaborante Ferdinand Delorme O.F.M. Accedit Liber de Cansis a Roberto Steele denus recognitus. (Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano MCXXXV. Pp. xxiv + 194. Price 17s. 6d.)

The so-called book *de Cansis*, or to give it its earlier name, the *Liber de expositione bonitatis purae*, has a curious history. It is, in fact, as St. Thomas seems to have been the first to perceive, a version of an Arabic original, itself consisting of some thirty-two theses excerpted from the *Elements of Theology* of the Neo-Platonist Proclus, and modified by the identification of the Neo-Platonic "One" with the personal transcendent God of Islam. The authorship of the Arabic text appears to be still a riddle, and perhaps an insoluble riddle, The Latin translation is known to be the work of Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187). In spite of the markedly Neo-Platonic and un-Aristotelian character of the theses, the whole was supposed, when it first became known in the West, to be the work of Aristotle, and though this was soon discovered to be a mistake, it was still assumed, both by Roger Bacon and Albert the Great, that the enunciations of the propositions are due to him, though the proofs subjoined to them are by some other hand; perhaps, as the colophon in some of the MSS. suggests, by Alfarabi, or perhaps, as Albert thought, a certain David the Jew, of whom nothing seems to be known, drawing on Avicenna, Algazel, and Alfarabi. As the Introduction to the present volume points out,

the original title of the Latin version caused it to escape the suspicions and consequent ecclesiastical censures which fell upon the newly recovered Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics in the first decades of the thirteenth century. Hence it was eagerly studied and lectured upon as a supposed authentic record of the teaching of the great philosopher, and thus played a historically important part in that process of giving Aristotle's philosophy a Platonic colouring, without which it could hardly have become, as it did, a standing background for the thought of Christian philosophers. The real nature of the book was only discerned when St. Thomas, profiting by the scholarship of his coadjutor, William of Moerbeke, was able to identify the work of Proclus as its original and to compare the Arabic-Latin excerpt, or compilation, with the source from which it had been derived.

In point of fact, the thirty-two propositions of the *de Concis* represent only a seventh part, or rather more, of the book of Proclus. Proclus has there set himself to digest the Neo-Platonism of the Athenian school to which he belonged into a series of over two hundred propositions, each accompanied with its demonstration *more geometrico.* His treatise is a compendious handbook to the whole Neo-Platonic system, not indeed as it was originally conceived by its one great original mind, Plotinus, but as it had taken shape in the course of two centuries under the influence—often a baleful influence—first of Iamblichus and then of Syrianus, the immediate teacher of Proclus himself. The propositions which reappear in the Arabic work deal exclusively with one part of this vast metaphysical construction, the theory of the derivation of the hierarchy of' 'intelligences'' and ''souls'' from the primary supreme ''One'' or ''Absolute.'' It is a consequence of this that the book contains no reference to the most characteristic doctrine of Syrianus and Proclus, that of the ''gods,'' or ''divine henads,'' which could hardly have been adapted by any feasible device to Moslem monotheism, whereas the ''intelligences'' can be readily, if not quite legitimately, disposed of by identifying them at once with the ''angels,'' and these with the ''unmoved movers'' of the celestial spheres in Aristotle's cosmology. Presumably it is the impossibility of fitting in the ''divine henads'' into either the theology of Islam or the metaphysics of Aristotle which explains why the unknown Arabic compiler limited his borrowings from Proclus so narrowly.

I cannot recommend the study of Bacon's lectures on this singular volume to anyone but students with a special interest in the history of thirteenth-century philosophy. Unlike his younger contemporary, St. Thomas, Bacon does not seem to me ever to shine as a commentator, and least of all in this particular instance. He makes no attempt to understand the spirit and drift of the work he is expounding as a whole, as St. Thomas does in his commentary on the same text, and this is perhaps why he can acquiesce so completely in the notion that the propositions he is discussing come from Aristotle. His method is the unprofitable one of merely taking each thesis in isolation, asking himself what objections he can devise to it on Peripatetic principles, and how those objections may be got rid of, again on what are, or are supposed to be, strictly Aristotelian lines. The method is, in a way, common to all scholastic commentators, but in Bacon's hands it is accompanied neither by the really minute and careful analysis of the text under discussion which is characteristic of St. Thomas, nor by Thomas's very real insight into the ''architectonic'' of a philosophical system. Consequently, whatever logical acumen may be displayed in the course of such discussions, their result is bound to be mere sterility. There is, or was, a popular impression that such sterility is a curse of the philosophy of the schoolmen in general, but that Bacon is a splendid exception. That view, so common in the nineteenth cen-

tury among enthusiasts who seem to have had very little acquaintance with what they commended, will not, I believe, survive the publication of the *Opera Inedita*, or, at any rate, not the study of them made possible by their publication. Apart from his knowledge in optics, Bacon seems to have had no remarkable stock of scientific knowledge, and the notion of him as a would-be liberator of the scientific genius from the domination of Aristotelian metaphysics is the merest of myths. On the contrary, it is he, much rather than Bonaventura or Albert or Thomas, who stands most deeply committed to the superstition that "the philosopher" is to all intents inerrant, and his interpretation of "the philosopher" is much more bound up with the traditions of the Arabian exegetes than theirs. How can any philosophy be other than sterile if it proceeds on the assumption that there is nothing now left for philosophy as such to do beyond drawing out in detail the exact logical implications of theses already laid down by Aristotle? And this is the assumption made, not by St. Thomas, but repeatedly by Brother Roger.

A word or two must suffice about the way in which the editors of the volume have executed their task. The text, like so much of what they have previously printed, comes from the now well-known Amiens MS. As the apparatus supplied by the editors shows, this MS.—apparently prepared for the Paris stationers—is very far from impeccable. The editors have themselves thought it necessary to "emend" pretty frequently in their text, as well as to append a further list of emendations at the close of the volume (I do not know on what principle it has been determined which of two equally certain corrections shall be printed in the text and which reserved for the appendix). In most cases their emendations will be found to be clearly necessary (though not in all, e.g., at pp. 13, 11; 94, 10; 115, 18; 158, 23; a little reflection on the sense intended by the writer should show that the text received as that of the MS. is absolutely correct). But it has to be added that quite a considerable further number of minor emendations—most of them, fortunately, fairly obvious, have to be made by the reader for himself, if he is to understand the author's reasoning. As I have supplied a pretty full list of such corrections in a recent issue of *Mind*, I beg to be excused from dealing with the matter here. The editors, I think, are not themselves quite clear as to their precise function as editors of a hitherto unprinted work. They might, of course, take the line that their task is that of paleographers pure and simple; they have merely to print what the scribe of their MS. wrote, or meant to write, whether it represents what Bacon himself said or not. Had they followed this view consistently, however, they could not have made the numerous corrections which they have made (and in my own view, quite properly). Or they might take, as I should myself bid, the very different view that in a work like this it is necessary to get behind the errors of the scribe to what their author said (when this can be certainly ascertained). On that view, they should have printed as their text a great many "emendations" which an attentive reading will show to be absolutely demanded by the context, though Messrs. Steele and Delorme do not mention them even in their Appendix. Whatever the explanation of their methods, they unfortunately tend to produce the impression that their text has not been subjected before printing to careful and competent perusal, with close attention to the writer's argument. Yet surely that is no more than we have a right to expect in an editor of the works of a famous Oxford man for which the University of Oxford, in a way, has made herself responsible. (For justification of these necessary, though reluctant, observations, I must refer the reader to the detailed list of *Corrigenda* which I have given elsewhere.)

A. E. Taylor.

The Source of Civilization. By GERALD HEARD. (London: Jonathan Cape 1935. Pp. 431. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

It would be a wiser and a kinder world if everyone could take it upon himself to write a book about the ills of human society. Even if such a task were made part of the routine of the conventional higher education, it would create a psychological aristocracy at least willing, if not able, to understand each other's emotional bias, and thus better prepared to shape the courses of their striving in a direction at least agreeable to a majority. Mr. Heard has taken Man as distributed in all time and space for his study, and, as he points out in his preface, insists on a due recognition of the instinctive, as opposed to the rationalistic, basis of human society; whereupon he makes it a chief point that the application of force plays little, if any, part among the causes of social cohesion. Where he appears to err, however, is in his failure to consider the social import of the threats as opposed to the use of force. For instance, the two basic crimes, incest and intestine murder, may not be common; and it may be that evolved instincts, as well as social pressure, stand at the back of such primal prohibitions. But it cannot be gainsaid that the traditional punishment for either is death, or at least excommunication, both of them forms of sanction fortified by the danger of unleashing an inherent group-aggressiveness. The tribe turns on the criminal breaker of a major taboo with all the fury of a wolf pack when it does to death a wounded mate. Such manifestations of almost blind wrath may be, in a sense, pathological; but so, after all, was every organic or social aberration that has been in the long run eliminated by the relentless verdict of natural selection.

Nevertheless, Mr. Heard's main thesis is a sound one, namely, that rationality is ultimately the product of unconscious—and, he would probably agree, unconsciously aggressive—stimuli. Hence, like a great tree, culture stands in constant danger of extinction; for the roots must ever find nutriment in a deeper subsoil of tenderness if the top is not to wither in the harsh light of a critical rationalism. Thus death and destruction must follow whenever the logician kicks against the pricks of a profounder and, as it were, mystic understanding.

Apart from this general warning, the reader is left somewhat free to construct his own social remedies; and likewise to speculate further on his own account concerning the aetiology of this disease of the unsheathed sword. Is it the maladjustment of a changing society to a fixed species of Man whose evolutionary clock has run down? This seems to be the author's impression. But may not evolution be with us here and now? And what of the ontogenetic, as opposed to the phylogenetic, reactions of an organism to the changes of its environment? May it not be, then, that the recent leap in cultural advance may have reorientated the instincts in a manner no longer compatible with the outworn strait-waistcoat of primitive cultural taboos. The new individualized system of technological specialization and economic rivalry, and perhaps other environmental influences directly affecting the body and mind by way of the better food thus provided, may have stimulated an aggressiveness which the older cultural institutions prove unable either to canalize or to control. Pragmatically, the sword and the chalice start as symbols of equal value. Why, then, should humanity be met by the point of the one each time it attempts to grasp the other? Can it be that aggression and love, being complementary, are severally unable to exist alone? If so, perhaps a rise in the tide of human affection, no less than an increase of instinctively pugnacity, has strengthened the arm with which each man is sworn to defend that which he holds most dear.

In conclusion, let it suffice to state that the reader will find here an elaborate apparatus of sociological information and argument well designed to disturb any complacent tolerance of things as they are.

J. R. DE LA H. MARETT.

Introduction to Philosophy. By GEORGE THOMAS WHITE PATRICK, Ph.D. Revised with the assistance of FRANK MILLER CHAPMAN, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1935. Pp. x + 482. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book is a notable example of a type in which—since instruction in the U.S.A. relies more upon textbooks than is customary in Great Britain—American authors excel. While it will certainly meet the need of the inquiring layman, its primary purpose will be found in the class-room. It is, perhaps, an open question whether our students would be better off if, in our philosophical schools, we were to utilize such a comprehensive introduction as this: nevertheless, there can be no doubt at all that if they were to add to a reading of these pages sufficient reference to the ample bibliographies appended, our students would indeed be well "introduced" to their theme. It might very well be argued that our pass-men would be the gainers by such a move; while for honours students our more personal and (perhaps) more critical methods still offer better meat.

Their method is described as "objective " by which the authors mean that they assume the right to describe the world and man, their growth and nature, without confusing the student at the outset by epistemological and kindred inquiries. Thus much of the book belongs to science and "general knowledge" rather than to what is now generally deemed philosophy. For example, "The Earth is one of nine planets revolving round the sun . . ." etc. The greater part of the book, however, deals with problems properly philosophical, under the three headings, "Theories of Reality," "The Nature of Mind and Knowledge," and "The Higher Values."

The character and scope of this book precludes comment upon points of detail, while generalities can only tend to be vacuous. It is obvious that the more advanced student—for whom the book is not intended—will be less satisfied with some portions than with others; but it is unlikely that a reasonably sympathetic reader will anywhere lose his sense of the competence, skill, and industry of the author and his coadjutor. A long section on "What is the Mind?"—which presents a strongly functional view—is, in my opinion, very good indeed. There is, on the other hand, some loose judgment. What, for example, can one make of this, occurring in an otherwise sober criticism of pragmatism? "Philosophy hitherto has been very much an avocation of a few select 'highbrows,' who frequented college and university classrooms, distant from the practical interests of common men. . . . If we are shocked at the extravagances and paradoxes of the Pragmatists, it is well to remember that nothing but a jolt like this would have brought philosophy down to earth" (p. 379). It is quite incredible that the authors would care to defend this truly monstrous utterance. Was J. S. Mill or John Locke "in the clouds"? Or were these no philosophers? Who, knowing anything of them, and liking or disliking their theories, could doubt the reality and effect of the "Idealists' " concern for social and moral matters? Is it an accident that Plato (an intellectualist of the intellectualists in Dewey's view) devotes vastly more attention

to civic, educational, and moral questions than to any, or perhaps to all, other themes?

Their "objective" method involves the authors in some repetition which another approach might conceivably have avoided. In discussing idealism as a theory of reality Berkeley's position is so baldly stated as to seem simply silly (pp. 214–16); while in a subsequent section (pp. 344–51), dealing primarily with epistemology, the foundations and ramifications of the Bishop's philosophy are disclosed, and the whole shown to be very far from ridiculous.

Setting aside these points of detail and the important problem as to whether its type is really suited to its theme—or whether philosophy is a textbook subject—this book can only be regarded, in its kind, as a wholly admirable production.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

Immanuel Kant on Philosophy in General. Translated with Four Introductory Essays by HUMAYUN KABIR. (Calcutta University Press. 1935. Pp. cl + 90. Price Rs. 5 or 9s.)

This consists of a translation of the tentative Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* that Kant wrote but never himself published, preceded by four introductory essays by the translator.

A very arbitrary abstract of this "first introduction" was given by Beck in the explanatory notes on the Critical Philosophy that he published in 1794, and in the same form it appeared again in Starke's collection of Kant's minor writings (*Kleine Schriften*, Leipzig, 1833). It was the latter who gave it the title *On Philosophy in General*, which does not appear to have Kant's authority. A full text of the manuscript appears in vol. v of Cassirer's edition of Kant, and there is a convenient separate edition by Lehmann published in 1927 by Felix Meiner.

Starke's title may have served its purpose in his collection, but it is unfortunate that this translation should be hidden under a name that has no connection with the third *Critique* and consequently obscures its considerable importance for the student of Kant.

Any translation is inevitably to some extent an interpretation, and Mr. Kabir tends naturally to translate in the sense that one would expect from the views he expresses in the Introductory Essays. These essays are therefore important not only for what they say of Kant but as an indication of how best to understand the translation. On the whole the English version follows the principle of carefully rendering the appropriate English word for the German, though it is, of course, debatable how far this method succeeds in putting the English reader in the state of mind in which he would be had he read the German. For instance, the substitution in a syntactical structure fundamentally similar of the English for the German names of the Faculties gives in English an impression of personifying the Faculties that is not conveyed by the original. But that is the problem of all translators, and need not in this case handicap the reader who acquaints himself with the Introductory Essays.

These Essays are in the main a discussion of the relation to each other of the three *Critiques*, and run on the traditional lines, though underlying the writer's general position there seems to be an interpretation of the relation of the Phenomenal and the Noumenal that is surely extreme. On his view Appearances are not Appearances *of* Things-in-themselves, but the two seem to be different alternative realms standing in not altogether dissimilar rela-

tions to a knower. This tacitly affects his views on all topics, but is occasionally explicit as in his discussion of Freedom and Causality in the second essay, where he says: "It is no explanation to refer the necessity to the phenomenal and the freedom the noumenal character of things. . . . The only way out is to recognize the difference between them [freedom and necessity] as one of degree. *That is phenomenal in which the aspect of freedom is negligible, while the noumenal is that in which causality is not the most important element*" (author's italics). This seems to give up the explanatory advantages that Kant's view on the more usual interpretation undoubtedly possesses.

The author's heavily adjectival style distracts attention from the subject and may lead one to misinterpret him. This is, of course, not a difficulty in the translation itself, and Mr. Kabir is to be thanked for his helpful version.

W. A. SINCLAIR.

Jesus and the Moralists. By E. W. HIRST, M.A., B.Sc., Lecturer in Christian Ethics in the University of Manchester. (London: Epworth Press, 1935. Pp. 189. Price 5s. net.)

A Student's Philosophy of Religion (revised edition). By WM. KELLEY WRIGHT (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 566. Price 12s. 6d.)

I imagine that a number of students of ethics reading Mr. Hirst's title will pass by on the other side of what they are assured is a religious, not an ethical study. If the title had been "J. S. Mill and the Moralists," they would have stopped to read. Yet as simple historical fact, Jesus of Nazareth has had more influence on the ethical ideas of the world than any other moral teacher or than all of them collectively. It is an amazing example of our water-tight minds, that keep science and religion in separate quarters with thick bulkheads (one might play on that word) between them, that any textbook of ethics will copiously refer to Mill and probably only incidentally to Jesus. The separation between ethics as a science and Christian ethics is one of those things which some future generation will have to be told and told again in order to believe it was ever possible.

Mr. Hirst's book in some degree bridges this needless chasm. He begins with a general account of the moral principles of Jesus, and continues with contrasting Hellenism and Stoicism with Christian Ethics. Next come Rationalism, Hedonism, and Self-realization, and finally some present-day tendencies, all of which are taken comparatively with Christian moral ideals. Mr. Hirst is in no sense an apologist, though his own standpoint is that of Christian ideals. But his purpose is comparative, not forensic, and he is more concerned to state the relationship between Christian and other ethical systems than to argue the merits of the one or other. If one has any criticism to make it is that in the last chapters Mr. Hirst deals with a number of writers such as G. B. Shaw, Aldous Huxley, D. H. Lawrence, whose relation to ethical theory is, to say the least, ephemeral, rather than with the New Intuitionism, with Professor Laird, who is not mentioned, and Hartmann, whose views are but scantily summarized. But this is to complain that we have not had more, which is ungracious when there is so much that is admirable in Mr. Hirst's book. It is much to be hoped that what Mr. Hirst has begun, he or others will continue. Christian and secular ethical theories need each other, if there is to be any hope of a synoptic view of morality. No European ethics

to-day can possibly be independent of Christian morality, even if its dependence is shown by reaction against it. The lack of co-ordination between the two is a serious defect which Mr. Hirst's essay effectively challenges.

Professor Wright's book is a re-edition of the volume that appeared in 1922, with three new chapters and various emendations. It is extraordinarily comprehensive. Taken strictly upon its title, it may be challenged as containing a great deal that properly belongs to the Comparative Study of Religion rather than to the philosophy of religion, and quite a fair-sized section is Church history. Another section is psychological. Despite the length of the book as a whole, it is inevitable that many questions such as reason and revelation, divine personality, morality, and religion, and so forth are inadequately treated. Deism gets a page. Whitehead's interesting conception of God is not mentioned and there are other omissions for which the introduction of so much non-philosophical matter is responsible. On the other hand, Professor Wright's intention is to provide materials from which the student can build up his own views, and in that respect he succeeds admirably. At the same time, in the vexed questions of the origins of religion it is not possible to enter into the issues as a whole, and what is said must necessarily be too summary to be sufficient. It is not what Professor Wright gives us that can be criticised. It is simply his laudable desire to equip his student as fully as possible that leads him to make his book a miniature encyclopaedia of religion and ethics rather than a philosophy of religion.

E. S. Waterhouse.

Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity. By Arthur O. Lovejoy and George Boas. With supplementary essays by W. F. Albright and P. E. Dumont. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xv + 482. Price $5; 22s.)

The book, the first of a series, explores ancient literature for evidence of what is termed "primitivism." This seems to consist primarily in the tendency to laud antiquity and to use it as a foil whereby the unsatisfactoriness of present conditions is exhibited by means of a sharp contrast. The advantage of placing the golden age in the past, rather than in the future, is that it is thereby shown to be compatible with human nature that this more blessed state of things should be attainable. Just so, in the thought of the seventeenth century the state of nature was, on the whole, exalted, although there were scientifically minded persons who had a clearer notion of what primeval savagery must have been like. Mr. Lovejoy has ransacked the classics for passages conceived in this vein, and brings out very clearly the value to the idealist of such an imagined state of human perfection, however vaguely, localized in time and space. On the other hand, he also deals with authors whose point of view was not philosophical but historical; and these precursors of modern anthropology are not surely to be accused offhand of primitivism in the sense of the tendency to glorify the past. For such a writer as Hippocrates, for instance, or for the matter of that even Herodotus, despite his desire to tell a good story, is really concerned to explore things as they have truly been, or as they actually were beyond the limits of Mediterranean civilization.

Meanwhile, wholehearted praise must be given to the thoroughness of the documentation and to the accuracy of the scholarship whereby the meaning

of the ancient texts is made clear. There is a quite unexpected amount of interest in the past discoverable in the writers of antiquity, some of them very little known to fame; and none of them is overlooked here. Whereas four hundred and twenty pages are given to the Greeks and Romans, supplementary essays by Professors Albright and Dumont, which deal with Western Asia (Mesopotamia, Israel, and Egypt) and Ancient India respectively, cover but twenty-six pages altogether, yet do so in such a suggestive way that it is clear that primitivism is a universal tendency of mankind. This must suffice as a summary notice of a book so full of illustrative detail that a very careful study is required; more especially, perhaps, when the later Greek philosophers come to be considered, with their rather ambiguous insistence on "conformity to nature." As for the subdivisions of primitivism which distinguish finitist and infinitist theories and so on, not to speak of something which goes by the portentous name of "animalitarianism," these somewhat pedantic attempts at classification do not seriously detract from the value of a work which will appeal not only to classical scholars, but to all who study the human mind and more especially its speculative and visionary impulses.

J. R. DE LA H. MARETT.

Studies in Philosophy. By G. C. FIELD, M.A., D.Litt., Professor of Philosophy in the University of Bristol. (Bristol: J. W. Arrowsmith, Ltd. 1935. Pp. 250. Price 10s. 6d.)

All the twelve lectures and essays in this volume have been previously published, but many readers will be grateful to have them collected. Professor Field covers a wide range of subjects, and he has something of Plato's gift for discussing subtle questions in the current language of educated men, so that he can be read with pleasure by the amateur as well as by the professed student of philosophy. This volume can be cordially recommended to all who are interested in metaphysics, psychology, and ethics.

F. M. CORNFORD.

Books received also:—

C. G. SHAW. *Logic in Theory and Practice*. London: Sir. I. Pitman & Sons. 1935. Pp. xvi + 428. 8s. 6d.

J. STEEKSMA. *Philosophical Inquiry*. London: C. W. Daniel Co. 1935. Pp. 168. 5s.

M. M. Z. AHMAD, M.A., LL.B. *A Peep into the Spiritual Unconscious (A Philosophical Attempt to explain the Phenomenon of Dreams)*. Published by the author, Bahauddin College, Junagadh, India. 1935. Pp. v + 218. Rs. 6.

G. N. BELKNAP. *Religion in Plato's States*. U.S.A.: University of Oregon Publication. 1935. Pp. 16.

G. MAYER. *Friedrich Engels* (A Biography). London: Chapman & Hall Ltd. 1936. Pp. viii + 323. 15s.

W. D. ROSS. *Aristotle's Physics*. A revised text with introduction and commentary. Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 1936. Pp. xii + 750. 36s.

G. K. ZIPF. *The Psycho-Biology of Language. An Introduction to Dynamic Philology*. London: G. Routledge & Sons Ltd. 1936. Pp. ix + 336. 12s. 6d.

J. R. DE LA H. MARETT, B.Sc. *Race, Sex and Environment. A Study of Mineral Deficiency in Human Evolution.* London: Hutchinson & Co. 1936. Pp. 342. 21s.

A. J. AYER. *Language, Truth and Logic.* London: V. Gollancz Ltd. 1936. Pp. 254. 9s.

A. H. COMPTON. *The Freedom of Man.* New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xi + 153. 2 dollars; 9s.

VARIOUS: *On the Bringing Up of Children.* (Ed. by J. Rickman.) London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1936. Pp. xvi + 237. 6s.

R. R. MARETT, D.Sc., LL.D. *Head, Heart and Hands in Human Evolution.* London: Hutchinson & Co. 1935. Pp. 303. 10s. 6d.

J. D. LEWIS. *The Genossenschaft-Theory of Otto von Gierke. A Study in Political Thought.* Madison: University of Wisconsin. 1935. Pp. 185.

C. PLEYDELL-BOUVERIE. *Objective Evolution.* London: Williams & Norgate Ltd. 1936. Pp. 233. 7s. 6d.

W. R. MATTHEWS, K.C.V.O., D.Lit., D.D. *The Purpose of God.* London: Nisbet & Co. 1936. Pp. xi + 182. 7s. 6d.

Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce. (Ed. by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss.) Vol. VI. *Scientific Metaphysics.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. x + 462. 5 dollars; 21s.

S. M. SHIROKOGOROFF. *Psychomental Complex of the Tungus.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1935. Pp. xvi + 469. £2 10s.

D. M. EMMET. *Philosophy and Faith.* London: Student Christian Movement Press. 1936. Pp. 164. 4s. 6d.

E. THOMAS. *A View of All Existence. Comprising New Interpretations and a Logical Plea.* London: Watts & Co. 1936. Pp. 570. 7s. 6d.

A. WOODS. *Time's Arrow in Society. A Philosophy of Progress.* University of Chicago Press; London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. xi + 233. 9s.

B. RAY, M.A., Ph.D. *Consciousness in Neo-Realism.* London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xv + 153. 9s.

R. V. FELDMAN, M.A. *The Union of Prophetism and Philosophism in the Thought of Maimonides.* (Reprinted from M. Maimonides' VIIIth Century Memorial Volume.) London: Soncino Press. 1935. Pp. 22.

F. R. TENNANT. *William Ritchie Sorley.* 1855–1935. (From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Vol. XXI.) London: Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 15. 1s.

J. W. BUCKHAM. *Christianity and Personality.* New York: Round Table Press. Pp. xi + 192. 2 dollars.

I. LEVINE, M.A., D.Litt. *Faithful Rebels. A Study in Jewish Speculative Thought.* London: Soncino Press. 1936. Pp. viii + 146. 6s.

K. HEIM. *God Transcendent.* (Introduction by E. Bevan, D. Litt., LL.D. Translated from third edition by E. P. Dickie, M.C., M.A., B.D.). London: Nisbet & Co. 1935. Pp. xix + 242. 10s.

T. ANDRAE. *Mohammed, the Man and His Faith.* (Tr. by T. Menzel.) London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1936. Pp. 274. 8s. 6d.

M. PLANCK. *The Philosophy of Physics.* (Tr. W. H. Johnston.) London: G. Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1936. Pp. 118. 4s. 6d.

D. KATZ, Dr.Phil., and R. KATZ, Dr.Phil. *Conversations with Children.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1936. Pp. xii + 318. 10s. 6d.

N. Abercrombie, M.A., D.Phil. *The Origins of Jansenism.* Oxford: at the Clarendon Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. Pp. xii + 341. 15s.

C. E. Raven, D.D. *Evolution and the Christian Concept of God.* (Riddell Memorial Lectures, 1935.) London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1936. Pp. 56. 2s. 6d.

L. Rusu, D.-ès-L. *Essai sur la Création Artistique.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. 460. Frs. 50.

Œuvres de Laberthonnière publiées par les soins de Louis Canet. Etudes. sur Descartes. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin. 1935. Vol. I. Pp. viii + 467; Vol. II. Pp. 379. Frs. 70 deux vols.

M. Blondel. *L'Etre et les Etres.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. 540. Frs. 50.

L. Robin. *Platon.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. viii + 364. Frs. 35.

G. Bachelard. *Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1934. Pp. 179.

Vauvenargues' *Réflexions et Maximes.* London: Cambridge University Press. 1936. Pp. 73.

Varies. *L'Evolution de la Physique et la Philosophie* (Quatrième Semaine Internationale de Synthèse.) Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. 151. Fr. 20.

L. Rusu, D.-ès-L. *Le Sens de l'Existence dans la Poésie Populaire Roumaine.* Paris: F. Alcan. 1935. Pp. 119. Frs. 15.

W. Mitscherlich. *Die Lehre von den Beweglichen und Starren Begriffen Erläutert an der Wirtschaftswissenschaft.* Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. 1936. Pp. xv + 451. Rm. 16.

E. Straus. *Vom Sinn der Sinne. Ein Beitrag zur Grundelgung der Psychologie.* Berlin: Julius Springer. 1935. Pp. v + 314. Rm. 12

A Bibliography on the Survival of the Classics. Vol. I. The Publications of 1931. The Text of the German Edition, with an English introduction. Edited by The Warburg Institute. London: Cassell & Co. 1934. Pp. xxiii + 333.

E. Wind. *Humanitätsidee und Heroisiertes Porträt in der Englischen Kultur des 18. Jahrhunderts.* (Reprinted from *Vortrage der Bibliothek Warburg* 1930–1931.) Pp. vi + 156–229 + Tafel xiii–xxx.

Dr. W. Goldschmidt. *Der Linguismus und die Erkenntnistheorie der Verweisungen.* Zurich-Leipzig: Recht und Gesellschaft A-G. 1936. Pp. 184.

A. Norsa. *Il Principio della Forza nel Pensiero Politico di Niccolò Machiavelli: Seguito da un Contributo Bibliografico.* Milano: U. Hoepli. 1936. Pp. xiii + 248. L. 30.

G. della Volpe. *La Filosofia dell' Esperienza di Davide Hume.* II. Firenze: G. C. Sansoni. 1935. Pp. viii + 207. Lire 30.

T. Campanella. *Teologia.* Libro Primo. Milano: *Vita e Pensiero.* 1936. Pp. xxxvi + 463. Lire quaranta.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi. Fasc. XIII. Questiones supra Libros Octo Physicorum Aristotelis. Nunc primum edidit F. M. Delorme, O.F.M.; collaborante R. Steele. London: Oxford Clarendon Press; Humphrey Milford. 1935. Pp. xxxix + 439. 30s.

M. Eckardi. *Opera Latina, XIII. Quaestiones Parisienses.* (Edidit A. Dondaine, O.P.; Commentariolum de E. Magisterio; Adiunxit R. Klibansky.) Lipsiae: F. Meiner. 1936. Pp. xxxv + 57. Rm. 6.50.

THE NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

(Congrès Descartes)

Organized by the Société Française de Philosophie under the presidency of M. Henri Bergson

will be held in Paris in 1937 (August 1st–6th)

THE Congress of 1937 will commemorate the third centenary of the appearance of Descartes's *Discours de la Méthode*, and the Committee propose as the central problem for written communications and discussions that of the unity of method among diverse mental activities, treated under the following heads:—

1. The Present State of Cartesian Studies.
2. The Unity of Science:—
   (*a*) Methodology and the Methods of the Special Sciences;
   (*b*) The History of the Problem in Antiquity, in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times.
3. Logic and Mathematics.
4. Causality and Determinism in Physics and Biology: Probability and Statistics.
5. The Relations of Body and Mind.
6. Value, Ethical, Social and Aesthetical Norms, and Reality.

Section 1 will alone be devoted to a historical study of Descartes, Section 2 (*b*) to the history of philosophy. The problems proposed throughout the remainder of the programme, though raised in a general form by Descartes, will be treated not historically but from the standpoint of their present position and interest.

Invitations are extended for participation either as "active members" or as "associate members" (fees payable, respectively, 80 Fr. and 40 Fr.). The former alone take active part in the work of the Congress and receive a copy of its *Actes*. The latter attend its sessions and enjoy, with "active members," gratuitous admission to the *Exposition Internationale*, a reduction of 60 per cent. in the price of return tickets on French railways to and from the Congress, a reduction of 50 per cent. in the price of tickets for railway travelling during the period of the Congress, certain privileges for receptions and theatres in Paris.

Communications should reach Professor Emile Bréhier, 40 rue de l'Yvette, Paris XVI, not later than February 1, 1937. Programme and further information is obtainable from Dr. R. Bayer, 26 avenue Théophile-Gautier, Paris XVI.

S. V. K.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION

My dear Editor,

I suggest that the distinction between description and explanation is that between values concerning which men agree and values concerning which they differ.

Everyone recognizes the difference between a true and complete statement of facts and a false or incomplete statement; everyone prefers the former. The purely descriptive part of science consists of a series of statements about scientific facts; everyone judges in the same way the value of these statements relative to their alternatives. There is complete agreement concerning the relative value of alternative "descriptions."

But there is complete disagreement concerning the absolute value of facts or, more accurately, their value relative to other things. To the scientist facts have a very great intrinsic importance; the keen curiosity of scientists about facts of every kind is the origin and inspiration of all science. The scientist delights in recording, remembering, and contemplating facts. A bare statement of facts is so complicated that he cannot contemplate it; he seeks therefore rules, relating the facts to each other, which enable him to contemplate facts as a whole. These rules, relating facts to each other and not to anything else, are not merely an explanation of the facts; they are the only possible explanation; they satisfy completely his intellectual desires concerning the part of the universe that is of greatest importance to him.

Others find little or no intrinsic value in facts. If they found no value at all, they would not concern themselves with science; science would be left to scientists and no question would ever arise concerning the value of its "explanations." But facts have a value for them; they have a utilitarian value for everyone; to mathematicians facts are often the starting-point of interesting investigations. (It is a curious circumstance, but for our purpose irrelevant, that mathematicians, in following out arguments suggested by facts, often hit on rules relating facts to each other for which scientists have sought in vain.) They are not content with rules relating facts to each other; they want to relate facts to other things, namely the things in which they find intrinsic value. The explanations of science, just because they are explanations to those with a sense of the intrinsic value of facts, are no explanation at all to those who lack that sense.

The question whether one valuation is right and the other wrong seems to me meaningless; the values concerned are ultimate; there is no common valuation to which both can be referred. I see no harm in philosophers and mathematicians seeking to find in science a significance other than that which scientists attribute to it; indeed, it may actually help science, as does the interest of mathematicians. The harm arises only when philosophers seek to prove that science cannot have for scientists the significance on which depends the very existence of science.

Yours sincerely,

Norman R. Campbell.

Watford,
Herts.
January, 1936.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

My dear Editor,

In the limited space at my disposal, allow me to comment briefly on only one of the issues raised by Professor Hallett in his review of my book *The Philosophy of Spinoza* in *Philosophy* for July 1935.

Professor Hallett objects to my contention that Descartes's description of the contrast between the geometrical method as employed by him in metaphysics and the syllogistic method as employed by the Schoolmen is, on the showing of his own words, nothing but the Aristotelian distinction between a scientific syllogism and a syllogism which is dialectical and contentious. He argues that it is improper to speak of geometrical demonstrations as syllogistic and testifies to his "uncomfortable feeling" which "almost reaches certainty" that I have "not . . . understood the logical principle involved." I dare say that the dogmatism of his assertion and his "uncomfortable feeling" do credit to his supreme faith in his own convictions, but they do not represent the true status of the problem. Aristotle, in fact, did consider geometrical demonstrations as syllogistic and the matter is still a subject of discussion among logicians. Professor Hallett's statement that "no geometrical proof is syllogistic except in incidental features such as the quotation of the authority of a prior truth" reflects the following statement in Joseph's *Introduction to Logic* (ed. 1916), p. 311: "In geometry we never syllogize except when we rely upon the result of a previous demonstration whose steps we do not realize in the case before us." Without going into the question whether even on the basis of Joseph's statement it is wrong to describe Descartes's geometrical method as syllogistic, I need only refer to discussions on the subject in such works as Ueberweg's *System of Logic*, pp. 397 ff.; Sigwart's *Logic*, I, pp. 362 ff., II, p. 190; Erdmann's *Logik* (3rd ed.), pp. 681 ff.; and Joyce's *Principles of Logic*, pp. 186, 199, to show that the matter is not so simple and one-sided as the reviewer imagines. Joyce, on p. 199, states the case as follows: "Several recent logicians have maintained that much of the reasoning employed in mathematics is not syllogistic. . . . We believe this view to be erroneous." Whatever merit or demerit my characterization of Descartes's geometrical method may have, it certainly cannot be impugned on the basis of the argument advanced by Professor Hallett.

Very sincerely yours,
Harry A. Wolfson.

Harvard University.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

During the past term Mr. T. M. Knox, M.A., of Jesus College, Oxford, has delivered an interesting course of lectures on "Philosophy and Practical Life."

The Addresses at the Evening Meetings have been as follows: "God and the Ultimate Values," by the Dean of St. Paul's; "Vice and Illusion," by Professor Gilbert Murray.

Members are asked to take notice that the first of the WRIGHT MEMORIAL LECTURES will be given by Professor Ernest Barker on May 7th at 5.45. Title of the lecture: "The Romantic Factor in Modern Politics."

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The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

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(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.
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Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies, at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C. 1.

[Suggested]

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I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of.....free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be a sufficient discharge for the same.

CONTENTS

PAGE

I. VICE AND ILLUSION: Professor GILBERT MURRAY . . . 259

II. GREAT THINKERS: (VIII) SPINOZA: Professor W. G. DE BURGH 271

III. REASON AND INTUITION: Professor J. L. STOCKS . . . 288

IV. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A PASSAGE IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC:* M. B. FOSTER, M.A. Ph.D. 301

V. THE MIND'S LOVE FOR GOD: K. HENDERSON, M.A., B.Litt. . 309

VI. RUSSELL AND McTAGGART: MARGARET MACDONALD . . . 322

VII. PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY:

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE 336

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY 340

VIII. NEW BOOKS 345

IX. SPINOZA MEMORIALS IN HOLLAND: The Rt. Hon. Sir HERBERT SAMUEL, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.C.L. 380

X. CORRESPONDENCE 382

XI. INSTITUTE NOTES 383

THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Appeal for New Members and Donations

THE Council appeals to members to do all in their power to introduce new members in order to extend the benefits of the Institute and to increase its revenue.

The Institute has no endowments, and its work, which includes lecture courses and meetings for discussion in the various Centres, as well as the conduct of the JOURNAL, cannot be carried on from revenue derived solely from subscriptions of £1 1s. per annum. The Council, therefore, appeals for donations, small or large, from sympathizers with the Institute's aims.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
LONDON AND WOKING